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Evolutionary debunking arguments [EDAs] in moral epistemology generally aim to 
show that what we know or what we have good reason to believe about the impact 
of evolution on the development of human moral psychology threatens the epistemic 
standing of our moral beliefs, and therefore we have a prima facie reason to withhold 
judgment in moral matters. Very often though, this claim is qualified to target only 
meta-ethical theories of a certain stripe. The prime target here has been a strong kind 
of moral realism. In those cases, it is argued that the sceptical conclusion would only 
follow if we assume strong moral realism. In turn, this is then taken to be a strong 
reason for rejecting those theories targeted by the respective EDAs. 
In this thesis, I will look specifically at certain replies to EDAs that have been 
developed on behalf of a strong moral realism. I will argue that the two most 
prominent members of a family of popular responses to EDAs, which I call the 
“standard responses” (in virtue of their popularity), are ill-suited for neutralizing the 
epistemic threat that supposedly arises from evolutionary considerations. 
I will argue that these two standard responses cannot make good on their promise 
that the epistemic threat supposedly arising from evolution can be neutralized, even 
if the debunkers’ empirical story is largely correct, and if we assume a strong moral 
realism. 
It is a plausible desideratum on any satisfying response to EDAs that the response 
should support the claim that evolutionary considerations do not show that our moral 
beliefs are seriously epistemically deficient or that we are seriously epistemically 
deficient for holding them. In other words: a good response to the EDAs should 
show that evolutionary considerations do not suffice to render us epistemically 
criticisable for holding or continuing to hold our moral beliefs. I will argue that the 





First and foremost, I would like to thank my primary supervisor, Alex Miller, for his 
tireless dedication in seeing this project through, for both his attention to detail and 
his keen eye for the larger picture and for helpful feedback and discussion. It is no 
overstatement to say that this project would have been a perfect mess without his 
support. Any remaining messiness is of course entirely my own fault.  
My second supervisor, Greg Dawes, also deserves special mention for going well 
beyond what one could reasonably expect in terms of providing invaluable feedback 
and discussion.  
Thanks to Robin McKenna, whose excellent course “Moral Anti-Realism” (Winter 
2016) at the University of Vienna first raised my interest in evolutionary debunking 
arguments in moral epistemology. Thanks to James Maclaurin for discussing basic 
philosophy of biology-questions with me in the early stages of my research.  
Thanks to the audience of my presentation of material from this thesis at the 2018 
NZAP/AAP-conference in Wellington for their questions and feedback. Many 
thanks to staff and postgrads of the Department of Philosophy at Otago for providing 
quite beneficial feedback to my presentations of material from this thesis (at various 
stages of development) at the departmental postgraduate-conference and at three 
sessions of the weekly postgraduate seminar. Special thanks to Chris Lean and Charles 
Pidgen for good advice, keen observations and for asking the hard-hitting questions. 
Thanks to the Department of Philosophy at Otago as a whole for being friendly and 
supportive throughout my stay in New Zealand. Special thanks to Kirk Michaelian 
and to Chloe Wall for all-around marvelousness (that’s a real word!) in helping me to 
get set up and orient myself in Dunedin and around the University. Thanks to Tiddy 
Smith for providing feedback on parts of my thesis, and for answering countless 
questions about how to best phrase/format things. Thanks to Joe Burke & Finn 
Butler for proof-reading parts of my thesis. 
Thanks to my (both past & currently still present, but soon to be past) office-mates 
(Finn, Joe, Jon & Tiddy) at the Philosophy Dungeon for conversations so enjoyable 
that they have kept my mind from going to pieces (for the most part) during the many 
days (and occasional nights) in the Dungeon. Thanks to Paul Tucek for the countless 
conversations about philosophy we’ve shared over the years. Occasionally, it does feel 
like we have made progress. 
In gratitude, I also recognize that the research for this MA-thesis has been supported 
by the Alan Musgrave Master’s Scholarship in Philosophy. As everyone who has ever 
had the good fortune to almost exclusively dedicate themselves to philosophical 
research for a whole year will surely attest, philosophy often is uniquely frustrating, 
unsettling and difficult. It is also uniquely fun, in a way that is hard to describe and 
communicate to people who have never gotten lost in the vortex of, say, 
contemporary epistemology. I am deeply thankful to the University of Otago and the 
Department of Philosophy at Otago for allowing me to throw myself into that vortex. 
To finish, I’d like to thank my family, and the one’s close to my heart, whose adamant 




  AMS: The Argument from Modal Security. 
  EDA: Evolutionary Debunking Argument.  












0 Introduction ______________________________________________________ 1 
1 Evolutionary Debunking ____________________________________________ 5 
1.1 Introduction ____________________________________________________ 5 
1.2 Two EDAs _____________________________________________________ 5 
1.2.1 Street’s Darwinian Dilemma ____________________________________ 5 
1.2.2 Joyce on the Evolution of Morality ______________________________ 11 
1.3 Key Ideas _____________________________________________________ 14 
1.3.1 Evolutionary Forces as Truth-Irrelevant Influences __________________ 15 
1.3.2 Defeating Justification ________________________________________ 16 
1.3.3 Non-sceptical, non-naturalist moral realism ________________________ 22 
1.3.4 Metaphysical Necessity of Basic Moral Truths ______________________ 24 
1.3.5 Modal Conditions for Knowledge _______________________________ 27 
1.4 Evolution as an Explanatory Challenge ____________________________ 30 
1.4.1 An Account of Undercutting Defeat _____________________________ 31 
1.4.2 An Explanatory Demand ______________________________________ 35 
1.4.3 Independent Means of Confirming Reliability ______________________ 37 
1.4.4 The Epistemological Underpinning ______________________________ 38 
1.4.5 A Generic Explanatory EDA __________________________________ 39 
2 Two Standard Responses to EDAs __________________________________ 43 
2.1 Introduction ___________________________________________________ 43 
2.2 The Argument from Modal Security _______________________________ 45 
2.3 Third-Factor Accounts __________________________________________ 54 
2.4 Summary _____________________________________________________ 62 
3 The Standard Responses as Defeater-Defeaters ________________________ 63 
3.1 Introduction ___________________________________________________ 63 
3.2 Defeater-defeaters or Defeater-deflectors? __________________________ 64 
3.3 A Set of Inconvenient Cases: Larry and Anne ________________________ 68 
3.3.1 The Case of Larry ___________________________________________ 68 
3.3.2 The Case of Anne ___________________________________________ 72 
vii 
3.4 The Defeater-Defeater Option ____________________________________ 76 
3.5 The Defeat Argument ___________________________________________ 85 
4 The Standard Responses as Defeater-Deflectors _______________________ 88 
4.1 Introduction ___________________________________________________ 88 
4.2 The Defeater-Deflector Option ___________________________________ 88 
4.3 The Cases of Larry and Anne Revisited ____________________________ 95 
4.4 The Epistemology of the Standard Responses as Defeater-Deflectors ___ 98 
4.5 Externalist Scepticism About Defeat ______________________________ 107 
4.6 Why the Defeater-Deflector Option is Unsatisfying __________________ 109 
4.7 The Dogmatism Argument _____________________________________ 117 
5 Conclusion _____________________________________________________ 120 
6 Appendices _____________________________________________________ 122 
6.1 Appendix A: Internalism & Externalism about Epistemic Justification & 
Mental State Defeaters ______________________________________________ 122 
6.2 Appendix B: Sensitivity and Safety _______________________________ 124 
6.3 Appendix C: Idealizations ______________________________________ 130 
6.4 Appendix D: Reliability ________________________________________ 135 
6.5 Appendix E: NO DEFEATER __________________________________ 136 
6.6 Appendix F: COGNITION DEFEAT ____________________________ 137 
6.7 Appendix G: BEST EXPLANATION _____________________________ 139 
6.8 Appendix H: INDEPENDENCE CONSTRAINT __________________ 145 
6.9 Appendix I: The Epistemological Underpinning of the Generic EDA 
Revisited _________________________________________________________ 147 






Genealogical debunking arguments in moral epistemology try to call into doubt that 
our moral beliefs constitute moral knowledge. They try to do so by attempting to 
establish the claim that what we know or what we have good reason to believe about 
the causal origin of our moral beliefs reflects negatively on the epistemic standing of 
those beliefs. A causal factor that has been the subject of intense debate recently is 
evolution.  
Evolutionary debunking arguments [EDAs] in moral epistemology1 generally aim to 
show that what we know or what we have good reason to believe about the impact 
of evolution on the development of human moral psychology threatens the epistemic 
standing of our moral beliefs, and therefore we have a prima facie reason to withhold 
judgment in moral matters.2 Very often though, this claim is qualified so as to apply 
only to meta-ethical theorists of a certain stripe. The prime target here has been a 
strong kind of moral realism. In those cases, it is argued that the sceptical conclusion 
would only follow if we assume strong moral realism. In turn, this is then taken to be 
a strong reason for rejecting those theories targeted by the respective EDAs. EDAs 
are thus often construed not as arguments for moral scepticism as such, but as 
arguments against strong kinds of moral realism. Strictly speaking, what these more 
restricted arguments try to debunk, is not morality, but a strong moral realism. 
In this thesis, I will look specifically at certain replies to EDAs that have been 
developed on behalf of a strong moral realism. I will argue that certain popular 
responses to EDAs, which I call the “standard responses” (in virtue of their 
                                              
1 Unless indicated otherwise, the label “EDA” will refer to EDAs in moral epistemology 
throughout (as opposed to e.g., EDAs in religious epistemology).  
2 I will assume throughout that our moral judgments are correctly conceived of as expressing 
beliefs (or belief-like states), that e.g., like other beliefs can be properly assessed along 
epistemic dimensions. This has been disputed by some non-cognitivist meta-ethicists (cf. 
Ayer 1946 & 1954). An interesting sub-debate concerns the question of whether non-
cognitivist meta theories might nevertheless be potentially subject to EDAs, cf. Joyce (2013) 
and Street (2011), and the reply to Street by Gibbard (2011). 
2 
popularity), are ill-suited for neutralizing the epistemic threat that supposedly arises 
from evolutionary considerations.3 
Though my arguments may well also apply to other members of the family of standard 
responses, I will be specifically concerned with the perhaps most prominent members 
of this family. These are the so called “third-factor” accounts or theories, developed 
and defended by several philosophers (cf. e.g. Enoch 2010 & 2011; Wielenberg 2010), 
and the argument from modal security [AMS] developed by Justin Clarke-Doane 
(2015 & 2016).  
There are empirically-minded replies to EDAs, which e.g. argue that what we know 
or what we have good reason to believe about the impact of evolution on the 
development of human moral psychology does not support the sceptical conclusion 
that the debunkers are aiming for, even if we assume a strong moral realism (cf. 
appendix C).  
But the standard responses are importantly distinct from these empirically-minded 
replies: these standard responses promise that even if the debunkers’ empirical story 
is largely correct, and assuming strong moral realism, the epistemic threat supposedly 
arising from evolution can be neutralized. So, even if EDAs do not succumb to the 
empirically-minded responses levelled against them, these responses promise to 
protect strong moral realism from the charge of leading to moral scepticism. This 
promise is what makes the standard responses interesting.4 
I will argue that these responses cannot make good on this promise. Assume strong 
moral realism is true. And assume a plausible desideratum on any response to EDAs: 
any satisfying response should support the claim that evolutionary considerations do 
not show that our moral beliefs are seriously epistemically deficient or that we are 
seriously epistemically deficient for holding them. In brief: a good response to the 
                                              
3 This is the same family of responses to EDAs that have recently been called “first-order 
replies” by Morton (2018: p. 2). Locke (2014: p. 221, p. 227) calls this same family of replies 
“minimalist”. These are replies which crucially assume substantive moral claims. The family 
of first-order replies/ minimalist replies/ standard responses also includes responses which 
are somewhat more direct, and certainly less intricate, than the responses I discuss here (cf. 
Dworkin 1996; Nagel 2012: p. 105; Parfit 2011: Chapter 32, pp. 493f., p. 531). 
4 If, on the other hand, the standard responses would have to rely on the success of the 
empirically-minded replies to EDAs, this dependence would render them superfluous. This 
point will come up again a few times.  
3 
EDAs should show that evolutionary considerations do not suffice to render us 
epistemically criticisable for holding or continuing to hold our moral beliefs. I will 
argue that the considerations offered by the two standard responses are insufficient 
for satisfying this desideratum.  
I should foreclose a potential source of confusion right from the start, concerning 
both the focus and the methodology of my investigation. In this thesis, I am solely 
concerned with a limited issue concerning the epistemology of evolutionary 
debunking:  
Are certain standard responses to EDAs successful in their own right (i.e., without 
largely depending on the success of other replies)?  
The topic I investigate in the four substantive chapters of this thesis is whether we 
can find an epistemologically respectable epistemic challenge to our moral beliefs that 
arises from making the discovery that evolution has influenced the moral beliefs of 
contemporary humans, or, more to the point, that evolution has influenced our (i.e., your 
and my) moral beliefs in some way – an epistemologically respectable challenge that is 
resistant to the above two standard responses. This way of framing the investigation 
is not entirely neutral, as it builds on a couple of idealizing assumptions concerning 
the nature and the scope of evolutionary explanations.5 
With this point out of the way, here is the plan for the thesis: 
Chapter (1): My task in this chapter is twofold. First, I intend to provide useful 
context on evolutionary debunking and introduce a few key ideas, which are necessary 
for the presentation and evaluation of the two standard responses. Secondly, I will 
construct a generic EDA that is based on a clear and reasonably plausible 
epistemological foundation, and that can serve as a foil for the two standard 
responses. 
Chapter (2): Here I present the two standard responses, the third-factor accounts 
and the AMS. These two responses offer considerations meant to neutralize the 
epistemic threat supposedly arising from EDAs. Both responses suppose that the 
epistemic threat in need of neutralizing is roughly that evolutionary considerations 
                                              
5 For a statement of these idealizing assumptions, and for some motivation for making these 
assumptions in the context of the current project, see appendix C. 
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might show that our moral beliefs are subject to a problematic kind of epistemic luck. 
And both responses crucially assume the truth of our common-sense moral beliefs. 
Chapter (3): In this chapter, I intend to do three things. I want to elucidate what it 
is for a consideration to counter-act or neutralize a supposed defeater. Next, I will 
consider one possible option for how an alleged defeater can be neutralized (the 
defeater-defeater option). And I will assess the success of the standard responses, if 
we understand these responses as defeater-defeaters (=conditions or considerations 
which are meant to reinstate lost justification via counter-acting an existing defeater 
for a belief). Ultimately, I will draw on recent work by Andrew Moon (2016) to argue 
that the two standard responses to EDAs are unsuccessful if they are regarded as 
defeater-defeaters. The reason for this is that it is clearly epistemically wrong to 
continue to assume the truth of your belief in the presence of a defeater for that very 
belief.  
Chapter (4): In this chapter, I will investigate how third-factor responses and the 
AMS fare if we understand them as defeater-deflectors (=conditions or 
considerations which are meant to prevent the occurrence of defeat in the first place). 
I will argue that even if the standard responses succeed in protecting our moral beliefs’ 
justification, they are nonetheless deeply unsatisfying, as they recommend a kind of 
doxastic behaviour that is epistemically vicious. Along the way, I hope to show that 
even getting to this (still deeply unsatisfying) result requires that we buy into a highly 
controversial epistemological account of epistemic justification and defeat.  
I will then summarize my results in the Conclusion.  
The Appendices (A-I) to this thesis contain material that clarifies background 
assumptions that underlie my reasoning in chapters (1-4), that provides additional 
detail or lends some further motivation to certain points. Throughout the text, I will 
refer the interested reader to these appendices, when I lack the space to elaborate on 
the relevant points in the main body of this thesis or when doing so would side-track 
us. The material contained in these appendices is (strictly speaking) for the most part 
dispensable to the main line of argument I develop. Nevertheless, I hope that this 




1 EVOLUTIONARY DEBUNKING 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
My task in this chapter will be to set the stage for the line of reasoning constructed in 
the following chapters. In sections (1.2) and (1.3), I will introduce two influential 
EDAs and a few key ideas, that we need to have a firm grip on to discuss and critically 
assess the two prominent replies to EDAs, which will be presented in the next 
chapter. In section (1.4), I construct a generic EDA, which I try to base on a clear and 
plausible epistemological foundation and which can serve as a foil for the two 
standard responses.  
1.2 TWO EDAS 
In this section, I will briefly present two influential EDAs to give us a better initial 
idea about what evolutionary debunking is about. In section (1.2.1), I will present 
Sharon Street’s Darwinian dilemma. In section (1.2.2), I will present a sketch of 
Richard Joyce’s EDA. Street’s and Joyce’s EDAs were both instrumental in sparking 
the recent explosion of interest in evolution in moral epistemology and in shaping the 
subsequent debate, and so are well worth our attention here as important points of 
reference for the debate on evolutionary debunking. 
1.2.1 STREET’S DARWINIAN DILEMMA 
Street (2006) argues that a certain kind of meta-ethical realism is not easily compatible 
with the theory of evolution. This is due to the Darwinian dilemma Street sets up for 
this kind of realism. Since Street also argues that anti-realist theories can circumvent 
the Darwinian dilemma, this seems to make anti-realism the superior option to 
realism.  
The target of Street’s argument is a robust kind of meta-ethical realism.6 Such realist 
views hold that there are at least some normative/moral facts or truths which hold 
independently of our actual or hypothetical evaluative attitudes. We might call this 
                                              
6 Street’s Darwinian dilemma targets not just realism about morality, but rather realism about 
practical normativity. For the sake of convenience, I have mostly written as if her argument 
was more narrowly focused, because that won’t make a difference in this essay, and it allows 
for an easier comparison between Street’s EDA and other EDAs. 
6 
thesis the “stance-independence of morality”.7 The stance-independence of morality 
entails that moral truths are not constituted or made true by anyone’s conative or 
cognitive stance with respect to them. Proponents of this thesis hold that the truths 
in the domain of morality are not made true “by virtue of their ratification from within 
any given actual or hypothetical perspective” (Shafer-Landau 2003: p. 15) 
The opening premise of the Darwinian dilemma then goes as follows: 
The Darwinian Premise. Evolutionary factors have had a great (albeit indirect) 
influence on the content of our evaluative attitudes. 
This premise comprises the empirical part of Street’s argument.8  
Street argues that making certain kinds of evaluative judgments tends to result in 
having higher chances for reproductive success (e.g. “The fact that something would 
promote one’s survival is a reason to do it”), whereas making other kinds of evaluative 
judgements tends to result in lower chances for reproductive success (e.g. “The fact 
that something would promote one’s survival is a reason against it”) (Street 2006: p. 
114). Evaluative judgments of the kind that tend to result in higher chances for 
reproductive success are among the most deeply and widely held judgements we 
actually hold (ibid.: p. 115). Furthermore, there’s a striking continuity between human 
                                              
7 This is Street’s own specific way of drawing that line (2006: pp. 110-111). One should keep 
in mind that this is not the only possible way of making the distinction between realism and 
anti-realism, and it is probably not the most common one. A more common way might be 
via asking the two questions of “Do moral/normative claims (that imply or presuppose the 
instantiation of a moral property) purport to report facts in light of which they are true or 
false?” and “Are some moral/normative claims actually true?” (Sayre-McCord 2016). If you 
answer “Yes” to each of those questions, then you are typically classified as a realist.  
As a consequence of Street’s somewhat unorthodox taxonomy, some philosophers who 
regard themselves as realists in some other sense (for instance, because they do hold that 
moral/normative judgments are both truth-apt and some are actually true) would be counted 
as anti-realists following Street’s taxonomy, and therefore their views are not targeted by 
Street’s argument.  
Street has defended her taxonomy by arguing that her way of making the distinction between 
realism and anti-realism revolves around a crucial point of contention. This is the point of 
whether or not at least some moral/normative facts or truths hold independently of all our 
evaluative attitudes, and therefore of whether or not these moral/normative facts and truths 
are objectively binding (Street 2008: p. 223). Street holds that this point marks out a crucial 
divide between meta-ethical theorists. The views of those theorists, who assert that some 
moral/normative truths and facts are objectively binding, are targeted by Street’s Darwinian 
argument. 
8 Street adds the caveat that her conclusion is conditional on her assumptions about evolution 
being true.  
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evaluative judgements and the more basic evaluative tendencies of other animals, 
especially those animals that are most closely related to humans (ibid.: pp. 117-119). 
Two complications arise from the opening premise of the argument: (a) Our pre-
reflective tendencies to act in certain ways are evolutionarily prior to our making of 
full-fledged reflective judgements. Moreover, (b) tendencies to make certain 
evaluative judgments are not genetically hereditary, and therefore this trait cannot 
evolve through natural selection.9 
The gist of Street’s dealing with (a) and (b) is that the influence of evolution on the 
content of human evaluative judgments is indirect: Had the general content of our 
basic evaluative tendencies been very different, then the general content of our full-
fledged evaluative judgments would have been very different. Therefore, according 
to Street there is a loose correspondence between evolutionary impact and human 
evaluative judgements (ibid.: p. 120). So much for the empirical part of Street’s 
argument.  
Given the Darwinian premise, the realist must take a stand on the relation between 
(i) the evolutionary forces that have had a tremendous influence on the content of 
our evaluative attitudes, and (ii) the attitude-independent moral/normative truths or 
facts posited by the realist.  
And this leads to the Darwinian dilemma (cf. ibid.: p. 121): 
First Horn DD. The realist denies a relation between the influence of evolutionary 
forces on our evaluative judgments and moral/normative truths. But this leads to 
scepticism.  
Second Horn DD. The realist asserts the relation, but then she would have to offer 
an account of how the influencing evolutionary forces and independent 
                                              
9 As Mogensen (2016b) points out, the claim that traits need to be genetically hereditary to 
evolve through natural selection is dubious:  
“Selection occurs when the members of a population vary in ways that lead some to survive 
and reproduce at greater rates than others, provided that those traits which lead to increased 
reproductive success are reliably transmitted across generations. The exact mechanism by 
which favoured traits are transmitted is not specified by the definition of natural 
selection…Thus, traits which are transmitted across generations as a matter of social learning 
can in principle evolve by selection and constitute adaptations.” (p. 1808) 
Thanks to James Maclaurin for also raising this point in conversation. 
8 
moral/normative truths are linked. But even the best realist account on this link 
is scientifically flawed. 
To the first horn: If the realist denies the relation this leads to scepticism. Why? Well, 
if the realist denies a relation, then our evaluative judgments (which have been greatly 
influenced by evolutionary forces) are most likely to be false or even if they were true, 
they would be true by complete happenstance (ibid.: p. 122). Of course, the realist 
here is free to assert that indeed our evaluative judgments are true by coincidence. 
However, Street argues that this is highly implausible, given the range of conceptually 
possible alternative options. Street compares this with trying to get to Bermuda by 
jumping in a boat and letting the tide and the wind take you where they may. It is 
always possible that you will get to Bermuda, but if you do, it will be an astounding 
accident. In addition, the question then arises, if there is no correlation between the 
moral/normative truth and our moral/normative judgments, and our judgments just 
happen to be true, why are we justified in holding them? Justification and knowledge 
are commonly thought to exclude epistemically lucky coincidences.  
If the realist were to reply that we could still get back in touch with moral truths by 
rational reflection, Street counters this by stating that the success of rational reflection 
depends on not starting the reflection process with largely false judgments (cf. ibid.: 
pp. 123-124). Rational reflection works via assessing a given judgment with respect to 
its consistency with other judgments. If we were to start the reflection process with 
largely false judgments, then we could only assess false judgments in terms of other 
false judgments. Then rational reflection is not going to get us closer to the truth. 
Therefore, if the realist denies the relation between the evolutionary forces that have 
influenced the content of our evaluative judgments and independent moral truths, 
then this leads to scepticism.10 
To the second horn of the dilemma: If the realist asserts the relation, she needs an 
account on how the evolutionary forces that influenced our evaluative judgments and 
                                              
10 As Selim Berker has pointed out, Street does not argue against scepticism, so the realist is 
free to opt for asserting that there’s no relation between our normative judgments and the 
normative truth and for thereby accepting scepticism (cf. Berker 2014: p.11). However, as 
Berker himself comments, this is unlikely to strike most realists as an attractive avenue for a 
rejoinder to the Darwinian dilemma. 
9 
the independent moral truths are linked. However, the most plausible account the 
realist can offer is scientifically flawed. The best account the realist can offer is the 
tracking account:  
The Tracking Account. Evolutionary forces have tended to make our evaluative 
judgments track the attitude-independent evaluative truths or facts because 
making true evaluative judgments (or proto-versions of these) promoted our 
ancestors’ reproductive success (ibid.: pp. 125-126).  
Since the tracking account is intended to be a scientific explanation, it can be assessed 
by the same scientific criteria (parsimony, clarity, explanatory power) as competing 
explanations. The trouble for the realist is that with respect to all three criteria, the 
tracking account fares worse than an alternative account, the so called “adaptive link” 
account: 
The Adaptive-Link Account. Evolutionary forces have pushed us towards 
making certain evaluative judgments because (i) having the basic evaluative 
tendencies, from which these judgments have developed, made our ancestors 
more likely to act in accordance with them, and (ii) it promoted reproductive 
success to act in those ways in our ancestors’ circumstances (cf. ibid.: pp. 127-
133).  
The adaptive link account is more parsimonious because it can explain everything that 
the tracking account can, without additionally having to posit the existence of 
independent moral truths. The adaptive link account is clearer because it works 
without having to rely on independent evaluative truths, and it is highly unclear why 
exactly it would have been more evolutionary advantageous to track these truths. And 
the adaptive link account offers more explanatory force because it explains certain 
10 
facts about our way of making evaluative judgements that the tracking account can 
say nothing about.11, 12  
Since with respect to these three crucial criteria the best account available to the realist 
is worse than an alternative account, the realist cannot plausibly assert the connection 
while staying a realist.  
Given the Darwinian dilemma, realism about values cannot be easily reconciled with 
the theory of evolution. What is left to do for Street then is to argue that her own 
constructivist account can evade the Darwinian dilemma. Now, a complex of various 
causal forces (one of these forces is evolution) brings about our basic evaluative 
judgements. Consequentially, Street’s constructivist will assert that there is a relation 
between evolutionary forces and evaluative truths (ibid.: p. 153).  
The genesis of the basic forms of our evaluative judgements will be explained via the 
plausible adaptive link-account (ibid.: p. 153). Evolutionary causes (among other 
factors playing a role) thus give us a base set of evaluative judgements. We can then 
go on in refining these basic evaluative judgments by assessing them through rational 
reflection, testing the consistency of a given judgement with respect to other 
judgements. The anti-realist (i.e., Street or the Street-style constructivist) now just 
defines the evaluative truth (or the truth of our evaluative judgements) as being the 
result of such a process (taking basic evaluative judgements and applying rational 
                                              
11 For example, it explains why we tend to make certain evaluative judgments (e.g., “That 
someone is not part of our group is a reason to treat that person worse”) that we then would 
reject on reflection. That explanation would hold that making these judgments promoted 
ways of acting that were advantageous with respect to survival and reproduction in our 
ancestors’ circumstances. Furthermore, the account explains why we don’t make certain 
evaluative judgements (e.g., “That something decreases one’s chances of survival is a reason 
to do it”). 
12 Her comparison between the tracking and the adaptive link-accounts raises a host of 
questions that Street unfortunately does not address. For instance, are there evaluative 
judgements we regard as true even on reflection, yet they wouldn’t obviously have been 
evolutionarily advantageous? In addition, are there evaluative judgements we regard as false 
on reflection, yet they would plausibly have been evolutionarily advantageous? This boils 
down to the question whether we can give an evolutionary explanation of the content of 
conventional morality. Second, why can’t the tracking account say e.g., that we don’t make 
the judgement that plants are more valuable than human beings because making false 
evaluative judgements was evolutionarily disadvantageous (in the same way that making true 
evaluative judgements was advantageous)? Thanks to Robin McKenna for raising these 
points.  
11 
reflection to them) (ibid.: pp. 153-154). In conclusion, since anti-realism fits better 
with the theory of evolution than realism, that speaks in favour of anti-realism.  
1.2.2 JOYCE ON THE EVOLUTION OF MORALITY 
Whereas Street thinks, moral scepticism only follows if we assume a strong form of 
moral realism, Joyce (2016a: pp. 145-146) doubts that meta-ethical presuppositions 
that turn on endorsing or rejecting the stance-independence of morality can make a 
difference to the debunking capacities of evolutionary explanations vis-à-vis our 
moral beliefs.13 His own EDA is not an argument that primarily targets any particular 
meta-ethical view such as a robust version of realism. Rather, Joyce’s EDA is an 
argument for moral scepticism, i.e. the claim that all our moral beliefs are unjustified 
(ibid.: p. 146). 
Furthermore, while Street proposes that evolutionary forces have heavily influenced 
the content of our evaluative beliefs, Joyce (2006) advances an evolutionary 
explanation for our tendency to make moral judgements of any sort. He supports an 
account of the evolutionary origin of the human moral faculty termed “moral 
nativism”. According to moral nativism, humans possess a “specialized innate 
mechanism (or series of mechanisms)” that “comes prepared to categorize the world 
in morally normative terms” (Joyce 2006: pp. 180-181). In other words, we humans 
have an innate tendency to make moral judgments.14 
The empirical component of Joyce’s argument is the claim that this innate moral sense 
is a feature shared by all normal humans combined with an evolutionary explanation 
of why humans have this innate moral sense.  
This evolutionary explanation holds that moral thinking was selectively advantageous 
to our ancestors because it reliably enhanced cooperative behaviour in our ancestors’ 
                                              
13 This does not mean that other meta-ethical presuppositions might not be able to make a 
difference in this respect. Consider for instance the following line of thought: moral 
judgments can only be evaluated in epistemic terms if they are fit to express beliefs. A non-
cognitivist meta-ethicist, who rejects this assumption, therefore seemingly has an easy way 
of sidestepping EDAs. An interesting debate has developed concerning the question of 
whether non-cognitivist views are potentially also subject to EDAs (Gibbard 2011; Joyce 
2013; Street 2011). 
14 For an up-dated and detailed discussion of the troubles with defining “moral nativism” 
and defending a version of the view, cf. Joyce (2016c: pp. 122-141) and Sripada (2008).  
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circumstances.15 Our ancestors’ capacity for moral thought allowed them to conceive 
of certain behaviours (e.g., helping someone else) as being required in such a strong 
sense that this requirement could not be trumped by other interests (which e.g., called 
for non-cooperation) (Joyce 2006: pp. 60-63). Jessica Isserow sums up the bottom 
line of Joyce’s empirical hypothesis nicely:  
Moral faculties therefore earned their evolutionary keep by enabling individuals to 
block competing interests that would interfere with prosocial motivation from the 
deliberative sphere—they functioned as devices of “personal 
commitment”…Given that prosocial behaviour is often costly, moral faculties 
also came to serve as signs of interpersonal commitment; they offered early 
humans a means by which to convincingly signal their prosocial dispositions to 
others. (2018: p. 5) 
A noteworthy feature of this explanation is that it neither explicitly appeals to nor 
requires the assumption that there actually exist any moral truths or facts.16 As Joyce 
writes, “…whether we assume that the concepts ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ succeed in 
denoting properties in the world…the plausibility of the hypothesis on how moral 
judgments evolved remains unaffected” (2006: p. 183). We might call this the 
“INDEPENDENCE THESIS”: 
INDEPENDENCE THESIS. The plausibility of the evolutionary explanation 
of why we have a propensity for making moral judgments is independent of the 
assumption that any of our ancestors’ moral judgments were true.  
As Joyce (2013) notes, the INDEPENDENCE THESIS does not hold across the 
board for all kinds of evolutionary explanations, i.e. sometimes the best evolutionary 
                                              
15 Furthermore, Joyce writes that apart from their capacity for moralized thought, humans 
also have prosocial inclinations that dispose us to cooperate with others (2006: pp. 47-51). 
But these inclinations fall short of reliably assuring cooperation, which is the reason for the 
need to develop a capacity for moral thought that goes “above and beyond a suite of 
emotional dispositions” (Isserow 2018: p. 5). 
16 But what if you endorse a meta-ethical theory that holds that the moral facts are reducible 
to whatever improves social cooperation (or something in that vicinity)? Wouldn’t Joyce’s 
claim be false on the assumption that a version of moral naturalism is true? This is correct, 
and that is why a considerable part of Ch. 6 of Joyce (2006) is dedicated to arguing against 
naturalism. For more on moral naturalism and EDAs, cf. also Barkhausen (2016) and Locke 
(2014: pp. 225-227). 
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explanation for a certain trait will classify this trait as truth-tracking. Take e.g., the case 
of humans possibly having an adaptive mechanism for distinguishing faces from other 
visual stimuli. The best evolutionary explanation for the face-identifying faculty 
classifies it as truth-tracking (i.e., a mechanism of this sort will not be fitness-
enhancing if it is does not produce accurate beliefs), while Joyce contends that the 
best explanation for the moral faculty does not (2013: p. 353). In the case of the face-
identifying faculty, the reason why having this trait might increase the fitness of its 
bearers directly refers to the fact that this faculty is truth tracking. Plausibly, the ability 
to distinguish human faces from other visual stimuli confers a selective advantage on 
its bearers (if it does) only if it tracks the relevant truths about human faces. In the 
case of our moral faculty on the other hand, Joyce holds that our ancestors’ propensity 
for making moral judgments plausibly conferred a selective advantage upon them 
independently of whether those judgments track the moral truths.  
Herein Joyce echoes Michael Ruse (1986) who argued that morality serves its adaptive 
function by strengthening our motivation for social cooperation through seeming to 
be imbued with a kind of external prescriptivity (1986: p. 103). That is the adaptive 
importance of the objectivity with which moral prescriptions are infused. However, 
this objectivity is an adaptive illusion (ibid.: p. 253).  
Ruse argues for this claim with an implicit appeal to parsimony: once we have 
explained why morality seems to be objective, there is simply no further call for 
explaining it in terms of positing objective moral facts (Joyce 2013: p. 356). 
Apparently, the evolutionary explanation works perfectly fine without our positing 
the existence of these facts. Therefore, the INDEPENDENCE THESIS seems to 
hold for the evolutionary explanation of our moral beliefs.  
This has epistemic consequences. Plausibly, a belief’s justification depends on it 
standing in a certain relation to the fact it represents. If evidence supports moral 
nativism, then this seems to be a confirmation that our moral beliefs have their origin 
in a process that is not set up to track the truth of the beliefs it produces. 
Joyce claims that this undermines the epistemic standing of our moral beliefs, as this 
discovery is relevantly like the discovery that a few years ago you have taken a pill, 
which made you form lots of beliefs about Napoleon, and without having taken the 
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pill you would not have formed any beliefs concerning Napoleon at all (2006: p. 181). 
Upon making this discovery, your beliefs about Napoleon lose all the justification 
they previously might have enjoyed. After all, you lack any reason to think that this 
belief-forming method relates your Napoleon-beliefs to their subject matter in an 
appropriate and reliable way. And this makes that method untrustworthy.  
Joyce thinks that similarly, upon discovering the evolutionary origin of our moral 
thinking, our moral beliefs lose all the justification that our beliefs might have enjoyed 
before (2013: p. 353). Given the evolutionary explanation of our moral beliefs, we too 
lack any reason to think that our moral belief-forming methods relate our moral 
beliefs to their subject matter in a reliable way. Therefore, it seems that this shows 
our beliefs to be the product of an untrustworthy method. In this way, Joyce aims to 
establish a kind of moral scepticism, by arguing that given moral nativism, our moral 
beliefs are unjustified.17 
1.3 KEY IDEAS 
In this section, I will introduce and explain several concepts, which are important to 
my project. In section (1.3.1), I will talk about the kind of evolutionary explanation 
involved in most EDAs. In section (1.3.2), I will talk about defeating epistemic 
justification. In section (1.3.3), I will present the favourite target of many EDAs, non-
sceptical, non-naturalist moral realism. In sections (1.3.4) -(1.3.5) I will then present 
ideas which are integral to understand the two standard responses (especially Clarke-
Doane’s modal security-argument).  
  
                                              
17 Joyce originally labelled the result of his EDA (combined with arguments against moral 
naturalism that can be found in the last chapter of Joyce (2006)) an error theoretic conclusion 
(2006: p. 223). This was motivated by his view that an error theory of morality might be 
understood as the disjunction of two accounts. That means an error theory denotes either 
the view that all moral judgements are false or the view that all moral judgements are 
unjustified. In a more recent publication (2013: pp. 354-355), Joyce recants this position for 
the following reason. Suppose moral scepticism is true, then all moral beliefs are unjustified. 
This claim is consistent with our moral judgments being true. Thus, moral scepticism is 
consistent with a (sceptical) version of moral realism. Hence, moral scepticism does not 
suffice to establish the truth of an error theoretic conclusion. In turn, Joyce suggests a new 
error theoretic argument that turns on the explanatory impotence of objective moral facts 
(2013: pp. 355-363). 
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1.3.1 EVOLUTIONARY FORCES AS TRUTH-IRRELEVANT INFLUENCES 
EDAs hold that evolutionary explanations challenge moral knowledge (or they 
challenge moral knowledge given that we assume a certain meta-ethical view). 
Subsequently, a good point with which to start the discussion is: what kind of 
evolutionary explanation is involved in those arguments? 
The bulk of contemporary EDAs have focused on explanations in terms of natural 
selection: i.e., beneficial effects on reproductive fitness explain the prevalence or 
existence of a certain trait (Mogensen 2014: p. 10; the EDAs due to Joyce and Street 
presented above are prominent examples here).18 In biology, this kind of explanation 
is called a “functional explanation”. This is an explanation of why certain organisms 
have certain traits rather than some conceivable alternatives by appealing to the 
reproductive advantages of having these traits rather than alternatives for those 
organisms’ ancestors (Mogensen 2014: p. 10). For example, in explaining why certain 
birds display migratory behaviour we might cite the ways in which spending different 
seasons in different locations was advantageous to the bird’s ancestors.19  
Now, many EDAs appeal to functional explanations of our moral beliefs for the 
following reason: as Mogensen puts it, they are “narrowly focused on the issue of 
functional truth-irrelevance” (Mogensen 2014: p. 19). In other words, many 
debunkers argue that evolutionary explanations are debunking because they provide 
evidence for the claim that our moral belief forming mechanisms are not connected 
to the moral truths in the right kind of way, since (i) our moral belief forming 
mechanisms were selected for on account of their tendency to produce reproductive 
fitness-enhancing beliefs (or belief-like states). And (ii), these advantages in terms of 
reproductive fitness are explanatorily independent of the accuracy or truth-conduciveness 
of these beliefs.  
The general idea behind these prominent EDAs thus is that if the origin of our moral 
beliefs is explained in a way that is truth-irrelevant, then this should significantly reduce 
                                              
18 The notable exception here is Andreas Mogensen’s EDA (2014; 2016b; 2017). His 
argument relies on an explanation of morality in terms of our evolutionary inheritance, a 
phylogenetic explanation, and not on the viability of an explanation of our moral beliefs in 
terms of natural selection. 
19 I take the example from Levy & Levy (2016: p. 2). 
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our confidence that these moral beliefs are true. These EDAs are therefore driven by 
the (apparent) insight that an evolutionary explanation in terms of natural selection 
threatens the prior justification our moral beliefs might have enjoyed by showing how 
our moral belief forming mechanisms have been shaped by forces that have not 
primed these mechanisms to produce accurate beliefs.  
1.3.2 DEFEATING JUSTIFICATION 
EDAs try to establish the point that the evolutionary explanation of our moral beliefs 
reflects negatively on the epistemic justification for those beliefs. It locates the 
epistemological threat of evolutionary considerations specifically with the notion of 
epistemic justification. I now want to shed some light on how evolutionary 
considerations are meant to take away the justification for our moral beliefs. A few 
brief remarks are in order here.  
First, assume a belief of yours constitutes knowledge. Then we remove epistemic 
justification from this belief. Removing justification is sufficient for making it the case 
that your belief no longer constitutes knowledge. This is the reason why I am 
interested in epistemic justification in this thesis. So, I am interested in epistemic 
justification as a property of beliefs – not of believers or of propositions (cf. Littlejohn 
2012: p. 5). Epistemic justification, as I am interested in it here, is about whether a 
belief is justifiably held. And this is epistemologically interesting, because I assume that 
justification in this sense is necessary for knowledge.20 
Secondly, it should be emphasized that justification is not the only focus of epistemic 
evaluation, e.g., we can also assess an agent’s epistemic standing directly in terms of 
knowledge or in terms of the agent exhibiting certain epistemic virtues or vices in her 
doxastic behaviour or in terms of her understanding etc. This point is important 
because appreciating this lets us see that in principle at least, a debunking argument 
                                              
20 So, I will use the term “justification” to refer to a property that is possessed strictly 
speaking not by believers, but by beliefs. On this way of using the term, there is only a derivative 
sense in which believers are justified, i.e. in virtue of believing justifiably (=holding a belief 
that is justified). To avoid baroque syntax, in a couple of instances I will write a bit more 
loosely, but nevertheless, the property of justification I am interested in throughout is always 
the one that is in the first instance a property of beliefs. 
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could also zoom in on an area of epistemic evaluation different from epistemic 
justification.  
Thirdly, assume that epistemic justification is tied up with the normative and deontic 
notions of what we ought to believe and what we are permitted to believe: Being 
justified in believing that p is a necessary condition for being permitted to believe that 
p and for it being true that you ought to believe that p (Mogensen 2014: p. 6). 
Therefore, if you are not justified in believing that p, you are not permitted to believe 
that p, and it is not the case that you ought to believe that p. Furthermore, on the 
assumption that if you are not permitted to believe that p, then you ought not to 
believe that p, it follows then that if you are not justified in believing that p, you are 
not permitted to believe that p, and if you are not permitted to believe that p, then 
you ought not to believe that p. 
Why is it the case that the debunking potential of evolutionary considerations 
specifically has enjoyed so much attention in recent philosophical discussion? It seems 
plausible, that this is due to a “felt possibility that we may be forced to make 
substantial revisions in our moral outlook in light of the new discoveries about the 
evolutionary origins of our moral beliefs” (Mogensen 2014: p. 6). And as Mogensen 
points out in the same passage, since epistemic justification is tied up with what we 
ought to believe and what we are permitted to believe, understanding EDAs in terms 
of defeating justification accounts nicely for this. 
The point of EDAs as they are usually understood is then to establish the claim that 
we are not justified in holding our moral beliefs and are therefore not permitted to 
believe them and ought not to believe them (or they try to establish a qualified version 
of this claim that is conditional on the truth of the meta-ethical view targeted).  
We can understand the epistemological threat posed by evolution according to the 
EDAs in terms of epistemic defeat of a belief’s justification. What is epistemic defeat, 
and what are defeaters? 
Generally, the defeasibility of a belief refers to the belief’s liability to lose some or all of 
its putative positive epistemic status, or to having this status downgraded in some 
particular way (Sudduth 2008). A belief that p can be defeasibly justified in the sense that 
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this belief enjoys justification (or some level of justification) in the absence of 
information that counteracts the reasons for believing that p. 
A defeater is now roughly a condition or consideration that gives us a defeasible reason 
to suspend belief or reduce our confidence in a proposition that we would otherwise 
have been justified in believing (Mogensen 2014: p. 7). Since defeaters are defeasible 
reasons to withhold belief, they can themselves be defeated by conditions or 
considerations referred to as defeater-defeaters. These might themselves be defeated by 
defeater-defeater-defeaters, and so on.  
Usually it is held that there are at least two distinct classes of defeaters: rebutting or 
overriding defeaters and undercutting or undermining defeaters.  
A rebutting or overriding defeater for your belief that p is a reason for believing the 
negation of p, or for believing a proposition that is incompatible with p being true 
(Pollock 1986: p. 38). 
An undermining or undercutting defeater for your belief is instead a reason that attacks 
the connection between your belief p and your grounds for believing that p, it is e.g., 
a reason to doubt the trustworthiness of your grounds for belief or the method by 
which it was produced.21 
From what I have said so far, it should be clear that EDAs do not supply us with a 
rebutting defeater: They do not give us a direct reason to believe that any of our moral 
beliefs are false. For all these arguments tell us, they all could be true (as they stand, 
the EDAs presented in section (1.2) above are perfectly consistent with the truth of 
our moral beliefs).22, 23 
                                              
21 There are also hybrid-defeaters, i.e. defeaters that are both undermining and rebutting. In 
some cases, it may be that a rebutting defeater is also undermining. If a certain belief-forming 
process of mine gives me a wrong result, if I have no independent reason to think that this 
was due to a random error and this process does not have a sufficient track record of success, 
then this seems to give me (some) evidence, that the process is systematically biased towards 
error, i.e. I receive an undermining defeater (Mogensen 2014: p. 7).  
22 This point is important to emphasize, as EDAs would appear to be instances of a genetic 
fallacy (=inferring the falsity of a claim from its origin), if one were to hold that they show 
our moral beliefs to be false.  
23 In the context of the debate on peer disagreement, it is often assumed that discovering 
that somebody (who does not seem to be irrational or who is even on par with you 
epistemically speaking) disagrees with you can give you a specific kind additional evidence 
speaking against your belief, i.e. “higher order evidence”. Such evidence works by inducing 
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Rather, the debunkers present arguments that turn on the evolutionary origin of our 
moral beliefs to generate an undermining defeater (this is explicit in Joyce 2013; Locke 
2014; Lutz 2017; Mogensen 2014, 2016a & 2017, it is also a plausible interpretation 
of Street 2006). 
There is also another important distinction between different kinds of defeaters to 
keep in mind: On the first account, we must distinguish between doxastic or 
psychological defeaters on the one hand, and normative defeaters on the other. I take 
this way of drawing the distinction from Jennifer Lackey (cf. e.g., 2014: p. 305).  
Doxastic or psychological defeaters are doubts or beliefs that the subject S has, which 
indicate that S’s belief that p is either false or formed or sustained in an epistemically 
untrustworthy fashion. As Lackey writes these beliefs or doubts can be defeating 
regardless of their own truth or epistemic status (ibid.). The main worry concerning 
doxastic defeaters is that one can unjustifiably/ irrationally or epistemically 
irresponsibly believe or doubt that one’s belief that p is epistemically inappropriate. 
Can an unjustified/ irrational or irresponsible belief or doubt take away your 
justification for believing that p? 
Here’s a simple argument that seems to support the idea that an unjustified or 
irrational belief cannot be a defeater. Assume the following is true: S’s belief that p at 
point in time t is justified if and only if S’s belief that p at t is supported by S’s 
evidence.24 Call this view “Simple Evidentialism”. Next, assume that necessarily, an 
unjustified belief of S cannot be part of S’s evidence. This is not completely 
uncontroversial, but let’s grant the assumption for the purposes of this paragraph. 
Then, it seems, it is impossible for an unjustified belief of S to add to or take away 
                                              
doubts that your belief is the result of a flawed process (cf. Christensen 2010). So, your belief 
may be defeated by higher order evidence (higher order defeat is also not limited to cases of 
peer disagreement, cf. ibid.). Some philosophers, like Christensen (2010), also think that 
“higher order defeat” is importantly different from undercutting defeat. Unfortunately, for 
reasons of space, in this thesis it will be impossible to engage with growing and complex 
literature on this topic (cf. Horowitz 2014 for a partial overview). In what follows, I will 
assume that such defeat can be thought of as belonging to the class of undermining or 
undercutting defeat. 
24 This is the core commitment of a family of popular views called “evidentialism” (cf. Conee 
& Feldman 2004). Alexander (ibid.: pp. 906-908) also argues that evidentialism, despite initial 
appearances, does not really support the conclusion that unjustified beliefs cannot constitute 
defeaters.  
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from the justification of S’s belief that p at t. This simple argument seems initially 
attractive, but things become more complicated, when we consider the following 
enticing thought, that clashes with this argument. Many epistemologists think that 
justification has a “perspectival dimension”, i.e. a belief is justified only if it is 
permissible from one’s perspective.25 And what is permissible from one’s perspective 
is plausibly constrained by the beliefs one holds – even by irrational or unjustified 
beliefs one holds. As Alexander writes:  
Unjustified beliefs may not be part of one’s evidence. But from one’s perspective 
an unjustified belief may seem to be part of one’s evidence in which case it would 
be irrational for one to treat it otherwise. (Alexander 2017: p. 900) 
This thought strikes me as compelling enough to reject the above simple argument. 
Denying the perspectival dimension of epistemic justification seems to be costly. The 
idea that justification seems to be constrained by the believer’s perspective will also 
be important in section (1.4.1) below.26  
A normative defeater is a doubt or belief, that S ought to have and that indicates that S’s 
belief that p is either false or formed or sustained in an epistemically illicit fashion. 
Defeaters in this sense function by virtue of being doubts or beliefs that S should 
                                              
25 I take that term from Alexander (2017: p. 908).  
26 In an influential treatment of defeaters, Michael Bergmann (2006: Ch. 6) defends the point 
that all believed defeaters are actual defeaters since it is a necessary condition on S’s belief 
that p to be justified that S does not take her belief that p to be epistemically inappropriate.  
Bergmann’s (2006: pp. 165-169) response to the above worry is that it runs together two 
separate questions: on the one hand there is the (i) question of how we ought to change our 
beliefs from the vantage point of ideal rationality, and on the other hand there is the (ii) 
question of what doxastic response is appropriate given that we hold certain beliefs. It may 
be that it is irrational for you to have a certain belief from the vantage point of ideal 
rationality, but given that you hold this belief, it might nonetheless be epistemically 
inappropriate for you to have some other belief. Bergmann (ibid.: p. 166ff.) also argues that 
generally, there is no reason to believe that only justified beliefs can be defeaters via attacking 
the alleged analogy between doxastic attitudes that can transmit or confer justification onto 
a belief and doxastic attitudes that can take away justification. Here Bergmann argues that 
we “have good reason to think that the way justification gets produced via inference is 
importantly different from the way justification is defeated via beliefs that are defeaters” 
(ibid.: p. 167).  
Alexander (2017) criticizes Bergmann’s arguments, but ultimately agrees that beliefs that 
“lack any positive epistemic merit can be defeaters…[c]onsequently, a belief can be a defeater 
even if it is neither supported by one’s evidence nor is the result of a reliable process – nor 
possesses any other positive epistemic merit” (p. 911).  
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have (whether or not S does have them) given the evidence available to S at that time 
(ibid.). 
The epistemic danger to your beliefs that arises from defeaters can be met in the 
following two ways (cf. Moon 2016: p. 5): One can offer defeater-defeaters, i.e. one can 
offer reasons reinstating our provisionally lost justification by countering defeasibly 
defeating considerations. That means to have a defeater-defeater for the defeater D, 
D must already be a defeater, which then gets defeated in turn. Examples for defeater-
defeaters include cases where I first get information that constitutes a defeasible 
defeater for my belief that p, but then I discover that this defeasible defeater is 
misleading, which in turn defeats my original defeater (cf. Moon 2016: p. 5).  
Here is an amended example for a defeater-defeater taken from Moon (2016: p. 6): 
Defeater-Defeater Case: You ingest a pill called XX. You go outside to the 
driveway, and you see a red car parked there. Plausibly, your perceptual belief that 
there is a red car in front of you is defeasibly justified. But then you learn that XX 
makes 95% of those who ingest it hallucinate red cars even when there are no red 
cars in front of them. Here, you have a defeater for your belief that there is a red 
car in front of you. Two hours after you have taken the pill, a scientist, whom you 
know to be trustworthy, informs you that you are one of the 5% who is immune 
to the drug. The justification for your perceptual belief that there is a red car 
parked in the driveway is reinstated.  
Alternatively, you can offer defeater-deflectors to protect your beliefs against defeat, i.e. 
reasons that are supposed to prevent supposedly defeating considerations from 
providing defeaters for our beliefs in the first place. A successful defeater-deflector 
prevents D from being a defeater in the first place. Examples here include cases where 
I already have or receive information INFO1 at time t1 that keeps information INFO2 
received at a later time t2 from constituting a defeater for my belief that p at t2, where, 
if I had not received INFO1 beforehand, INFO2 would have constituted a defeater 
for my belief that p at t2. 
Here is again an amended example from Moon (ibid.):  
Defeater-Deflector Case: A scientist whom you know to be trustworthy tells you 
that you are immune to the effects of the pill XX. You proceed to ingest XX. You 
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walk outside and see a red car in the driveway. You form the defeasibly justified 
belief that there is a red car in front of you. You then learn that XX makes 95% 
of those who ingest it see red cars even when there are no red cars in front of 
them. However, it seems that receiving this information now does not reflect 
negatively (epistemically speaking) on the justification for your belief.  
In the Defeater-Deflector-Case, receiving the information that I have ingested a pill 
never impinges on the justification for my belief. In the Defeater-Defeater Case on 
the other hand in the time after you learn about the effects of XX, but before you 
have been told by the scientist that you are immune, the justification for your belief 
is gone. In that case, but not in the Defeater-Deflector-Case, there is a time where 
you are not permitted and where you ought not to believe that there is a red car in the 
driveway.27 
Epistemic defeat is the most important notion in this thesis, and so it will accompany 
(or, depending on your attitude towards epistemology, haunt) us throughout. But for 
now, I hope what I have said so far suffices to give us a good initial grip on this 
notion.  
1.3.3 NON-SCEPTICAL, NON-NATURALIST MORAL REALISM 
It is often supposed, that EDAs are especially or even exclusively problematic for the 
epistemological plausibility of a certain meta-ethical position: non-naturalist moral 
realism [NNMR].28 This assumption is questioned and explicitly rejected by some 
debunkers (cf. e.g., Barkhausen 2016; Locke 2014), but for the purposes of 
streamlining my presentation, there is no harm in supposing that if any view is in the 
cross-hairs of EDAs, it is NNMR, while leaving the question of whether debunking 
worries also apply more generally (e.g., to all non-error theoretic meta-ethical theories) 
aside. This assumption is justified by the focus of this thesis on responses, which (for 
the most part), have been brought forward by non-naturalist moral realists to defend 
their view against EDAs. NNMR is the view that is defended against EDAs by the 
standard responses on which I will focus in the chapters to come. So, let’s assume 
                                              
27 For a brief explanation of why the present framework of epistemic defeat is not begging 
the question against epistemic externalism or internalism, please see appendix A. Cf. also 
appendix E.  
28 Cf. Crowe (2016); Lutz (2017). 
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that the debunkers aim to show that moral knowledge is somehow out of reach if 
NNMR is true – which in turn would give us a strong incentive to reject NNMR.  
Now, NNMR is comprised of several positions in the fields of semantics, moral 
psychology, metaphysics and epistemology. Here is a rough and ready 
characterization of the view, which I have taken from Schechter (2018) (although I 
have tweaked it a bit):29 
(a). Semantic Factualism. At least some moral sentences express propositions 
and purport to represent moral facts, and they are therefore meaningful and 
truth-apt. 
(b). Cognitivism. Moral judgments express beliefs or are belief-like states that aim 
to represent how the world is in a certain respect, and consequently they can 
be assessed on whether they represent this aspect of the world accurately or 
not, i.e. on whether they are true or false. 
(c). Non-error theory. Some atomic moral sentences (i.e., sentences that suppose 
or imply the instantiation of a moral property) are actually true.30 
(d). Independence. The explanatorily basic moral facts do not depend on us, they 
are “stance-independent”. Facts about our minds, language or social practices 
do not constitutively explain the fundamental moral facts. That means that the 
fundamental moral facts obtain “independently of any preferred perspective, 
in the sense that the moral standards that fix the moral facts [i.e., the 
explanatorily basic moral facts] are not made true by virtue of their ratification 
from within any given actual or hypothetical perspective” (Shafer-Landau 
2003: p. 15).31 
                                              
29 For example, conditions (a) and (b) above form only one condition in Schechter (2018). I 
split them up to account for the fact that some meta-ethicists could endorse either (a) or (b), 
but not both (cf. e.g., versions of meta-ethical fictionalism).  
30 Roughly, an error theory of morality amounts to the conjunction of the following 
positions: (i) Semantic factualism, (ii) Cognitivism, and (iii) all atomic moral sentences are 
false. In other words, moral judgments express genuine beliefs and they constitute genuine 
assertions, and each moral judgment that implies or presupposes the instantiation of a moral 
property (e.g., “Breaking your promise to Peter is morally wrong”) is false. 
31 Given the above definition of Independence, it is conceivable that both the actual moral 
deliberators and hypothetical idealized moral deliberators could be wrong about what the 
explanatorily basic moral facts are (although NNMR will of course hold that we are actually 
not wrong about all of the basic moral facts). In this sense, the explanatorily basic moral facts 
transcend our (actual and hypothetical) perspective on them. But NNMR is held to be 
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(e). Non-plenitude. Of the many possible coherent practices of moral 
assessment, only a few are correct. Not all practices are on par. 
(f). Non-Naturalism. There is a distinct class of moral facts and properties, and 
these are non-natural and non-supernatural facts and properties.32 
Importantly, these distinct moral facts and properties are causally inert (which 
distinguishes them from natural facts and properties).  
(g). Epistemic Success. Many of our moral beliefs are successful in constituting 
moral knowledge. That means (i) by-and-large, the moral claims we believe 
upon reflection and discussion are epistemically justified, and (ii) by-and-large, 
the moral claims we believe upon reflection and discussion are true, or at least, 
we do significantly better than chance would predict.33 
In section (1.4), when I formulate a generic EDA, I will suppose that NNMR is the 
view targeted by this generic argument.  
1.3.4 METAPHYSICAL NECESSITY OF BASIC MORAL TRUTHS 
Third-factor responses assume that basic moral truths are necessary in a fairly strong 
sense (Enoch 2011: p. 172). The AMS rests on the assumption that the basic moral 
truths (if they exist) are metaphysically necessarily true. In this section, I want to 
elucidate this assumption.  
Here, the basic moral truths or facts are true propositions that state the conditions 
under which a moral property is instantiated. The basic moral truths take the form: 
If x has property N, then x has property M.34 
                                              
consistent with a weak form of mind dependence that basically amounts to the insight that 
there would e.g. be no obligations if there were no rational agents to be obligated (Shafer-
Landau 2003: p. 15).  
32 Following Miller (2003: p. 4), I take natural properties and facts to be those which are 
either causal or detectable by the senses, which are studied by the typical “natural” sciences 
or by psychology. Supernatural facts and properties are understood as non-natural facts and 
properties that imply or suppose the activity of the kind of non-material beings typically 
invoked by religion, mythology or mysticism like e.g. God or gods, ghosts, spiritual forces or 
some such.  
33 Importantly, (g) also seems to presuppose that even before reflection and discussion take 
place, we are at least not epistemically hopeless in our intuitive moral beliefs. If all our initial 
moral beliefs were epistemically unjustified, it is hard to see how reflection and discussion 
could remedy this situation. This harkens back to a point by Street from section (1.2.1). 
34 Cf. also Shafer-Landau (2003: p. 15).  
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Where N is some (possibly very complex) non-moral property (that gives an 
exhaustive description in non-moral terms),35 M is a moral property and where x is 
some entity fit for being ascribed a moral property (i.e., usually some action or 
person). Basic moral beliefs have as their content propositions of this form. 
Therefore, the AMS involves the claim: 
M-NECESSITY. It is metaphysically necessary that for all x: if x has property N, 
then x has property M.  
What’s the rationale for positing this metaphysical necessity-claim? NNMR holds that 
moral properties are not natural properties, i.e. they are neither identical to any natural 
property, nor reducible or explainable in terms of natural properties. But now 
consider the following highly intuitive thought: No two actions can differ in their 
moral properties without differing in their natural properties (and conversely, two 
actions with identical natural properties also have the same moral properties). For 
example, if I lie to my friend in scenario A, and if I lie to my friend in scenario B, and 
everything in scenario A is exactly like it is in scenario B when it comes to all of the 
natural properties (including my lying to that friend), then it can’t be that the two 
cases differ morally, it can’t be e.g., that it is morally bad or impermissible to lie in A, 
but morally good or permissible to lie in B.  
To account for this highly intuitive thought, proponents of NNMR (but also meta-
ethicists more generally) typically posit that the moral supervenes on the natural, i.e. 
no two things or states can differ with regard to their moral properties without also 
differing with regard to their natural properties. A strong supervenience-relation holds 
that necessarily whenever something has a moral property M it has some (possibly 
very complex) non-moral property N that necessitates M, in the sense that necessarily 
anything that is exactly alike it with respect to the property N also has the moral 
property M. In other words: 
STRONG SUPERVENIENCE. As a matter of conceptual necessity, when 
something has any moral property M, it has some (possibly very complex) non-
                                              
35 So e.g., if x is some act, then N gives a complete specification of all its non-moral features, 
such as the acts “intrinsic nature, its causes and effects, the intentions with which it was done, 
and so on, insofar as these can be specified in wholly non-normative terms” (Rosen Msc.: p. 
1).  
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moral property such that, as a matter of metaphysical necessity, anything that is 
exactly alike it with respect to the non-moral property also has the moral 
property.36 
This supervenience-relation between the moral and the natural invokes two necessity 
claims. The outermost necessity claim is most often interpreted as conceptual (i.e., 
being necessary in the very same sense in which all bachelors are unmarried), while 
the innermost necessity claim is often interpreted as metaphysical (i.e., being necessary 
in the very same sense that the claim “Atoms of gold contain 79 protons” is necessary) 
(cf. McPherson 2015; Väyrynen forthcoming: p. 5). 
The strong supervenience-relation between the moral and the natural entails the 
above metaphysical necessity-claim that anything that has some (possibly very 
complex) non-moral property has that moral property as well (Väyrynen forthcoming: 
p. 5). In other words, M-Necessity, which tells us that as a matter of metaphysical 
necessity, if something has a non-moral property N, then it has a moral property M, 
is entailed by the claim that as a matter of conceptual necessity, when something has 
any moral property M it has some (possibly very complex) non-moral property N, 
such that as a matter of metaphysical necessity if it has N, then it has M.  
Therefore, it seems that M-NECESSITY is a consequence of STRONG 
SUPERVENIENCE. M-NECESSITY is then well motivated if STRONG 
SUPERVENIENCE is.  
As far as I can see, the best motivation for STRONG SUPERVENIENCE is 
provided by the fact it gives us a general account about the relation between two 
families of properties (moral and non-moral) that rules out the possibility mentioned 
above that there could be two cases, which are identical with respect to their non-
moral properties, but which differ with respect to their moral properties.37  
                                              
36 I am glossing over complications pointed to by McPherson (2012: pp. 210-220). 
37 In a similar vein, Tristram McPherson (2012: pp. 211ff.) also considers the question of 
how a strong supervenience-thesis is motivated, and he takes it that it is best motivated 
through a two-part process:  
(i) We start by considering various particular cases which are ruled out by specific 
instances of a strong supervenience-thesis (examples for cases where two scenarios 
have all the same non-moral properties, but which differ in their moral properties).  
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1.3.5 MODAL CONDITIONS ON KNOWLEDGE  
To understand the AMS, we also need to introduce two prominent modal conditions 
on knowledge: safety and sensitivity. Many epistemologists think that either safety or 
sensitivity are necessary for knowledge.38 Before talking about these two conditions, 
let me provide some context.  
Modal conditions necessary for knowledge are introduced by epistemologists to help 
answer the following question:  
What relation must hold between a fact that p and the belief that p in order for 
the belief that p to amount to knowledge? 
 It is widely agreed that knowledge is incompatible with accidentally true belief, cases 
where your belief is related to the corresponding fact only by accident. This has often 
been taken to be the upshot of Gettier-cases, brought forward originally as counter-
examples to the “justified true belief”-analysis of knowledge (cf. Gettier 1963).  
Here’s an example for such a case (Rabinowitz 2011: section 1; Russell 1948): Suppose 
Bertrand truly believes that it’s noon as a result of looking at his clock that correctly 
reads noon. However, what Bertrand does not know is that his clock broke down 
exactly twelve hours prior. Even though Bertrand seems to have good reasons to 
believe that it’s noon and his belief is true, Bertrand clearly does not know it’s noon 
since he is lucky that his belief is true. 
Modal conditions are often used in epistemology to cash out the intuitive idea that 
knowledge requires our beliefs to be not merely correct, but to stably track the truth 
even if your circumstances were to slightly change (Ishikawa & Steup 2017: section 
                                              
(ii) We notice that our view about the specific cases do not seem to rest on idiosyncrasies 
of those cases. This encourages the inductive thought that it is impossible for there 
to be an example where it is not the case that the moral supervenes on the natural. 
Furthermore, a general strong supervenience-thesis is explanatorily attractive: it is 
simpler than having to posit and explain a huge raft of specific necessary connections, 
and it suggests the hope of explaining it in terms of quite general features of moral 
properties.  
Thus, McPherson argues that the commitment to a general strong supervenience-thesis is 
best seen as being (epistemically) grounded in an elegant and seemingly unproblematic 
generalization from uncontroversial cases. Cf. also Rosen (Msc. pp. 1-2). 
38 That is to say, these conditions are often proposed as necessary conditions for knowledge, 
but they are usually not taken to be sufficient.  
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5). The hope is that by applying either of these modal conditions, we can filter out 
cases that involve epistemic luck of the kind that is incompatible with knowledge. So, 
here are the two conditions stated: 
Sensitivity3. S’s belief that p formed via or based on M is sensitive if and only if: 
in nearby possible worlds where p is false, S would not believe that p via or based 
on M.  
Safety3. S’s belief that p formed via or based on M is safe if and only if: in nearby 
possible worlds where S believes that p via or based on M, p is true.39 
Sensitivity is intended to capture an important feature of knowledge, namely the 
ability to tell the difference between when a proposition is true and when it is not 
(Becker 2012: p. 82). Safety is meant to capture the intriguing thought that “[i]f you 
know, you couldn’t easily have been wrong” (Sainsbury 1997: p. 907). In other words, 
the safety-condition is meant to exclude cases in which a true belief is formed in a 
way that could have easily delivered error (cf. Hawthorne 2004: p. 56).  
How is the discussion of modal conditions on knowledge connected to evolutionary 
debunking? Safety and sensitivity are often thought to be necessary conditions for 
knowledge, but EDAs attack epistemic justification. So how are the modal conditions 
relevant here? 
The basic idea is that although safety and sensitivity are two conditions, which are 
often thought to be necessary for knowledge, it seems plausible to assume that 
receiving information that a belief of yours is insensitive or unsafe can defeat your 
justification for holding it. Indeed, the argument due to Justin Clarke-Doane, which 
will be presented in chapter (2), comes with an account of undercutting defeat that 
draws on both sensitivity and safety. As we will see there, Clarke-Doane assumes that 
if you have reason to think that your belief that p is either not safe or not sensitive, 
then this suffices for taking away your justification for believing that p.  
Let me end this section by sketching out the rationale for this thought.40 Let’s first 
consider how receiving information that indicates insensitivity might take away 
                                              
39 In appendix B, I discuss these conditions and various formulations of them in more detail. 
40 This is a rather preliminary sketch, we will discuss the epistemology of Clarke-Doane’s 
argument in much more detail in the chapters to come. 
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justification in the context of evolutionary debunking. Assume that our moral beliefs, 
produced by our moral faculty M,41 are initially justified. Now, an evolutionary 
explanation might be thought to defeat our moral beliefs via showing those beliefs to 
be insensitive. That means this explanation now gives us reason to believe that there is 
a disconnect between our moral beliefs formed via M and the moral truths by giving 
us reason to think that the following claim is true:  
MORAL INSENSITIVITY. If the moral truths were different, our moral 
beliefs would have been the same, i.e. in nearby possible worlds the moral truths 
are different, and our moral beliefs formed via M are thus false there. 
MORAL INSENSITIVITY presupposes that the moral truths could have been easily 
different.42 If evolutionary explanations give us reason to believe that MORAL 
INSENSITIVITY is true, then these explanations might defeat the justification of 
our moral beliefs via giving us reason to think that we could easily have ended up 
believing the same things we actually believe, even if the moral truths were different. 
And, intuitively, this seems to be an epistemically worrisome discovery.  
And let’s next consider how evolutionary explanations might defeat the justification 
of our moral beliefs via indicating that our beliefs are not modally safe from error. 
Evolutionary explanations might take away our justification by giving us reason to 
believe that the following claim is true:  
MORAL UNSAFETY. Employing our moral faculty M could easily have led us 
to form different moral beliefs, while the moral truths remain the same. That 
means in nearby possible worlds employing M gives us divergent doxastic results, 
and these beliefs are false, since the moral truths stay fixed.  
Here the information we receive suggests that the evolutionary influence on our moral 
belief-forming mechanism could have easily led us to hold different moral beliefs, 
even if the moral truths were to remain as they are in the actual case. Intuitively, our 
                                              
41 In this section, I bracket the question of what the relevant method or basis is in the case 
of our moral beliefs. See appendix C.  
42 Given what we have said in section (1.3.4), we can perhaps already tell how Clarke-Doane 
will try to defuse the defeating potential of MORAL INSENSITIVITY, but let’s not get 
ahead of ourselves.  
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initial justification here seems to be defeated by the recognition that M does not 
provide the beliefs it produces with enough protection against error in similar cases. 
Clarke-Doane’s AMS now assumes that the only way for evolutionary considerations 
to undercut our moral beliefs, is via giving us reason to think that MORAL 
INSENSITIVITY and/or MORAL UNSAFETY are true. This assumption, which 
he calls “Modal Security”, will be presented in chapter (2) and will be critically 
discussed in chapters (3) and (4).43  
1.4 EVOLUTION AS AN EXPLANATORY CHALLENGE 
In this section, I construct a generic EDA. As its name implies, the generic EDA is 
hardly original. In fact, this generic argument is an only slightly modified version of 
Dustin Locke’s (2014) EDA.  
The main purpose of this generic EDA in the context of this thesis will be twofold. 
First, I want to identify an argument that (epistemologically at least) qualifies as a 
serious competitor for further consideration in the philosophical debate. This 
argument deserves attention because it rests on a clear and plausible epistemological 
story. It is important to have such an argument in place, as EDAs (like the one’s 
presented by Street and Joyce) have often been criticized for being “all murky where 
it counts most: exactly which epistemic principle combines with the facts of evolution 
to undermine moral realism?” (Bogardus 2016: p. 638; cf. also Berker 2014, White 
2010; Brosnan 2011; Clarke-Doane 2012, Hanson 2017, Mogensen 2014). Here it is 
not my ambition to show you that the generic EDA is successful in refuting NNMR. 
My modest ambition is just to have an argument in place that is epistemologically 
clear and respectable. 
Secondly, this argument is meant to provide a foil for the two influential responses to 
EDAs, third-factor accounts and the AMS, which are the main focus of this thesis. 
These two responses will be presented and critically discussed in chapters (2-4).  
  
                                              
43 For another modal account of undercutting defeat, similar in spirit to Clarke-Doane’s, cf. 
Pollock (1987).  
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1.4.1 AN ACCOUNT OF UNDERCUTTING DEFEAT 
The epistemology of evolutionary debunking is a controversial topic (cf. e.g., 
Bogardus 2016; White 2010). Thus, I suggest the following cautious way of 
proceeding. Let us first start with a popular and plausible general conception of 
undercutting mental state defeat. Then we can reflect on how to utilize this general 
notion of undercutting defeat in a generic EDA. So, before we ask what makes 
evolution a defeater, we should try to answer the question of what makes a defeater a 
defeater.  
Before we start, I need to clarify a bit of terminology. I will repeatedly use the term 
“reliability” in this section. Obviously, given the importance of this term to 
contemporary epistemology, trying to get clear on what reliability is goes way beyond 
the scope of this thesis. Instead of getting us bogged down in difficult epistemological 
issues,44 that I can’t solve, I propose we use the following simple account to give us 
some guidance: I use the term “reliability” as meaning roughly (i) that the relevant 
belief-forming process/source/ method/mechanism/faculty of a subject S produces 
mostly true over false beliefs in the appropriate environment, and (ii) the fact that this 
belief-forming process/source/ method/mechanism/faculty produces mostly true 
over false beliefs in the appropriate environment is itself not a freaky coincidence. 
Conditions (i) and (ii) are admittedly vague, and I don’t take them to be appropriate 
endpoints for any respectable account of reliability. But they are often taken as starting 
points (cf. Goldman 1979; Goldman & Beddor 2015: section 2), and I think that they 
are fine for the purposes of this thesis. This vague and intuitive notion can then be 
cashed out in various ways by epistemologists, e.g. in terms of modal safety from 
error.45 
                                              
44 Cf. appendix D for some cursory, but hopefully helpful remarks about the use of the term 
“reliability” in contemporary epistemology.  
45 Reliability is strictly speaking a property not of beliefs (or other doxastic attitudes) 
themselves, but of the relevant belief-forming process/method/mechanism/ basis/source 
/faculty of a subject S that produces those beliefs (or other doxastic attitudes). Sometimes I 
am going to write a bit loosely and say e.g., “that a belief is reliable” or that a “belief was 
formed reliably”. But this should always be taken to mean that this belief was formed via 
applying a belief-forming process/method/mechanism/faculty that is reliable. I am also 
going to use the words “reliable” and “(epistemically) trustworthy” interchangeably when I 
refer to a belief-forming process/method/mechanism/ basis /source /faculty.  
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I will also make heavy use of the term “explanation”. As with “reliability” in 
epistemology, there are a myriad of conceptions of “explanation” in the philosophy 
of science. Here, I follow Kevin McCain in taking a very general and inclusive 
approach towards explanation:  
The gist of this approach is that “explanations track dependence relations” of all 
kinds – causal relations, mereological relations, the relation of constitution, and so 
on. More simply, an explanation in this context can be understood as a set of 
propositions that provide an answer to a why-question, e.g. why did some event 
occur, why is some claim true, or why does something have the features that it 
does? (McCain 2016: p. 9) 
Now to begin, let us take a step back and ask a very basic question about undercutting 
defeat: 
Why is it that receiving clear and convincing information that your way of arriving 
at a given belief that p is unreliable takes away the justification for believing that 
p? 
A popular answer to this question builds on the idea that it is a requirement on your 
justifiably believing that p that you do not take or that you are not in a position to 
take a negative perspective toward whether your belief that p has been produced in 
an epistemically sound way (Moon 2018: pp. 256-257; cf. Bergmann 2005: p. 422).46 
This requirement has only recently been made explicit by Andrew Moon (2018: p. 
256), but I think it is safe to say that versions of this condition are widely endorsed.47 
Here I present a slightly amended version of Moon’s formulation. Let “p*” denote 
the proposition that S’s belief that p was formed reliably (via the method that S 
employed to form it) (cf. Bergmann 2005). Let S’s “doxastic/normative set of 
background beliefs” denote the set of beliefs of S including both (i) the whole set of 
S’s other beliefs and (ii) the set of beliefs that S should have on account of the 
evidence available to her (regardless of whether she actually has those beliefs). 
Defining S’s relevant set of background beliefs in this way of course references the 
                                              
46 Borrowing a term from Alexander (2017: p. 900) the idea here seems to be that justification 
has a “perspectival dimension”, i.e. the thought that a belief is justified only if it is permissible 
from one’s perspective. 
47 For an impressive list of supporters cf. Moon (2018: p. 270).  
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notions of doxastic and normative defeat introduced in section (1.3.2) above. Then 
we have the following “no defeater”-requirement on S’s justified belief that p: 
NO DEFEATER. S justifiably believes that p only if it is not the case that in 
virtue of S’s doxastic/normative set of background beliefs, S should withhold or 
disbelieve p*.48 
So, if S justifiably believes that p it is necessarily not the case that in virtue of her 
background beliefs or in virtue of beliefs that S should have on account of the 
evidence available to her, S should withhold49 or disbelieve p*. NO DEFEATER 
basically tells us that for S’s belief that p to be justified, it must not be the case that S 
has a doxastic or normative undercutting defeater for her belief that p. NO 
DEFEATER also gives us a partial account on how receiving clear and convincing 
information that your way of arriving at your belief that p is unreliable defeats your 
beliefs justification. If this information makes it the case that in virtue of your 
background beliefs or in virtue of beliefs that you should have (on account of the 
evidence available to you), you should withhold or disbelieve p*, then this generates 
an undercutting defeater for your belief’s justification. 
This condition is in line with the framework for epistemic defeat developed by 
Michael Bergmann (2005; 2006: Ch. 6). In Bergmann’s view, if a subject has or should 
have a certain doxastic attitude (i.e., suspension of judgment or outright disbelief) 
towards the higher-order proposition p*, then this generates an undercutting defeater 
for her belief that p (Bergmann 2005: pp. 426–427). On this picture, these defeaters 
are always “mental state-defeaters”: i.e., what defeats S’s justification for believing that 
                                              
48 Cf. appendix E for some further clarifications of and motivation for NO DEFEATER.  
49 Throughout, I am going to use “withhold” as shorthand for “withhold belief in/ withhold 
from believing in”. I also use “withhold” interchangeably with “suspension of judgment”. 
As Locke (2014: p. 223) points out in a footnote, obviously withholding belief that p is not 
equivalent to believing that not-p, but neither is it equivalent to not believing that p, although 
this might be less obvious. Withholding belief is more active and implies that S has 
considered whether to believe that p. S might not believe that p, because she simply has 
never even considered whether p is true, but for S to withhold belief that p, it is necessary 
that S has considered this.  
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p is a doxastic attitude (i.e., suspension of belief or disbelief) that S has or should 
have. Within this framework, it is these mental states, which constitute defeaters.50, 51 
Here is some intuitive motivation for NO DEFEATER (this is a case also taken from 
Moon 2018: p. 256). Let “CAR” denote the proposition that this is a red car and let 
“CAR*” denote the proposition that my belief that this is a red car was reliably 
formed. Johnny comes to believe CAR. In a first case, Johnny then comes to believe 
(or Johnny should come to believe) that before he arrived at his belief that CAR he 
has been administered medication that makes 99% of people hallucinate red cars. In 
a second case, Johnny then comes to believe (or Johnny should come to believe) that 
before he arrived at his belief that CAR he has been administered medication that 
makes 50% of people hallucinate red cars. In both cases, we can stipulate that Johnny 
does not actually hallucinate, he looks at a real red car in the driveway, and reliably 
forms the belief that CAR. Nonetheless, given Johnny’s doxastic/normative set of 
background beliefs, it seems that Johnny should disbelieve CAR* in the first case, and 
that he should withhold CAR* in the second case.52 Furthermore, in both cases, it 
seems that his belief in CAR is not justified. It seems that his doxastic/normative set 
of background beliefs defeats his justification for believing CAR via making it the case 
that he should withhold or disbelieve CAR*. Moreover, as Moon notes, this seems to 
be true in general: 
For any belief that p, if one should disbelieve p* or withhold p*, then it seems that 
one is not justified in believing p. (Moon 2018: p. 257) 
                                              
50 In what follows, I am sometimes going to write a bit loosely: e.g., I might write that 
“evolutionary evidence generates a defeater” or that “a piece of information constitutes a 
defeater”. This should always be understood as meaning that the relevant piece of evidence 
or information generates a defeater by (and only by) making it the case that S should now 
withhold or disbelieve that p*. Strictly speaking, the defeater is not the evidence or 
information that S receives, but the doxastic attitude towards the higher-order proposition 
p* that S forms or should form in response to that evidence or information.  
51 Does the focus on “mental state” defeaters bias the above account of defeat towards 
epistemic internalism? No: see appendix A. Cf. also appendix E. 
52 Here I assume that what doxastic attitude a believer should take towards a proposition at 
least partly depends on how probable a believer thinks (or should think) it is that this 
proposition obtains.  
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As I have noted, variations of NO DEFEATER seem to be rather widely endorsed. 
NO DEFEATER can be amended in various ways, to suit your epistemological 
convictions.53 
1.4.2 AN EXPLANATORY DEMAND  
The explanatory EDA I develop here (following Locke 2014: pp. 220-221, 223-225, 
227-232) now seizes on an interpretation of what makes it the case that S should 
withhold or disbelieve p* by formulating an explanatory demand on what we can 
continue to believe with justification. Before going into a bit more detail on this 
interpretation, it might be useful to dwell briefly on the intuitive basis for such a 
demand, and to sketch out how this demand figures in Locke’s EDA.  
This explanatory demand is based on the intuitive thought that it is often the case that 
I will not be able to continue to justifiably believe that p if the truth of my belief that 
p does not figure in the best explanation available to me for why I believe that p. For 
example, we might, intuitively, doubt that my belief that p is still justified, if I am now 
presented with clear and convincing information that makes it the case that the best 
explanation available to me for why I have come to believe that p nowhere 
presupposes, posits, entails or makes likely the truth of my belief.  
When we apply this thought to our own belief-forming mechanisms, we get a demand 
that tells us that if the best explanation (available to us) of our belief-forming 
mechanism in no way involves the truth about p, then we should withhold (or 
disbelieve) whether this mechanism reliably produces beliefs about p.  
Now, Locke’s EDA features an epistemic principle of just this kind. This principle 
tells us that for it to be the case that we should withhold p* it suffices if we should 
withhold belief in the claim that the explanatory history of the relevant belief-forming 
mechanism does not involve the truth of the beliefs it produces. Locke then uses this 
principle to argue that if we have very good reason to believe an evolutionary 
explanation of our moral belief-forming faculty that nowhere involves non-
naturalistically construed moral truths or facts, then this means that we should 
                                              
53 Moon (2018: pp. 257-258) sketches out a few of these ways. For example, how one applies 
NO DEFEATER, will partly depend on one’s account of S’s available “evidence” (e.g., S’s 
beliefs or S’s true beliefs or S’s justified beliefs or S’s justified true beliefs or S’s 
knowledge…).  
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withhold belief about the claim that the explanatory history of our moral belief-
forming faculty (and thus also of our moral beliefs) involves moral truths or facts. 
Since withholding belief about the claim that the explanatory history of our moral 
belief-forming mechanisms involves moral facts undermines our initial justification 
for believing that our respective faculty is reliable, evolution potentially provides us 
with an undercutting defeater for our moral beliefs.  
That’s the rough picture of Locke’s EDA. Now I want to go into a bit more detail. 
Let’s discuss what makes it the case that S should withhold or disbelieve p* on this 
interpretation. Here’s the principle that Locke (2014: p. 232) presents and that 
together with another condition that I will discuss in a moment gives us a sufficient 
condition on when S should withhold p*. For a subject S, let M be one of S’s cognitive 
mechanisms to form beliefs involving the concept X, and let “X-facts” refer to facts 
involving the object/property/relation/kind/etc. picked out by X: 
COGNITION DEFEAT. If S withholds or should withhold belief that the 
explanatory history of M involves X-facts, then S’s initial justification to believe 
that M is reliable is lost. 
Suppose that S was initially justified to believe that her belief that p54 has been reliably 
produced by M, i.e. S was justified to believe p*. Initially, it was not the case that given 
her doxastic/normative set of background beliefs she should have withheld or 
disbelieved p*. Perhaps, S’s initial justification is in part due to a default entitlement 
to belief in the reliability of one’s own cognitive mechanisms. That our cognitive 
mechanisms are innocent until proven guilty is a highly useful assumption for 
combatting global sceptical arguments. As Locke points out, in contrast to globally 
sceptical challenges the above formulation of COGNITION DEFEAT is entirely 
compatible with this assumption (2014: pp. 230-232). S’s initial justification for 
believing p* is only lost after S receives information that is apt to have this effect. 
Say that S receives information that makes it the case that she should withhold belief 
that the explanatory history of M involves X-facts. COGNITION DEFEAT states 
                                              
54 Where S’s belief that p formed via M involves the concept X. Here is an example: Say “M” 
is S’s moral faculty. This faculty produces beliefs involving the concept of duty. Joanna’s 
belief that Max has the duty to care for his aging grandmother is formed via Joanna’s moral 
faculty.  
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that this suffices for S to lose her initial justification for believing p*. Assume for the 
moment that S also lacks any other source of justification for her belief that p* that 
is independent of M. In that case, it seems that S’s belief that p* given her updated 
doxastic/normative set of background beliefs is unjustified. In section (1.3.2), we have 
observed that if you are not justified in believing in a claim, you are not permitted to 
believe that claim, and if you are not permitted to believe that claim, then you ought 
not to believe it. Therefore, if you become unjustified in believing that p*, then at 
very least, you should withhold p*. Given NO DEFEATER, this generates a defeater 
for the justification of S’s belief that p: You are not justified to believe that p if you 
should withhold or disbelieve that p*.55 
There’s still one question left to settle in this section: When should S withhold belief 
that the explanatory history of M involves X-facts? Here’s the answer I favour:  
BEST EXPLANATION. If the best explanation available to S of her belief-
forming process M nowhere involves (=presupposes, posits, implies or makes 
likely) the existence of X-facts, then S should withhold belief about the claim that 
the explanatory history of M involves X-facts. 
BEST EXPLANATION strikes me as the intuitively most plausible answer to the 
above question.56 
1.4.3 INDEPENDENT MEANS OF CONFIRMING RELIABILITY 
COGNITION DEFEAT states a sufficient condition on when S loses her initial 
justification for believing that p*. However, losing your initial justification for 
believing a certain claim is not equivalent to being unjustified in believing that claim. 
Let us assume that it is indeed the case that S loses her initial justification for believing 
p* by withholding that M’s explanatory history involves X-facts. But perhaps S can 
gain new justification for believing p* by finding the means to independently confirm 
that M reliably produces beliefs that p (Locke 2014: p. 232). This would enable S to 
reinstate her justification for believing that p*. Following Locke, we can thus 
                                              
55 For further motivation for COGNITION DEFEAT, see appendix F. 
56 For further discussion of and motivation for BEST EXPLANATION, please see 
appendix G. 
38 
formulate the following necessary condition for when S can still be justified in 
believing p*, while withholding that M’s explanatory history involves X-facts:  
INDEPENDENCE CONSTRAINT. If S withholds belief that her belief-
forming mechanism M has an explanatory history that involves X-facts, it is 
permissible for her to believe that M is reliable only if S’s belief that M is reliable 
is based on a source for justification that is itself independent of M.  
COGNITION DEFEAT tells us that if S withholds belief that the explanatory 
history of M involves X-facts, then S’s initial justification to believe that M is reliable 
is lost. The INDEPENDENCE CONSTRAINT now spells out a necessary 
condition on when you can withhold belief in the claim that the explanatory history 
of M involves X-facts without losing your justification: only if you have M-
independent means of showing that M is trustworthy.57, 58 
1.4.4 THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL UNDERPINNING  
We are now able to tell a reasonably comprehensive and seemingly plausible story 
concerning the epistemological underpinning of the explanatory challenge to non-
naturalist moral realism under consideration.  
Suppose that S was initially justified to believe that her belief that p has been reliably 
produced by M, i.e. S was justified to believe p*. Initially, it was not the case that given 
her doxastic/normative set of background beliefs she should have withheld or 
disbelieved p*. S then receives information that makes it the case that the best 
explanation available to S about her belief-forming process M nowhere presupposes, 
posits, implies or makes likely the existence of X-facts. If the best explanation 
available to S concerning M nowhere presupposes, posits, implies or makes likely the 
existence of X-facts then then S should withhold belief about the claim that the 
explanatory history of M involves X-facts.  
If S should withhold belief about the claim that the explanatory history of M involves 
X-facts, then this suffices for S to lose her initial justification for believing p*. If S 
withholds belief that her belief-forming mechanism M has an explanatory history that 
involves X-facts, it is permissible for her to believe that M is reliable only if S’s belief 
                                              
57 Lutz’s (2017) EDA features a similar demand for independence. 
58 For motivation for the INDEPENDENCE CONSTRAINT, please see appendix H. 
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that M is reliable is based on a source for justification that is itself independent of M. 
Assume that S’s belief that M is reliable cannot be based on a source of justification 
that is itself independent of M.  
If it is not epistemically permissible to believe that M is reliable, then S’s belief that M 
is reliable is unjustified. In other words, S’s belief that p* is unjustified given her 
updated doxastic/normative set of background beliefs. If you are not justified in 
believing in a claim, you are not permitted to believe that claim, and if you are not 
permitted to believe that claim, then you ought not to believe it. So, if S is not justified 
in believing that p*, then S is not permitted to believe and ought not to believe p*. 
Therefore, if S becomes unjustified in believing p*, then at the very least, S should 
withhold p*.  
S’s belief that p is justified only if it is not the case that in virtue of her 
doxastic/normative set of background beliefs S should withhold or disbelieve p*. 
Therefore, if S should withhold p*, this generates an undercutting defeater for the 
justification of S’s belief that p. This is the whole epistemological story underpinning 
the generic EDA.59 
1.4.5 A GENERIC EXPLANATORY EDA 
Finally, we are in a position, to formulate a generic EDA that seems epistemologically 
clear and respectable, and that can serve as a foil for the standard responses discussed 
in the following chapters. Now for the argument to get off the ground, we need to 
make two empirical assumptions (Locke 2014: p. 220 & p. 223): 
(I) Our moral faculty60 is (largely) the product of our evolutionary history.  
(II) Our moral faculty was selected because it had some natural property N (e.g., 
it contributed to reproductive success by promoting certain kinds of 
cooperation amongst our ancestors).61 
                                              
59 For another succinct statement of this story, and for some further motivation, please see 
appendix I. 
60 Where the “moral faculty” is a psychological mechanism that is crucially involved in the 
production of many or most of our moral beliefs. This mechanism could e.g., produce moral 
intuitions, which regularly give rise to corresponding moral beliefs. For more on the moral 
faculty, see appendix C.  
61 Needless to say, these assumptions are controversial, cf. Kahane 2011; Fitzpatrick 2015; 
Isserow 2018. Cf. also the discussion of the idealizing assumptions in appendix C.  
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Under the assumption that there is strong evidence for (I) and (II),62 it seems we now 
have what we need to get a generic explanatory EDA off the ground. The debunker 
now has what looks like a good case for the claim that the best explanation available 
to a moral believer who is confronted with the evidence for (I) and (II) nowhere 
involves the existence of non-naturalistically construed moral facts. Applying the 
above epistemological story, we now can construct an argument that generates a 
defeater for our moral beliefs (provided we assume NNMR):  
  Generic EDA: 
(1) The best explanation available to you for your moral faculty nowhere involves 
(=presupposes, posits, implies or makes likely) the existence of moral facts. 
(2) If the best explanation available to you concerning your moral faculty nowhere 
involves the existence of moral facts, then you should withhold belief about 
the claim that the explanatory history of your moral faculty involves moral 
facts.  
(3) Therefore, you should withhold belief about the claim that the explanatory 
history of your moral faculty involves moral facts.  
(4) If you should withhold belief about the claim that the explanatory history of 
your moral faculty involves moral facts, then it is epistemically permissible for 
you to believe that your moral faculty is reliable only if this belief is based on 
a source for justification independent of your moral faculty.  
(5) It is epistemically permissible for you to believe that your moral faculty is 
reliable only if this belief is based on a source for justification independent of 
your moral faculty 
(6) Your belief that your moral faculty is reliable is not based on a source for 
justification independent of your moral faculty.  
(7) It is not epistemically permissible for you to believe that your moral faculty is 
reliable.  
(8) If it is not epistemically permissible for you to believe that your moral faculty 
is reliable, then you should withhold or disbelieve that your moral faculty is 
reliable.  
                                              
62 And provided that the idealizations made in appendix C hold.  
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(9) You should withhold or disbelieve that your moral faculty is reliable.  
(10) If you are justified in holding your moral beliefs formed via your moral faculty, 
then it is not the case that you should withhold or disbelieve that your moral 
faculty is reliable. 
(11) You are not justified in holding your moral beliefs formed via your moral 
faculty.63  
(1-10) comprise the application of the abstract epistemological story above to the 
evolutionary explanation of our moral faculty. Assume that you have sufficient 
epistemic reason to believe (I) and (II). The truth of (I) and (II) (plus the idealizing 
assumptions (a-c) presented in appendix C) furnishes you with an evolutionary 
explanation of your moral faculty that nowhere involves the existence of moral facts. 
Assume that this explanation concerning your moral faculty is better than any rival 
explanation of your moral faculty. In other words, it is better than any explanation of 
your moral faculty that involves the proposition that moral facts exist. This supports 
(1). (2) is just the application of BEST EXPLANATION. (3) follows from (1) and 
(2). (4) states the application of the INDEPENDENCE CONSTRAINT. (5) follows 
from (3) and (4). (6) states that your belief that your moral faculty is reliable does not 
satisfy the INDEPENDENCE CONSTRAINT. The reason is simple: (given the 
idealizations of appendix C) all your moral beliefs are the product of your moral 
faculty. (7) follows from (5) and (6). (8) seems clear as day, and has been argued for 
in section (1.4.4) above. (9) follows from (7) and (8). (10) is based on NO 
DEFEATER: if it is necessary for being justified in believing that p via M that it is 
not the case that you should withhold or disbelieve that M is reliable, then if you are 
justified in believing that p via M, it is not the case that you should withhold or 
disbelieve that M is reliable. (11) follows from (9) and (10). And (11) is just the kind 
of conclusion you would want to have as an evolutionary debunker.  
                                              
63 As NNMR is the view targeted by this argument, it is assumed that the “you” that this 
argument addresses shares the commitments of NNMR that give rise to this argument 
(although it is not necessary that the subject has a philosophically sophisticated grasp of these 
commitments). But that’s fine: defenders of NNMR often claim that of all available meta-
ethical positions, NNMR is the view that undergirds our common-sensical moral practices 
and discourses and the phenomenology of our moral experience (cf. Cuneo 2011; Enoch 
2011; Kramer 2009). And since the argument is targeting NNMR, it is also fine if it does not 
work if the “you” happens to be e.g. a moral naturalist.  
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We now have a generic explanatory EDA based on a sufficiently stable 
epistemological foundation. This wraps up our task for this chapter. With this 
argument now in hand, we can go on to discuss and evaluate third-factor accounts 
and the AMS in the remaining chapters.  
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2 TWO STANDARD RESPONSES TO EDAS 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
In the last chapter, we constructed an epistemologically respectable EDA. This 
chapter and the next two will be concerned with coming to grips with two standard 
responses to EDAs. In this chapter, I will present these responses, while in the 
following two chapters I will argue against them. Here is a preview of the argument 
that will emerge from chapters (2-4): Clarke-Doane and the third-factor theorists are 
ultimately confronted with the unattractive choice between conceding epistemic 
defeat or recommending an option that sanctions epistemically irrational doxastic 
behaviour. In any case, the AMS and third-factor accounts are thus shown to be bad 
responses to the generic EDA, as they fail to show that evolutionary considerations 
do not render us epistemically criticisable for holding or continuing to hold our moral 
beliefs.64  
I use the term “standard responses” because (i) these two responses have been much 
discussed in the literature, and (ii) these responses are importantly similar in several 
respects. These responses are the argument from modal security (Clarke-Doane 2015 
& 2016) and third-factor accounts (e.g., Enoch 2010 & 2011; Wielenberg 2010). 
Importantly, these responses do not focus on the empirical assumptions that the 
debunkers make, but rather argue that even if the debunkers’ empirical story is largely 
correct, and even if we assume non-naturalist moral realism, the epistemic threat 
supposedly arising from evolution can be neutralized.65 
                                              
64 While we assume NNMR. 
65 In the philosophy of religion, Alvin Plantinga (2000) employs a strategy for dealing with 
what he calls “de jure objections” to theistic belief (=objections, which try to establish the 
point that theistic belief, whether true or not, lacks a positive epistemic property) which is 
eerily similar to the standard responses. De jure objections include debunking explanations of 
theistic belief. In response to de jure objectors, Plantinga argues for the following conditional 
conclusion (2000: 189-190):  
Plantinga’s Conditional Conclusion. If God exists, then belief in God is probably prima 
facie justified. 
A powerful implication that Plantinga draws from this conditional conclusion is that since 
theistic belief probably has justification if it is true, if you want to raise objections to the 
justification of theistic belief, you must show that the antecedent in Plantinga’s Conditional 
Conclusion is false.  
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These arguments share several important similarities. Both the AMS and third-factor 
accounts suppose that the epistemic threat in need of neutralizing is roughly that 
evolutionary considerations might show our moral beliefs to be subject to a 
problematic kind of epistemic luck. Both Clarke-Doane, as well as the third-factor 
theorists think that the potential epistemic danger lies in that an (i) evolutionary 
explanation of our moral belief-forming mechanisms, in conjunction with (ii) a 
commitment to a picture of moral facts as causally inert and causally and constitutively 
independent of our moral attitudes seems to imply (iii) that it would be a “cosmic 
coincidence” if our moral beliefs were actually true (cf. Bedke 2009). Both Clarke-
Doane and the third-factor theorists think that this sort of coincidence could 
potentially undercut the justification of our moral beliefs.  
Another important similarity is that in trying to neutralize this potential epistemic 
danger via arguing for the conclusion that it is not a coincidence that our moral beliefs 
land on the truth, both responses rely on roughly the following claim:  
COMMON-SENSE MORALITY. Our common-sense moral beliefs are by-
and-large true.66 
And the third important similarity is that both the AMS and third-factor accounts 
utilize COMMON-SENSE MORALITY in the same fashion: they argue that if our 
moral beliefs are true, then they are reliably formed – and evolutionary considerations 
cannot give us a reason to believe differently. In short: they argue that if our beliefs 
are true, and provided some other conditions obtain, then evolutionary consideration 
do not undercut the justification of our moral beliefs.  
                                              
If true, this means that you cannot call into question the epistemic justification of theistic 
belief without calling into question its truth. This renders the whole family of de jure objection 
impotent without the support of a successful de facto objection.  
I tend to think that versions of the arguments developed in the next few chapters should also 
apply to Plantinga’s strategy for dealing with de jure objections, but supporting this point is a 
project for another occasion.  
66 As I have mentioned in the introduction, third-factor responses and the AMS belong to a 
family of responses to EDAs that have recently been called “first-order replies” by Morton 
(2018: p. 2), and “minimalist replies” by Locke (2014: p. 221, p. 227). These are replies which 
all crucially assume substantive moral claims. I lack the space for showing this, but I tend to 
think that a version of the arguments developed in the following chapters should also apply 
to the members of this family, which I do not discuss in this thesis.  
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Both the AMS and third-factor accounts are therefore crucially similar in certain key 
respects. In the next chapter, we will see that relying on the truth of our moral beliefs 
in the face of the evidence or information involved in the generic EDA from the last 
chapter is problematic.  
Here is how I will proceed in this chapter. In (2.2) I will introduce the argument from 
modal security. In section (2.3), I will present third-factor accounts. In (2.4), I will 
summarize the most important points.  
2.2 THE ARGUMENT FROM MODAL SECURITY 
In this section, I want to give you a succinct presentation of the AMS due to Justin 
Clarke-Doane (2012; 2015; 2016). In a nutshell, this argument aims to show that if 
some of our basic moral beliefs are true, and if we could not have easily failed to have 
these beliefs, then the epistemic threat supposedly arising from evolutionary 
considerations can be neutralized.  
Like third-factor accounts, to provide a defence of our common-sense moral beliefs 
against the debunking threat, the AMS needs to assume that our basic moral beliefs 
are mostly true. The assumption that our common-sense moral beliefs are mostly true 
is crucial, since the AMS aims to establish the conditional claim that if our basic moral 
beliefs are true, then they are reliably true. And so, to get to the conclusion that our 
moral beliefs are reliable, the AMS needs to assume that the antecedent of that 
conditional is true.  
Is it legitimate for the AMS to assume our basic moral beliefs are true? This will be a 
main topic of the following chapters, so I will postpone discussing this question until 
then. Clarke-Doane points out that since EDAs do not provide us with rebutting 
defeaters, they do not give us any direct reason to think that any moral belief of ours 
is wrong. He therefore holds that it is compatible with EDAs that there are moral 
truths, some of which might be believed by us. We will return to this point below.  
It is worth pointing out that the scope of the argument is restricted to only directly 
protecting our justification for believing basic moral truths from arguments like the 
generic EDA. However, Clarke-Doane also argues that once we have secured 
justification for belief in the basic moral truths, then it might be reasonably expected 
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that we are able to justifiably infer non-basic moral truths from them (Clarke-Doane 
2016: p. 29, p. 35). 
So, in the first instance, the AMS needs to assume that our basic moral beliefs are 
true. Furthermore, Clarke-Doane relies on the claim that the basic moral truths (if 
they exist) are metaphysically necessarily true. The motivation for this assumption has 
been presented in section (1.3.4). Recall: The metaphysical necessity of the basic moral 
truth is part of a strong supervenience-claim. The necessity-claim is then well 
motivated if the supervenience-claim is. Motivation for the strong supervenience-
claim is provided by the fact it gives us a general account about the relation between 
two families of properties (moral and non-moral) that rules out the possibility 
mentioned above that there could be two cases, which are identical with respect to 
their non-moral properties, but which differ with respect to their moral properties. 
(This motivation of course assumes that some moral properties are instantiated, this 
is another reason why Clarke-Doane needs to rely on COMMON-SENSE 
MORALITY.) Let’s assume that the metaphysical necessity-claim is indeed true.  
Now, we can look at the substantial epistemological story on which the argument 
rests. Clarke-Doane assumes the following account of undercutting defeat:  
MODAL SECURITY. Information, E, cannot undermine our beliefs of a kind, 
D, without giving us some reason to believe that our D-beliefs are not both safe 
and sensitive.67 
That means for E to take away your justification for believing that p, E needs to give 
you a reason to think that your belief that p is either not safe or not sensitive. MODAL 
SECURITY will be called into question in due course, but in this chapter, I focus 
                                              
67 Clarke-Doane (2015: p. 97) formulated this condition to cover both undercutting and 
rebutting defeaters. The reason supporting this broader formulation is that a rebutting 
defeater also gives you a reason that your relevant belief is not both safe and sensitive by 
indicating that the belief is false. This is due to the fact that a false belief can neither be safe 
nor sensitive (ibid.). Clarke-Doane (2016: p. 31) recants this. The reason for this seems to be 
that while every defeater (in Clarke-Doane’s book) indicates that a belief is either not safe or 
not sensitive, undercutting defeaters defeat a belief’s justification only via indicating that it is 
either not safe or not sensitive (as opposed to defeating it via indicating its falsity and its lack 
of safety or sensitivity).  
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exclusively on presenting the standard responses. Critical discussion will take place in 
the next two chapters. 
And to give us a reminder, here are the final versions of the principles of safety and 
sensitivity from section (1.3.5):  
Sensitivity3. S’s belief that p formed via or based on M is sensitive if and only if: 
in nearby possible worlds where p is false, S would not believe that p via or based 
on M.  
Safety3. S’s belief that p formed via or based on M is safe if and only if: in nearby 
possible worlds where S believes that p via or based on M, p is true. 
So, if evolutionary considerations do not undermine the justification for our basic 
moral beliefs, it must be the case that these considerations do not give us a reason to 
think that our basic moral beliefs are either not safe or not sensitive. Why is that so? 
Let’s start with looking into the safety of our basic moral beliefs first. Here we 
encounter a complication. Given that the fundamental moral truths are necessary and 
given that our belief has as its content a basic moral truth, then there’s no close 
possible world where we have this belief while it is false, since there is no possible 
world where the relevant belief is false. Does this mean that belief in necessary truths 
is safe by default?  
No. Epistemologists who hold that safety is a necessary condition for knowledge have 
argued that we can nonetheless evaluate beliefs that have a necessary truth as their 
content in terms of safety. These epistemologists hold that the safety-condition 
should be formulated in such a way as to ensure that a belief formed via the relevant 
method is “safe from error”. For your belief to be safe, it does not suffice that this 
belief could not easily have been wrong. It must also be true, that M could not easily 
have given you a false belief in a different proposition. For example, Duncan 
Pritchard writes that “[all] we need to do is to talk of the doxastic result of the target 
belief-forming process, whatever that might be, and not focus solely on the belief in 
the target proposition” (Pritchard 2009: p. 34). And in a similar vein, Timothy 
Williamson writes that an agent’s belief in a necessary truth can still be unsafe and 
thereby fail “to be knowledge because the method by which he reached it could just 
as easily have led to a false belief in a different proposition” (Williamson 2000: p. 182).  
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Thus our basic moral beliefs could still be unsafe, at least in the sense that although 
the contents of our present beliefs might be necessarily true, we easily might have 
believed differently while still using the same method, and so we could easily have 
had false beliefs.  
So, to have a condition that can give us sensible results in cases where somebody 
forms beliefs in necessary truths in a bad fashion we must amend the safety-condition 
in a way that reflects Pritchard’s and Williamson’s comments. Max Baker-Hytch 
presents us with such an amended safety-condition: 
AMENDED SAFETY. “S safely believes that p in world w via method M iff 
there is no nearby world w* in which S arrives at a false belief with a relevantly 
similar propositional content and with a relevantly similar causal history.” (2014: 
p. 175)  
AMENDED SAFETY can deal with epistemically fishy belief in necessary truths: 
Let’s say that my belief that God exists is a belief in a necessary truth. Let’s say I have 
formed this belief via the testimony provided by a person who unbeknownst to me is 
a habitual liar on matters of religious concern. This lying person decided to tell me 
that the God of “Perfect Being-Theology”68 existed on a whim, but he also might 
have easily told me that Zeus exists. If he had told me that Zeus exists, I would have 
believed it. Although this time around I may have gotten the correct answer by 
consulting this person, there will be some nearby worlds in which I form a distinct 
but similar false belief, a false belief with a very similar causal history to my actual 
belief. My belief that God exists is therefore unsafe, even though it is a belief that has 
a metaphysically necessary proposition as its content. 
Given that our basic moral beliefs have metaphysically necessarily truths as their 
contents, there are no relevantly nearby possible worlds where these same basic moral 
beliefs are false, since there is no possible world where they are false. So, with the 
AMENDED SAFETY-condition in hand, we need to ask whether there are nearby 
worlds where we have different moral beliefs (Faraci Msc: p. 4). Holding fixed the 
actual types of mechanisms bringing about our moral beliefs and the actual moral 
truths, do evolutionary considerations give us reason to think then that we could easily 
                                              
68 Cf. section (3.3.1), FN 82. 
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have come to have different and false moral beliefs? This seems to be affirmed by e.g. 
Braddock, Mogensen and Sinnott-Armstrong when they write:  
[D]ifferent instantiations of the process of cultural group selection have produced 
divergent normative systems, which nonetheless solve the same design-problem: 
namely, that of getting human societies to function as adaptive corporate units. In 
this way, one and the same process type may, through its various instantiations, 
easily result in divergent moral systems. (Braddock, Mogensen & Sinnott-
Armstrong 2012)  
But as Clarke-Doane argues, it is ironically the robustness of evolutionary 
explanations that could help to ensure the safety of our beliefs: Suppose again that we 
have the basic moral beliefs that we actually have for reasons that do not turn on their 
truth, but because, given our evolutionary history, these beliefs raised our 
reproductive fitness. Evolutionary forces would have made it the case that we would 
have these beliefs, no matter the truth. But if evolutionary forces would have made it 
so that we have these beliefs no matter the truth, then it seems these beliefs could not 
have been easily different. And so,  
given that our moral beliefs are actually true…and that the…basic moral truths 
could not have been different, we could not have easily had false…basic moral 
beliefs (Clarke-Doane 2016: p. 29).  
This argument does not mean to conclusively show that our moral beliefs are safe. 
Rather, Clarke-Doane’s point here is that an argument for their safety can be made 
that does not rest on our ability to explain their correspondence with the truth in any 
other sense (Faraci Msc.: p. 4). And so, this explanation seems compatible with, e.g. 
explanations of our moral belief that do not involve the relevant moral truths. 
It should be no surprise that it is controversial how modally robust evolutionary 
explanations really are. Baker-Hytch, who in an unpublished manuscript develops a 
line of argument similar to the one supported by Clarke-Doane, points to Street for 
support for the claim that “evolution pushes human-like creatures in the direction of 
a certain fairly narrow range of biologically optimal moral belief-forming 
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[tendencies]” (Msc.: pp. 17-18).69 This leads Baker-Hytch to conclude, that for at least 
many basic moral beliefs it is true that  
the method or causal process as a result of which we acquired our moral beliefs is 
such that it results in pretty much the same beliefs in nearby possible worlds… 
[therefore,] if… [our actual] beliefs are true, then the beliefs that that method 
produces in nearby possible worlds are also true. (ibid.) 
Joyce (2016b: pp. 131-132) on the other hand disputes that evolutionary explanations 
are robust enough to establish the strong claim that our evolutionary history makes it 
the case that we could not have had different basic moral beliefs. He supports this by 
pointing to the actual diversity of moral beliefs across human cultures. This diversity 
will make it difficult to find a plausible candidate for any moral belief that is 
biologically entrenched in most individuals across most cultures. Furthermore, he 
argues that only an extreme (and in turn extremely implausible) version of moral 
nativism70 would hold or support the claim that particular moral beliefs would have 
been selected for.  
Nevertheless, supposing that this implausible version of moral nativism is true, seems 
for Joyce the best shot for supposing that evolution does supply us with an 
appropriately robust explanation for why we hold our basic moral beliefs. If the AMS 
must rely on an extreme version of moral nativism to establish the claim that our 
moral beliefs are safe, this would provide the debunker with an easy reply: argue that 
since this extreme moral nativism is likely to be false, we have good reason to think 
that evolutionary considerations can show our moral beliefs to be unsafe. 
                                              
69 Here is the relevant quote by Street:  
“From an evolutionary point of view, these and many other of our basic evaluative 
tendencies are no accident. It is fairly obvious why, other things being equal, ancestors with 
these evaluative tendencies would have left more descendants than counterparts who, for 
example, viewed their survival as bad, their children’s lives as worthless, or the fact that 
someone has helped them as a reason to hurt that person in return.” (Street 2008: p. 208) 
70 We have come across moral nativism in section (1.2.2). Here is a reminder of what it is: 
moral nativism holds that humans have a specialized innate mechanism (or mechanisms) that 
accounts for their tendency to categorize the world in moral terms.  
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Perhaps, Clarke-Doane could look to the philosophy of religion to find another way 
of defending the safety of moral belief. More specifically, he could perhaps look to 
Baker-Hytch’s defence of the safety of theistic belief (2014: pp. 178-180).  
Baker-Hytch’s reasoning there has the following starting point: a notorious problem 
with modal conditions in epistemology is that crucial notions like the “closeness” of 
possible worlds and “relevant similarity” are so vague. One way to deal with this 
problem is to use our intuitive judgments about cases on which everyone agrees to 
find an “anchor”-case. What’s meant by “anchor” here? We start with a case where 
we all agree that it constitutes knowledge, e.g. an ordinary case of testimony-based 
belief. Then we start looking for the next closest error world (=possible worlds in 
which a subject S who correctly believes p via M in the actual world, believes a false 
proposition similar to p via M).  
Following Baker-Hytch, one could now go on to argue that for some ordinary 
testimony cases, the closest error world is intuitively at least as close to the actual 
world, as it is for fairly typical cases of basic moral belief. One could then further 
argue that for the ordinary testimony-case, the causal history in the closest error world 
to the belief’s causal history in the actual world is at least as similar as it is for typical 
cases of basic moral beliefs. As Baker-Hytch does for the case of typical instances of 
theistic belief, one could then contend that these two points are at least true for the 
person whose moral beliefs are assumed to be true, and whose moral belief is, as we 
could call it, “causally insulated” by e.g. her culture. That means, that for this person 
a considerable counterfactual alteration of her environment would have to take place 
for her to e.g. have been placed under the influence of a diverging moral system. 
This results in a potential dilemma for the debunker who wants to draw on the 
contingency of moral belief to show that our moral beliefs are unsafe: either (i) the 
argument is only successful if focused on moral beliefs of people whose circumstances 
are such that they easily could have had different beliefs. Or (ii) the safety-measure 
applied to undermine causally insulated moral belief will also undermine ordinary and 
perfectly fine cases of testimony-based belief.  
This is obviously only a sketch of a possible argument for the safety of (some) moral 
belief of perhaps at least some people. Here, I am going to grant Clarke-Doane that 
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some argument of this sort is available to him to support his point that our basic 
moral beliefs are safe, if true. I think the AMS can be shown to be an unsatisfactory 
response to the generic EDA even if we grant this. So much for the argument for the 
safety of our true basic moral beliefs. Now let’s turn to sensitivity.  
Attempting to make use of the sensitivity-condition for debunking morality runs into 
a well-known problem that sensitivity has with beliefs who have as their content a 
necessary truth (cf. e.g., Faraci Msc.; Roland & Cogburn 2011). If a belief is 
metaphysically necessarily true, then the relevant counterfactual if the truth had been 
different then our beliefs would have been correspondingly different is trivially true across 
metaphysically possible worlds (at least on the standard semantics for 
counterfactuals). Therefore, our relevant belief is also sensitive by default because 
since there is no close possible world where the truth is different, but I still have the 
same belief, because there is no possible world where the truth would have been 
different.  
If Clarke-Doane is right, then this means that at least some of our moral beliefs are 
safe and sensitive, the debunking arguments notwithstanding. Now, MODAL 
SECURITY basically tells us that there is no such thing as a non-modal undercutting 
defeater: 
MODAL SECURITY. Information, E, cannot undermine our beliefs of a kind, 
D, without giving us some reason to believe that our D-beliefs are not both safe 
and sensitive. 
In defence of MODAL SECURITY, Clarke-Doane writes that it is hard to see how 
information could undermine our beliefs without challenging their safety or 
sensitivity: after all, if (i) there is no rebutting defeater for our relevant beliefs, and (ii) 
our beliefs are modally secure, i.e. they are both safe and sensitive, then it seems they 
“were (all but) bound to be true” (Clarke-Doane 2016: p. 33).  
And now let us put all the material in this section together, and state the argument 
from modal security: 
  THE ARGUMENT FROM MODAL SECURITY. 
(i). Our basic moral beliefs are true.  
(ii). If true, our basic moral beliefs are metaphysically necessarily true.  
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(iii). Therefore, our basic moral beliefs are metaphysically necessarily true.  
(iv). If our basic moral beliefs are metaphysically necessarily true, then our basic 
moral beliefs are sensitive by default since there is no close possible world in 
which they are false.  
(v). Therefore, our basic moral beliefs are sensitive.  
(vi). If our basic moral beliefs are metaphysically necessarily true and if we could 
not easily have failed to have these beliefs, then our basic moral beliefs are 
safe.  
(vii). We could not easily have failed to have our basic moral beliefs.  
(viii). Therefore, our basic moral beliefs are safe.  
(ix). Our basic moral beliefs are both safe and sensitive.  
(x). Information, E, cannot undermine our beliefs of a kind, D, without giving us 
some reason to believe that our D-beliefs are not both safe and sensitive. 
(xi). If our basic moral beliefs are true, then evolutionary explanations of our moral 
beliefs do not give us a reason to believe that our basic moral beliefs are not 
both safe and sensitive.  
(xii). Therefore, evolutionary explanations do not provide us with undercutting 
defeaters for our moral beliefs.  
(xiii). Evolutionary explanations do not provide us with rebutting defeaters for our 
moral beliefs. 
(xiv). Therefore, evolutionary explanations neither undermine, nor rebut our basic 
moral beliefs.  
(xv). The justification of our basic moral beliefs is not defeated by evolutionary 
explanations.  
(xvi). We are able to justifiably infer non-basic moral truths from our basic moral 
beliefs and our non-moral background knowledge. 
(xvii). So, evolutionary explanations do not defeat the justification for all of our basic 
and non-basic moral beliefs.  
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2.3 THIRD-FACTOR ACCOUNTS  
Another kind of standard response to EDAs in the above sense are third-factor 
accounts. Before we can discuss these responses themselves though, we need to 
provide some context.  
In section (2.2), we have seen that Clarke-Doane thinks that the debunkers aim (or in 
any case, would need to aim) at proving that evolutionary considerations show our 
beliefs to be either not safe or not sensitive. In a similar vein, third-factor theorists, 
seem to be worried that evolutionary considerations could give us reason to think that 
even if our moral beliefs were true, we would have arrived at the truth only due to a 
problematic sort of epistemic luck.  
How might an evolutionary explanation of our moral beliefs imply that these beliefs 
if true, are true only as a matter of epistemic luck? The idea here seems to be that it 
might require an extraordinary coincidence if evolution has favoured the production 
of true moral beliefs given that matters of moral truth and falsity are irrelevant in 
accounting for the selection pressures that shaped human moral psychology. This idea 
is clearly recognizable in Street e.g. in defending the first horn of her dilemma, she 
tells us:  
[T]he content of human evaluative judgements has been tremendously 
influenced...by the forces of natural selection, such that our system of evaluative 
judgements is saturated with evolutionary influence...[C]oincidence between the 
realist’s independent evaluative truths and the evaluative directions in which 
natural selection tended to push us...would require a fluke of luck that’s...extremely 
unlikely, in view of the huge universe of logically possible evaluative judgements 
and truths. (2006: pp. 121-122) 
David Enoch makes clear that he thinks of the evolutionary challenge along those 
lines. According to Enoch, the challenge consists in the charge that a commitment to 
non-naturalist realism makes it apparently impossible to explain how our moral beliefs 
and the moral facts are reliably correlated, given that non-naturalistically construed 
moral facts are causally and constitutively independent of our moral attitudes. Here’s 
Enoch’s concise abstract statement of the challenge: 
55 
Very often, when we accept a normative judgement j, it is indeed true that j; and 
very often when we do not accept a normative judgement j (or at least when we 
reject it), it is indeed false that j. So there is a correlation between (what the realist 
takes to be) the normative truths and our normative judgements. What explains 
this correlation? (Enoch 2011: p. 421) 
Evolution highlights this problem. Assuming non-naturalist realism, the moral truths 
are not dependent on our moral attitudes. Furthermore, the moral non-naturalist is 
not a moral sceptic: she thinks that often enough, our moral beliefs land on the 
relevant moral truths, and not just as a matter of luck. Therefore, non-naturalists are 
committed to a reliable correlation between our moral beliefs and the moral truths.  
But assuming the debunkers have gotten the empirical story right, our moral beliefs 
have been influenced to a significant degree by evolutionary pressures. Assume that 
the non-naturalist does not deny the empirical story. Now, as we have noted in section 
(1.4), the generic EDA tells us that non-naturalistically construed moral facts were 
not involved in the evolutionary explanation of our moral belief-forming faculty. 
Putting all this together, the non-naturalist moral realist now is committed to strong 
correlation between the independent moral truths and the moral beliefs you can 
expect in evolutionary successful creatures whose moral belief-forming tendencies 
have been selected for (Enoch 2010: pp. 425-426). But what accounts for this relation 
given that non-naturalistically construed moral facts are not involved in the 
evolutionary explanation of our moral faculty? What accounts for the strong 
correlation given that evolution is a truth-irrelevant influence, an influence that we 
should not expect to reliably push us towards the moral truths? So, according to 
Enoch (and it seems third-factor theorists more generally), the “general challenge…is 
that of coming up with an explanation of a correlation between our relevant beliefs 
and the relevant truths” (ibid.).  
If this challenge cannot be met, it seems that the non-naturalist moral realist is 
committed to positing an unexplained brute correlation between moral beliefs and 
moral truths, i.e. a reliable correlation that came about by accident. And this seems to 
imply that whenever we hit on the truth in our moral beliefs, we do so as a matter of 
epistemic luck. This is due to (i) our beliefs being formed under the influence of a 
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truth-irrelevant force, and (ii) there being no principled explanation for the reliable 
correlation between our moral beliefs and the moral truths. 
In turn, third-factor theorists try to neutralize this potential threat by providing an 
account of how we would end up with a reliable moral belief-forming faculty, even 
though non-naturalistically construed moral facts are not involved in the evolutionary 
explanation of the development of this faculty.  
The guiding thought behind third-factor proposals is succinctly stated by Karl 
Schafer:  
[In] evaluating the reliability of our normative dispositions, it doesn’t matter 
whether or not they developed so as to track the nonnormative properties that 
have normative significance because these properties have normative significance, 
so long as the development of our normative faculties was sensitive to the 
distinction between properties that do have normative significance and those that 
do not for some reason. (2010: p. 480; Schafer’s emphasis)71 
Let’s illustrate Schafer’s point by using the example of pain. Say that it is a moral fact 
that pain is pro tanto morally bad (I’ll leave the “pro tanto” implicit in the next few 
lines). To meet the challenge of accounting for the reliable correlation between moral 
beliefs and truths, it is not necessary to claim that our moral faculty developed as it 
did because pain really is morally bad.72 It will suffice to have an account that shows 
how our moral faculty has developed in a way that makes us disposed to believe that 
pain is bad for some reason. The reason here could be that as it happens, creatures 
who were disposed to believe (or proto-believe) that pain is bad in our ancestors’ 
circumstances had a reproductive advantage over creatures who were disposed to 
believe (or proto-believe) otherwise. Since these beliefs happen to be true, it turns out 
                                              
71 Schafer’s account here serves to emphasize a general thought underlying third-factor 
responses, even though it is certainly open to discussion, whether Schafer’s account is best 
seen as a third-factor account, or as a closely related, but more straightforward response to 
EDAs (cf. Morton 2018: p. 4). 
72 This is good news too: this claim would tie you to the implausible position that Street 
termed the “tracking account” (cf. section (1.2.1). That means, the account that evolutionary 
forces have tended to make our evaluative judgments track the attitude-independent 
evaluative truths or facts because making true evaluative judgments promoted our ancestors’ 
reproductive success 
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that evolution happened to lead to the development of a faculty that would dispose 
us to have true beliefs about the badness of pain.  
Now, with some context in place, we are in position to look at third-factor accounts 
in some detail. I take the following succinct general statement of third-factor views 
from Selim Berker:  
THIRD-FACTOR ACCOUNT. Evolutionary forces have tended to make our 
moral judgments track the attitude-independent normative truth because, for each 
normative judgment influenced by evolution in this way, there is some third factor, 
F, such that  
(i) F tends to causally (help) make it the case that (proto) judging in that way 
promotes reproductive success (when in our ancestors’ environment), and  
(ii) F tends to metaphysically (help) make it the case that the content of that 
judgment is true.73 (2014: p. 15) 
As Berker points out, one basic thought behind third factor-accounts is that it is not 
necessary to posit a direct dependency relation between our belief that p and the fact 
that p to account for why it is not accidental that the belief tracks the fact (Berker 
2014: p. 15). In many cases, a common cause-structure or a structure akin to a 
common cause-explanation will serve just fine to explain the tracking relation between 
judgment and fact (where we posit a third factor on which the belief and the fact 
depend). Another point that is emphasized by Berker is that “when explaining why a 
given judgment tracks a given fact, any sort of a dependency relation is enough” 
(ibid.). So, to explain why a belief that p tracks the fact that p, one can take a common-
cause structure and replace one of the causal relations with a metaphysical relation 
(e.g., a supervenience or a grounding relation) (ibid.). When “p” is normative we 
would then have a typical third factor-explanation, where you posit some non-
normative factor F on which the belief that p causally depends, and on which the fact 
that p metaphysically depends. Importantly, this allows the realist to explain why our 
                                              
73 In the above “pain-example”, the relevant factor F would be the non-normative facts 
about pain, which are then said to both (i) partly (causally) explain why creatures, who were 
disposed to believe (or proto-believe) that pain is bad in our ancestors’ circumstances had a 
reproductive advantage, and (ii) to partly (metaphysically) explain why it is a normative fact 
that pain really is bad.  
58 
moral judgments track the moral facts, without endowing the moral facts with causal 
powers.  
Different third factor accounts will substitute “F” with different non-normative 
assumptions, and they will then posit different substantive moral facts, that are (at 
least partly) grounded in F. For example, Enoch’s proposal (2010, 2011) substitutes 
the “non-normative facts about survival (of creatures like us and our ancestors)” for 
“F”, and works with the normative assumption that survival is good for beings like 
us and our ancestors. Wielenberg (2010) pursues a similar strategy in substituting “F” 
with the “non-normative facts about certain cognitive faculties (of creatures like us 
and our ancestors)” and he utilizes a moral assumption about the value of certain 
cognitive faculties.  
To further illustrate how these accounts work, consider Enoch’s and Wielenberg’s 
proposals. As Enoch (2011) has argued, our moral beliefs about what is good track 
facts about what promotes survival – that’s an important part of the evolutionary 
story about the origins of our moral beliefs. That survival indeed is generally good for 
beings like us in our usual circumstances is the substantive normative assumption 
involved.74 As it happens, the argument goes, evolutionary forces have tended to push 
us towards believing that survival is good (because being disposed to believe this 
presumably tended to raise fitness in our ancestors’ circumstances). Survival therefore 
stands both in a causal relation with our moral beliefs (as evolutionary forces have 
pushed us towards believing that survival is good) and it stands in a metaphysical 
relation with the moral facts (e.g., the moral fact that survival is good is partly 
grounded in the non-normative facts about survival or the moral fact that survival is 
good supervenes on the non-normative facts about survival). Thus, there is a third 
factor – survival – that explains both our moral beliefs and the moral facts. If survival 
is good for beings like us and evolutionary forces have pushed us towards moral 
judgments that track the goodness of survival, then it turns out that evolutionary 
forces have generally pushed us in the direction of the moral truth.  
                                              
74 The claim that “survival is good” is qualified in quite a few ways in Enoch’s argument: he 
says that all he requires is that survival, for beings like us and our ancestors, in our usual 
circumstances, is by-and-large better than the alternative (Enoch 20111: p. 168).  
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Wielenberg (2010) assumes that creatures like us, who are endowed with certain 
cognitive capacities, have rights. Starting from this assumption, he argues to the 
conclusion that we are perfectly reliable at detecting that we have rights – and for 
evolutionary reasons, no less. Evolution has selected for creatures with our advanced 
cognitive capacities, once again presumably for the reason that having these capacities 
tended to raise fitness. Creatures with such advanced cognitive abilities have rights. 
The fact that humans have rights is partly grounded in the facts about their cognitive 
makeup. Thus, in selecting for creatures like us to have certain advanced cognitive 
capacities, evolution selects for creatures with rights. The crucial step for Wielenberg 
is to point out that to entertain the thought that you have rights, you must be a 
creature with advanced cognitive capacities that enable you to have some grasp on 
the concept of rights (2010: pp. 446-447). If rights exist, it is widely agreed their 
presence is guaranteed by the presence of advanced cognitive faculties (ibid.). 
Wielenberg assumes that humans have rights. Thus, if you believe that you have 
rights, you exhibit certain cognitive faculties which guarantee that you have rights 
(given that rights exist). It is thus no worrisome coincidence that our beliefs that 
humans have rights match the moral truth, as evolution pushed us towards developing 
cognitive faculties which also (partly) ground the fact that humans have rights.  
Both Enoch and Wielenberg also discuss potential worries that their third-factor 
accounts might yet involve instances of problematic epistemic luck. The worry here 
might be that it is also a problematic instance of epistemic luck that evolutionary 
forces have played just the right sort of role in bringing about a correlation between 
our beliefs and the relevant truths, given that it is not the case that evolution has 
pushed us towards forming our beliefs because they are true. It seems that if our 
ancestors’ circumstances had been relevantly different, evolution’s influence on our 
moral faculty would have led to relevantly different (and thus false) beliefs. So, it 
seems that even given the third-factor explanation, there’s a sense in which we are 
lucky to have true moral beliefs. 
Enoch responds to this worry with what seems to be a “partners-in-guilt”-argument 
(Enoch 2011: pp. 172-173). He asserts that it is true that some luck is involved in 
evolving a faculty that happens to dispose us to believe truly. But he argues that the 
same kind of epistemic luck is involved in the development of accurate perceptual 
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faculties. Had our ancestors’ circumstances been relevantly different, then being 
disposed to have accurate perceptual beliefs might not have raised fitness in those 
different circumstances. But we don’t tend to worry about this kind of epistemic luck 
in the development of our perceptual faculties. Since, according to Enoch, it is the 
same kind of epistemic luck in both cases, either we should be worried in both cases 
or in neither of them. Since recommending being worried in both cases seems to settle 
you with a sceptical result that goes far beyond the debunkers’ intended goal, Enoch 
concludes we should not worry in either case. 
A second worry is that according to Enoch’s proposal, evolution happened to aim at 
something which is good (i.e., survival) but might also have aimed at something that 
is not good.75 And in that case, we would have tended to believe that this different 
aim is good and would thus have believed falsely. (You will recognize this thought 
from our above discussion on the issue of whether evolution easily could have 
resulted in us believing differently in moral matters.) Here Enoch seems to basically 
just state that for creatures like us and our ancestors in our circumstances, it does not 
seem to be the case that an aim different than survival could easily have led to belief-
forming tendencies that would have been adaptive (cf. Enoch 2011: p. 172). 
Therefore, we need not worry about what would have been if evolution would have 
aimed at something different than survival.  
One thing also worth pointing out is that third-factor accounts in themselves only 
offer a partial vindication of what we usually take ourselves to know in moral matters. 
They aim to show how certain basic individual claims to moral knowledge (concerning 
e.g. the goodness of survival or that humans have rights) are defensible even given an 
evolutionary moral genealogy. However, the hope of third-factor theorists clearly is 
that this can deliver the base for a more thorough vindication (Enoch 2011: p. 168), 
a vindication of many of our non-basic moral beliefs. The thought here seems to be 
that once we can take our basic moral beliefs for granted, then we can tell a story on 
how we can potentially use e.g. rational reflection to correct for the influence of 
                                              
75 A related worry could of course also be that survival could have failed to be good. But 
with regards to this worry, Enoch seems to go for the same reasoning as Clarke-Doane: that 
survival is good is a basic moral truth that is necessary in a strong sense (Enoch 2011: p. 
172). 
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evolution, if we had reason to think that this influence would perhaps lead us astray 
in the case of some non-basic moral beliefs (Vavova 2015: p. 115). Basically, third-
factor theorists like Enoch here seem to think that if the reliable correlation between 
our basic moral beliefs and the independent moral truths is not unexplainable, we will 
have some plausible means for accounting for the reliable correlation between our 
non-basic moral beliefs and the relevant independent moral truths as well (via e.g. 
pointing to the correcting influence of rational reflection).  
Again, I think it is useful to end with putting the above material together in the form 
of an argument. This time around, the argument we end up with is a bit simpler: 
  THIRD-FACTOR ARGUMENT. 
(i) Our moral beliefs are true.  
(ii) Evolutionary considerations can only undercut our moral beliefs via giving us 
reason to think that the reliable correlation between our moral beliefs and the 
independent moral truths is unexplainable.  
(iii) If our moral beliefs are true, then we can explain the reliable correlation 
between our basic moral beliefs and the independent moral truths via a third-
factor account.  
(iv) Therefore, the reliable correlation between our basic moral beliefs and the 
independent moral truths is not unexplainable.  
(v) If the reliable correlation between our basic moral beliefs and the independent 
moral truths is not unexplainable, we can account for the reliable correlation 
between our non-basic moral beliefs and the relevant independent moral 
truths (via e.g. pointing to the correcting influence of rational reflection).  
(vi) Therefore, the reliable correlation between our non-basic moral beliefs and 
the relevant independent moral truths is not unexplainable.  
(vii) Therefore, evolutionary considerations do not undercut our moral beliefs.  
That wraps up my presentation of the two standard responses to EDAs. The 
remainder of this thesis will be dedicated to the development of arguments against 




In this chapter, I have presented two influential standard responses to EDAs, third-
factor accounts and the AMS. These two responses offer considerations meant to 
neutralize the epistemic threat supposedly arising from EDAs. Both responses 
suppose that the epistemic threat in need of neutralizing is roughly that evolutionary 
considerations might show our moral beliefs to be subject to a problematic kind of 
epistemic luck. And both responses crucially assume the truth of our common-sense 
moral beliefs. In the next two chapters, I will now evaluate these responses.  
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3 THE STANDARD RESPONSES AS DEFEATER-
DEFEATERS 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
The generic EDA is meant to generate a defeater for our moral beliefs. Third-factor 
responses and the AMS try to establish the claim that evolutionary considerations do 
not undercut the justification of our moral beliefs. That means they both offer 
considerations meant to counter-act or neutralize the supposedly defeating force of 
evolutionary explanations. In this chapter, I try to do a few things. First, I want to 
elucidate what it is for a consideration to counter-act or neutralize a supposed 
defeater. Next, I will consider one possible option for how an alleged defeater can be 
neutralized (the defeater-defeater option). And I will assess the success of the standard 
responses, if we understand these responses as defeater-defeaters.76 
Here is the plan for the chapter. First, in (3.2), I will work out how these two responses 
conflict with the generic EDA. Here I will also argue that in relation to the generic 
EDA (and EDAs more generally), we can either understand the AMS and third-factor 
accounts as presenting defeater-defeaters or defeater-deflectors. 
In (3.3), I will show that for both third-factor accounts and the AMS, we can find 
cases, where, intuitively, a belief’s justification is lost in virtue of incoming information 
about the explanatory history of the faculty that produced it. And I will argue that in 
those cases, intuitively, justification is lost, even though the believer is aware that if 
her belief were true, her belief is modally secure or not subject to a problematic sort 
of coincidence. I will furthermore argue that in all relevant respects, these cases are 
exactly analogous to the cases of the relevant moral believers. The two examples 
constructed in this section will be very important for the further critical discussion, in 
both this chapter and the next.  
In (3.4), I will argue that if we understand the AMS and third-factor accounts as 
defeater-defeaters, we have good reason to think that both responses are not 
                                              
76 As will become apparent during this chapter, my line of reasoning draws heavily on Moon 
(2016).  
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successful in reinstating the justification of our moral beliefs. In (3.5), I will conclude 
by summarizing the most important points from this chapter.  
3.2 DEFEATER-DEFEATERS OR DEFEATER-DEFLECTORS? 
After the presentation of the argument from modal security and third-factor accounts 
in the previous chapter, I will now develop an argument against these standard 
responses to EDAs. Let’s first work out where the epistemological conflict between 
these responses and the generic EDA lies.  
To recap: How does evolution generate a defeater for your moral beliefs according to 
the generic EDA? According to the generic EDA, evolution generates an 
undercutting defeater for your moral beliefs by making it the case that you should 
withhold belief that the explanatory history of your moral faculty involves moral facts. 
If your belief that your moral faculty is reliable is not based on a source of justification 
independent of this faculty, then, in the end, this makes it the case that you should 
withhold or disbelieve that your moral faculty is reliable. This is the generic EDA’s 
story about how receiving information that the best explanation for our moral faculty 
does not involve the relevant moral facts takes away your justification.  
Both third-factor responses and the AMS argue for the claim that evolutionary 
considerations do not undercut the justification of our moral beliefs. That means they 
both offer considerations meant to counter-act or neutralize the supposedly defeating 
force of evolutionary explanations. In section (1.3.2) above, we heard that the 
epistemic danger arising from alleged defeaters can be met in two ways:  
Via a defeater-defeater: Initially, at t0, your belief that p is justified. Then, at t1, 
you receive information D that defeats your belief that p. At this point in time, 
you are not justified to believe that p. But afterwards, at t2, you receive new 
information D-DEFEATER that counter-acts the defeater for believing that p, 
which reinstates your justification for believing that p.  
Via a defeater-deflector: Initially, at t0, your belief that p is justified. At t1, you 
already possess or receive information D-DEFLECTOR, that keeps information 
D, which you receive at the latter point in time t2, from defeating your belief that 
p and thereby from taking away your justification for believing that p. Without 
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possessing or receiving D-DEFLECTOR at t1, receiving information D at t2 
would have defeated your justification for believing that p.  
The basic difference between defeater-defeaters and defeater-deflectors is a difference 
between how the justification for a belief of yours changes or remains constant 
depending on everything else you believe or should believe at certain points in time. 
In section (1.4.1), we formulated the following necessary condition for justified belief, 
a condition that basically tells you that for your belief to be justified, you need to lack 
an undercutting defeater for that belief:  
NO DEFEATER. S justifiably believes that p only if it is not the case that in 
virtue of S’s doxastic/normative set of background beliefs, S should withhold or 
disbelieve p*.77 
If S justifiably believes that p it is necessarily not the case that in virtue of her 
background beliefs or in virtue of beliefs that S should have due to the evidence 
available to her, S should withhold or disbelieve that her belief was reliably formed 
(via the method that S employed to form it). 
In defeater-defeater-cases (where the relevant defeater is an undercutting one), the 
following scenario now obtains: at a certain point in time, t0, S is justified in believing 
that p via method M. Afterwards, at t1, due to new information that S receives, it is 
now the case that, given everything else she now believes or should believe, S should 
withhold or disbelieve that p*. And after that, at t2, S comes into possession of further 
information, that counter-acts the information she received at t2 in such a way, that S 
should now no longer withhold or disbelieve that p*. 
Take the following example of such a scenario: Paula sees (or seems to see) a guitar 
in her brother’s garden shed, and on the basis of her visual perception, she forms the 
belief: “There’s a guitar in in my brother’s garden shed”. Initially, it seems that this 
belief formed on the basis of her visual perception is justified. Sometime afterwards, 
Dr. Uno, an ophthalmologist with seemingly excellent credentials, diagnoses Paula 
during a routine examination with a peculiar eye defect, an eye defect that makes her 
hallucinate guitars whenever she finds herself in a garden shed. It seems that receiving 
                                              
77 Where p* was the proposition that your belief that p was formed reliably (via your way of 
arriving at your belief that p). 
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this information indeed undercuts her original belief’s justification. That means 
Paula’s justification for believing that there is a guitar in her brother’s garden shed is 
lost upon receiving the medical expert’s testimony. Assume also that Paula has no 
reason to mistrust Dr. Uno. Later still, a few colleagues and associates of Dr. Uno 
come to Paula. While these people assert that there really is a peculiar eye defect that 
causes you to hallucinate guitars when you are in a garden shed, they also tell her that 
Uno recently went mad. This led him to diagnose people with exotic eye defects they 
do not have. Paula, it now seems, was one of those people. It seems that the 
justification for Paula’s initial belief is reinstated again. Here the testimony of Uno’s 
colleagues and associates counter-acts the defeating force of Uno’s testimony in such 
a way as to make it the case that her belief that there is a guitar in her brother’s garden 
shed is once again justified on the basis of her original visual perception.  
In a defeater-deflector case (again, where the relevant defeater is an undercutting one), 
the scenario looks like this: at a certain point in time, t0, S is justified in believing that 
p via M. Afterwards, at t1, S is already in possession of information, or else now 
receives information, that serves to prevent the occurrence of defeat at t2, where in 
the absence of this information, S’s belief that p would have been defeated at t2. That 
means that either before or at t2, it is never the case that S’s belief that p via M 
becomes unjustified.  
Consider the following example of a defeater-deflector-scenario: Tim is a PhD-
student, who is writing a thesis in history. He’s working on the causes of an outbreak 
of a typhus epidemic in the city of ABC in the 19th century. Sometime into his 
investigation, after collecting and assessing considerable amounts of evidence, Tim 
forms the (let’s suppose) initially justified belief that the outbreak was mainly due to 
mismanagement at the level of local government. He then discovers a fairly unknown 
study by another historian, Liz, that discusses a number of documents (let’s call these 
documents “Dossier X”) that Tim so far has not encountered in his research. 
Although Liz’s study is unknown, it seems to be of a very high quality (which is 
attested by several experts on the subject at hand, which Tim presents with Liz’s 
book), and makes a rather compelling case that is consistent with all the known facts 
about the case. Liz reports in her study that Dossier X looks very much authentic, 
and seems to indicate clearly that it was actually the national government’s 
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mismanagement, which was to blame for the typhus outbreak. Dossier X also 
indicates that the national government then proceeded to cover its tracks via 
fabricating evidence that implicates the local government. And it is this seemingly 
fabricated evidence, on which Tim has based his originally justified belief.  
But Liz then goes on to argue, convincingly, that the whole case (supported by 
Dossier X) for a conspiracy headed by the national government is made up. Through 
painstaking research, she has discovered that Dossier X, which seems to show that 
there was a conspiracy by the national government to avert blame for the outbreak of 
the typhus epidemic, was most likely itself manufactured by a masterful forger in the 
service of the local government of ABC. The forged Dossier X is so convincing, that 
it took Liz years of work to prove that it is not authentic. Liz concludes that the (most 
likely forged) Dossier X gives us no reason to think that there’s anything wrong with 
the original evidence (=the evidence which indicates that the local government of 
ABC is responsible). 
Sometime afterwards, Tim comes across the fabricated documents that make up 
Dossier X. Had he not discovered Liz’s almost forgotten study, then Tim’s belief that 
the local government was crucially responsible for the outbreak would have been 
defeated via casting doubt on the trustworthiness of the grounds for Tim’s original 
belief. But the information contained in Liz’s study seems to be capable of preventing 
the occurrence of defeat (via preventing Dossier X from functioning as a defeater). 
Thus, in this example, it is never the case that Tim’s initially justified belief becomes 
unjustified. 
The generic EDA tries to generate an undercutting defeater for our moral beliefs. In 
response, third-factor accounts and the AMS can be seen as responding either via 
presenting a defeater-defeater or a defeater-deflector. That means these responses can 
either argue that our justification for our moral beliefs can be reinstated (the defeater-
defeater option) or they can argue that the justification for our moral beliefs is never 
lost to begin with, since the considerations offered by these responses prevent the 
evolutionary explanation from constituting a defeater in the first place (the defeater-
deflector option).  
So, the question I am interested in now is:  
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Do third-factor responses and the AMS constitute defeater-defeaters or defeater-
deflectors? 
I will go through both options in this chapter (the defeater-defeater option) and the 
next (the defeater-deflector option). The trouble for the AMS and third-factor 
accounts is that neither option is promising. 
3.3 A SET OF INCONVENIENT CASES: LARRY AND ANNE 
In this section, I will argue that for both third-factor accounts and the AMS, we can 
find cases where, intuitively, a belief’s justification is lost in virtue of incoming 
information about the explanatory history of the faculty that produced it. And I am 
going to argue that in those cases, intuitively, justification is lost, even though the 
believer is aware that if her belief were true, her belief is modally secure or not subject 
to a problematic sort of coincidence. I will furthermore argue that in all relevant 
respects, these cases are exactly analogous to the cases of the relevant moral believers. 
There are ways to dispute the analogy, but these ways of responding seem to make 
the standard responses superfluous.  
As we are going to see in the next two sections, the existence of these two kinds of 
cases proves to be very inconvenient for the AMS and third-factor account. 
Intuitively, in both cases, the relevant subjects would be epistemically irrational for 
continuing to hold onto their belief in light of the relevant incoming information.78  
3.3.1 THE CASE OF LARRY 
Let’s begin by discussing an example that is problematic for the AMS. Here I present 
and discuss a version of an example due to Silvia Jonas (2016).79 Larry believes that 
                                              
78 My presentation of the cases in (4.3.1) and (4.3.2), and the subsequent discussion of the 
standard responses as defeater-defeaters in (4.4) is similar in structure to Locke’s (2014: p. 
231) discussion of his “Martian”-case.  
79 Jonas uses the original version of this example to argue that the AMS is problematic for 
rendering certain beliefs “viciously immune” (cf. Jonas 2016: p. 11; Schechter 2018). Jonas 
argues that if sound, Clarke-Doane’s argument would make it in principle impossible to 
challenge the reliability of beliefs that have as their content metaphysically necessary truths 
and with respect to which some intervening force (e.g., evolution or cultural influence) has 
made it so that we could not easily have believed differently. However, both Jonas and 
Schechter make the point that this is highly implausible: sometimes causal influences in the 
origin story of these beliefs do seem to pose a real challenge to the reliability of these beliefs 
(Jonas 2016: p. 11).  
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God exists. This belief is in fact true. This belief is based on an intellectual seeming80 
of Larry. It seems to Larry that God exists, and, on this basis, he forms the belief that 
God exists. Assume that Larry’s belief that God exists is initially justified. Significantly 
for our purposes, this means (among other things) that given his initial 
doxastic/normative set of background beliefs, it is not the case that Larry should 
withhold or disbelieve that his belief that God exists was formed reliably (via an 
intellectual seeming).  
Note that Larry’s theistic belief has important similarities with the moral beliefs of 
ordinary epistemic agents. First, many of the moral beliefs of ordinary believers seem 
to be based on their strong inclination to have these beliefs. In other words, many 
ordinary beliefs are held by people because they seem true to them. For example, it 
appears that ordinary moral believers often think that killing is (pro tanto) wrong 
because it seems true to them that killing is (pro tanto) wrong, and this seeming 
remains intact even after some reflection.  
Now, perhaps Clarke-Doane would object at this point by saying that the crucial 
difference between Larry’s theistic beliefs and the beliefs of ordinary moral believers 
is that ordinary moral beliefs are initially justified, while Larry’s belief that God exists 
is not. But it is hard to see why that must be case. Stipulate that Larry has thought as 
long and hard about God’s existence as any typical moral believer has thought about 
the wrongness of killing or the value of giving to charity. Stipulate that Larry has so 
far not encountered evidence that indicates clearly that there might be something 
epistemically wrong with his belief. My point here is basically the following: if it can 
                                              
80 Intellectual seemings are sui generis propositional attitudes that p, akin to perceptual 
seemings, that can non-inferentially justify beliefs formed on their basis. What distinguishes 
seemings from other attitudes is their peculiar phenomenal character:  
“The phenomenology of a seeming makes it feel as though the seeming is ‘recommending’ 
its propositional content as true or ‘assuring’ us of the content’s truth.” (Tucker 2011: p. 57)  
I basically assume that intuitions are intellectual seemings here. If you are uncomfortable with 
an account of intuition in terms of intellectual seemings, you could substitute it with an 
account of intuitions as e.g., non-inferentially justified beliefs.  
I grant that, in virtue of having the intuition that p, I have prima facie justification to believe 
p, even if I have no positive evidence for the reliability of my intuitions. As Mogensen (2017: 
pp. 282-283) writes, this is something the debunker should grant: given the extent to which 
our moral judgments are governed by our intuitions, supposing otherwise would arguably 
require a wide-ranging scepticism about ordinary moral beliefs, rendering any concern about 
the debunking power of evolutionary considerations idle. For more on intellectual seemings, 
see FN 153 in appendix I.  
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be the case that (in the right circumstances) moral beliefs gain some modest level of 
epistemic support via being based on a subject’s intellectual seeming, then it is hard 
to see how one could exclude the possibility that Larry’s theistic belief (in the right 
circumstances) gains the same level of support from being based on his intellectual 
seeming. I simply ask you to imagine that the right circumstances are in place: i.e., it 
is initially at least not the case that given everything else Larry believes or should 
believe, Larry should immediately withhold or disbelieve that his belief that God exists 
was reliably formed.81 
Let us furthermore stipulate that Larry is aware and justifiably believes that if his belief 
that God exists is true, it is metaphysically necessarily true.82 Now, given that I 
suppose that Larry is an ordinary theistic believer in this scenario, he does not, of 
course, explicitly believe “If my belief that God exists is true, it is metaphysically 
necessarily true”. But Larry could well be aware that if God exists, then there is a 
certain sense in which God could not easily have failed to exist. And assume that if 
he were to be interrogated by a philosopher, Larry perhaps could be brought to agree 
and appreciate that there is a clear difference in necessity between the existence of 
God (assuming God exists) and the existence of e.g., a book in Larry’s library. And 
perhaps he could, on the basis of this appreciation, be brought to assert that if his 
belief that God exists is true, it is necessary in the same strong sense as his belief that 
atoms of gold have 79 protons is necessarily true. And that suffices for the purposes 
of the example.  
Moreover, let’s say that Larry is aware and justifiably believes that given his 
circumstances, he could not easily have believed differently. In other words, he 
justifiably believes in a certain explanation for why he holds the belief that God exists, 
                                              
81 It is also important to note that the requirements on Larry’s circumstances do not seem to 
be that challenging, at least if we are assuming that the moral beliefs of actual moral believers 
can be and regularly are justified on the basis of their moral intuition. If a substantial number 
of actual moral believers hold moral beliefs, which are justified on the basis of their intuition, 
then it must be the case that the requirements on a believer’s circumstances allow for factors 
like e.g., the awareness, that there is substantial disagreement about the subject matter of the 
relevant beliefs.  
82 I am assuming that Larry’s theistic belief is about the God of “Perfect Being Theology”, 
i.e. an omnipotent, morally perfect and omniscient divine being that is often thought to be 
metaphysically necessary, if it exists (cf. Davidson 2013: Section 1).  
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an explanation that has no bearing on the truth of the belief,83 but that does show 
that Larry could not have easily believed differently. So, Larry in this example is 
broadly aware and justifiably believes that his belief that God exists, if true, is 
metaphysically necessary, and that given his circumstances, he could not easily have 
believed differently. Thus, I stipulate that it is correct to say of this scenario that Larry 
is broadly aware and justifiably believes that his belief that God exists is modally 
secure if it is true.  
So, Larry is broadly aware and justifiably believes that if his belief that God exists is 
true, then it was all but bound to be true. However, Larry then receives information 
that for the whole period of time in which he has formed and held the belief that God 
exists, he has been fed hallucinogenic drugs. And he’s informed that these are drugs, 
which tend to produce intellectual seemings that God exists in most people.  
One plausible way of working out what happens when Larry receives this information 
is to say that he has now come into the possession of evidence for the claim that the 
best explanation of the faculty that produces his intellectual seemings about theistic 
subject matters does not involve facts about God. This makes it the case that Larry 
should now withhold belief about the claim that the explanatory history of his 
“theistic intellectual seemings”-faculty involves the relevant theistic facts.  
Now, Larry might not be too troubled by this. After all, if Larry has means to confirm 
the reliability of his “theistic intellectual seemings”-faculty which are independent of 
this faculty, then it seems that his belief might nonetheless be justified, even after 
Larry has considered all the information now accessible to him. But let us stipulate 
that Larry does not have independent means of doing this. That means Larry has no 
means of confirming the reliability of his faculty that produces his theistic intellectual 
seemings that is independent of this very faculty.  
So, in line with the general epistemological story that supports the generic EDA, we 
can give an account of how receiving information that his theistic beliefs have been 
formed under the influence of hallucinogenic drugs affects the initially positive 
epistemic status of those beliefs. Given all the information in his possession, it is now 
                                              
83 Knowing that this explanation holds does not give Larry an epistemic reason to think that 
his belief is true. 
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the case that Larry should withhold or disbelieve that his theistic beliefs have been 
formed reliably via his “theistic intellectual seemings”-faculty. And this means that his 
justification for holding his theistic beliefs is undercut.  
Importantly, this epistemological story stays silent on the modal security of Larry’s 
belief. Since Larry is broadly aware that if his belief that God exists is true, this belief 
is modally secure, he does not think that the above incoming information makes his 
belief that God exists epistemically inappropriate because it shows it to be not modally 
secure.  
Is the case of Larry exactly analogous in all relevant respects to the case of the moral 
believer according to the AMS? It seems it is. In both cases, the relevant beliefs are 
assumed to be true. In both cases, the relevant beliefs are initially justified. In both 
cases, these beliefs are modally secure, if true, and the subject is aware that her beliefs 
are modally secure, if true. In both cases, the subject is confronted with information 
that makes the subject aware that the best explanation for her relevant way of arriving 
at her beliefs does not involve the relevant facts. And the subject becomes aware that 
she lacks independent means of confirming the reliability of her way of arriving at her 
beliefs. So, with respect to all these features, the two cases seem to be exactly alike.  
3.3.2 THE CASE OF ANNE 
Let’s now provide an example that is relevant to the discussion of third-factor 
accounts. Here I use a slightly amended example due to Lutz (2017: p. 17) (who takes 
this example from (Bedke 2009)). Consider the case of Anne.  
Anne believes that every person has a spirit animal that is connected to her 
personality. Wise people have owls, brave people have lions, and so on. Anne forms 
these beliefs based on intellectual seemings. For example, when she interacts with 
Jordan, who is wise, she has an intellectual seeming that Jordan has an owl as her 
spirit animal, when she interacts with brave Grigori, it seems that her that Grigori has 
as his spirit animal a lion, and so on. Based on her seemings, she goes on to form 
beliefs like “Jordan has an owl as her spirit animal” and “Grigori has a lion as his spirit 
animal”. Assume that Anne’s beliefs about spirit animals are actually true.  
Let’s say that, initially, Anne’s beliefs about spirit animals are justified. Among other 
things, this means that, initially, it is not the case that in virtue of her 
73 
doxastic/normative set of background beliefs, Anne should withhold or disbelieve 
that her beliefs about spirit animals have been formed in a reliable fashion via her 
relevant intellectual seemings. Perhaps third-factor theorists like Enoch and 
Wielenberg would now object that the case of Anne and the case of the typical moral 
believer are disanalagous precisely because Anne’s beliefs are not initially justified. 
Third-factor theorists could simply state that in contrast to the moral convictions of 
ordinary moral believers, Anne’s spirit animal-beliefs are not initially justified since 
they are just so outlandish that it is hard to see how it could be epistemically sound 
for Anne to trust her intellectual seeming.  
As I have said above, S’s intellectual seeming that p can only render a belief that p 
justified in the right kind of circumstances, i.e. in circumstances in which it is not the 
case that S immediately has sufficient reason to think that this intellectual seeming 
that p is not trustworthy or that it is not a good indicator of the truth about p. Against 
the claim that the sheer outlandishness of Anne’s belief disqualifies it, I hold that there 
is no in principle reason to think that Anne’s initial circumstances could not be such 
that they could render her spirit animal-beliefs based on her seemings initially 
justified.84 Stipulate that Anne initially does not already have evidence or information 
that is sufficient for making it the case that she should withhold or disbelieve that her 
belief that Jordan’s spirit animal is an owl is reliably formed by her “spirit animal 
intellectual seeming”- faculty”. For example, assume that in the circumstances in 
which Anne initially finds herself in, there’s no strong reason accessible to Anne to 
dismiss her spirit animal-seemings out of hand. Given this stipulation, I see no in 
principle reason for why Anne’s beliefs could not enjoy some initial justification based 
on her intellectual seemings. 
But now Anne receives information that what causes her intellectual seemings about 
spirit animals is a brain tumour. In other words, Anne has these seemings and her 
subsequent beliefs not because people do have spirit animals, but because of the 
tumour. Again, we can account for the effect that receiving this information has on 
                                              
84 Indeed, it seems that in many societies throughout history, a belief of this sort might have 
been perfectly acceptable, or at least as acceptable as moral convictions based on moral 
intuitions in our circumstances.  
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the initially positive epistemic status of her beliefs in terms of the epistemological 
story developed in the last chapter. 
In virtue of the information about the tumour, it is now the case that the best 
explanation available to Anne for her “spirit animal intellectual seeming”- faculty does 
not involve the relevant facts about spirit animals. In line with the epistemological 
story developed in (1.4), it is now the case that Anne should withhold belief about the 
claim that the explanatory history of her “spirit animal intellectual seeming”- faculty 
involves the relevant facts. Suppose further that Anne lacks independent means of 
confirming the reliability of her way of arriving at those beliefs. At the very least, it 
appears that Anne would be epistemically irrational if she did not withhold or 
disbelieve that her belief that Jordan’s spirit animal is an owl is reliably formed by her 
“spirit animal intellectual seeming”- faculty.  
It is important to note that this information about what best explains her intellectual 
seemings is silent on whether some explanation is available to Anne, that shows how 
her beliefs and the relevant truths could be reliably correlated. For all that this account 
of how Anne’s belief is undercut tells us, Anne might yet be able to reason in the 
following way:  
The discovery that that I have a brain tumour, which is responsible for my beliefs 
about spirit animals, does not ultimately defeat my belief. I have not learned 
anything, which is, strictly speaking, inconsistent with the existence of spirit 
animals. In the context of this sceptical challenge I am entitled to make some 
assumptions about the way the world is. Therefore, I will assume that all my spirit-
animal beliefs are true. Since my beliefs about spirit animals are true, I guess the 
brain tumour made me reliable! 
Moreover, assume that Anne has an explanation available for her reliability:  
ANNE’S THIRD-FACTOR. There is a factor, namely the factor that Jordan is 
wise, of which it is the case that: 
(i) Jordan’s being wise is part of what explains why I think her spirit animal is an 
owl (i.e., Jordan’s being wise causally helps make it the case that it seems to Anne 
that Jordan’s spirit animal is an owl),  
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(ii) and her being wise is also part of what explains why her spirit animal is an owl 
(i.e., Jordan’s being wise metaphysically helps make it the case that her spirit animal 
is an owl, since (let’s assume) the non-natural facts about spirit animals strongly 
supervene on relevant psychological facts).  
In other words, Anne now believes that, if Jordan’s spirit animal is an owl, then she 
can provide a story about how it is not just a coincidence that she believes Jordan’s 
spirit animal to be an owl.85 And this gives Anne an account of how her intuitively 
true beliefs are produced in a way that is not epistemically lucky in a problematic sort 
of way: if Anne’s belief that Jordan’s spirit animal is an owl is true, then she has an 
explanation of the reliable correlation between her belief and the truth in hand. So, 
the discovery that she has a brain tumour does not show that she has been lucky in a 
problematic sort of way in landing on the truth, if her belief that Jordan’s spirit animal 
is an owl is true. And Anne can then conclude her reasoning by stating: “And my 
belief that Jordan’s spirit animal is an owl is true! Therefore, my justification for 
holding this belief is reinstated.”  
Once again, with respect to all relevant features, the case of Anne, and the case of the 
moral believer according to the third-factor accounts seem to be exactly analogous. 
In both cases, we assume that the relevant beliefs are true. In both cases, the relevant 
beliefs are initially justified. In both cases, the subject is confronted with information 
that makes the subject aware that the best explanation for her relevant way of arriving 
at her beliefs does not involve the relevant facts. And the subject becomes aware that 
                                              
85 Perhaps someone could challenge Anne’s third-factor explanation in the following way: 
even if it is true that Jordan’s spirit animal is an owl, it could easily have been the case that 
Jordan’s spirit animal is not an owl, while Anne would still believe that Jordan’s spirit animal 
is an owl, since Jordan would still have been wise. Taking a page from Bedke’s original 
presentation of the example, I would like to point out that Anne could go for her own version 
of a strong supervenience-argument to defend the necessity of the claim that wise people 
have owls as spirit animals:  
“When asked about other possible worlds, and other possible people, it is clear that Andy 
[the subject corresponding to Anne in Bedke’s presentation of the example] believes that 
which spirit animal a person has strongly supervenes on that person’s psychology (character 
traits, really). People who are predominantly brave have lion spirit animals; people who are 
predominately wise have owl spirit animals; etc. Andy acknowledges that these subvenient 
psychological properties are fully natural. Moreover, he thinks that the truths about spirit 
animals satisfy strong global supervenience: any two metaphysically possible worlds that 
differ with respect to who has what spirit animal would also differ with respect to natural 
properties.” (Bedke 2009: p. 197) 
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she lacks independent means of confirming the reliability of her way of arriving at her 
beliefs. What’s more, in both cases, the subject has a third-factor explanation available 
to her, that can account for the correlation between her beliefs and the relevant truths. 
Again, with respect to all these features, the two cases seem to be exactly alike.86 
3.4 THE DEFEATER-DEFEATER OPTION 
In this section, I will develop an argument to the conclusion that if we understand the 
AMS and third-factor accounts as defeater-defeaters, then there is good reason to 
think that both responses are ineffective. That means they are not successful in 
defeating the defeater generated by the generic EDA, and so they are not successful 
in reinstating the justification for our moral beliefs.  
My argument will be rather straightforward. With the examples of Larry and Anne, 
for both third-factor accounts and the AMS we have found cases, analogous to the 
cases of the relevant moral believers, where, intuitively, a belief’s justification is lost 
in virtue of incoming information about the explanatory history of the faculty that 
produced it. In those cases, intuitively, justification is lost, despite the fact that the 
believer is aware that if her belief were true, her belief is modally secure or not subject 
to an epistemically problematic sort of coincidence. What accounts for the fact that, 
in those cases, justification cannot be reinstated via the kind of reasoning suggested 
                                              
86 The cases of Larry and Anne will be very important to the argument in the rest of this 
chapter, and to the argument in the next chapter. I have argued that with respect to all 
relevant features, the cases of Larry and Anne are exactly analogous to the cases of the 
relevant moral believers. But let me clarify that I do think that certain philosophers, who are 
sceptical of EDAs, have the resources to deny the analogy. The (to my mind) most 
straightforward way of denying the analogy is to argue that the empirical case of the debunker 
does not hold water, and that therefore an argument like the generic EDA does not generate 
a defeater at all, and therefore, does not generate a defeater in a way analogous to the defeater 
generated in the cases of Larry and Anne. I think that this might be a promising thought to 
pursue for the opponent of evolutionary debunking. Unfortunately, this line of argument 
also threatens to make the standard responses superfluous.  
If you argue that the empirical case that the debunker needs to make is not sufficiently 
supported by the evidence or rests on confusions regarding evolutionary explanations, then 
it seems that there is no incentive to engage in the kinds of arguments proposed by Clarke-
Doane and the third-factor theorists in the first place. Therefore, it seems that disputing the 
empirical case that supports arguments like the generic EDA is incompatible with thinking 
that the standard responses are non-superfluous to the debate. This is bad news to the 
standard responses, though obviously not necessarily good news for the debunker, as the 
actual empirical case of the debunkers looks vulnerable to empirically-minded replies, cf. 
appendix C.  
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by the AMS and third-factor accounts, is that this reasoning would be epistemically 
circular in a problematic kind of way. The examples I have presented in the last section 
will also be important in chapter (4), since there too I rely on the claim that these 
examples intuitively show at least that it would not be epistemically rational for the 
relevant subjects to continue to hold their respective beliefs.  
As I have written above, both the third-factor accounts and the AMS argue that if our 
relevant beliefs are true, and if certain other conditions are in place, then these beliefs 
can be shown to be reliably formed. Without assuming that the relevant beliefs are 
true, neither the AMS nor third-factor accounts could get off the ground. To protect 
our common-sense moral beliefs, both responses therefore need to assume the 
following claim: 
COMMON-SENSE MORALITY. Our common-sense moral beliefs are by-
and-large true.87 
The central point in this section will be that, intuitively, in the presence of a defeater, 
a believer cannot reinstate her justification for her relevant belief via continuing to 
assume that her belief is true. The discussion of whether the third-factor theorist is 
entitled to COMMON-SENSE MORALITY is the focus of much attention in the 
current debate on EDAs (cf. Bedke 2009; Crow 2016; Locke 2014; Lutz 2017; Moon 
2016; Vavova 2016; Wielenberg 2016). This point has not been as prominent in the 
critical discussion of the AMS, although the AMS too depends on this assumption 
(but cf. Morton 2018). My argument in this section aims to show that it is clearly not 
legitimate to rely on prima facie defeated beliefs to reinstate the justification of those 
very beliefs. If the AMS and third-factor accounts are meant to serve as defeater-
defeaters, this spells serious trouble for them.  
From here on out, until the end of this chapter, I will assume that we ought to 
understand the AMS and third-factor explanations as defeater-defeaters. If we 
understand the AMS and third-factor accounts as defeater-defeaters, then we have 
the following initial scenario before us with regards to both responses. After being 
confronted with information that makes it the case that you should withhold belief 
                                              
87 Both responses need to feature an assumption of this approximate scope to afford us a 
wholesale defence against EDAs.  
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about the claim that the explanatory history of your moral faculty involves moral facts, 
and since you are unable to independently confirm the reliability of your moral beliefs, 
the justification of your moral beliefs is undercut. That means it is now the case, that 
given everything else you believe or should believe, you should withhold or disbelieve 
that your moral beliefs are reliably formed. 
Now assume that third-factor accounts and the AMS try to reinstate the justification 
of our moral beliefs via defeating the defeater. In other words, they are meant to 
provide considerations that make it the case that despite the presence of the 
evolutionary explanation for your moral faculty, and even though you lack 
independent means of confirming the reliability of your moral faculty, it is no longer 
true that you should withhold or disbelieve that your moral beliefs are reliably formed 
by your moral faculty. 
The AMS aims to defeat the defeater via showing that, if your relevant beliefs are true, 
and if certain other conditions are in place, then your beliefs can be shown to be 
modally secure. Believing that if your belief is true, then it is modally secure, and 
assuming that your relevant beliefs are actually true, then, is meant to make it the case 
that you no longer should withhold or disbelieve that your moral beliefs are reliable. 
In a similar vein, third-factor accounts aim to defeat the defeater via showing that, if 
your relevant beliefs are true, then we have an explanation for how they are reliably 
correlated with the truth. Believing that if your belief is true, then it is reliably 
correlated with the truth, and assuming that your belief is actually true, then, is meant 
to make it the case that you no longer should withhold or disbelieve that your moral 
beliefs are reliable.  
And here is how my argument in this section is straightforward: I am going to use the 
analogous cases of Larry and Anne to argue that in neither case is it legitimate for the 
relevant moral believer to rely on the truth of her defeated beliefs.88 
Before I develop this argument, let me preclude potential confusion by addressing a 
possible objection. Here’s the objection:  
                                              
88 My argument here is in line with Moon’s (2016).  
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An undercutting defeater for your belief that p does not provide you with a reason 
for believing that your belief that p is false. Since EDAs try to generate 
undercutting defeaters, is it not the case that the debunker, in the context of this 
sceptical challenge to the non-naturalist realist, must grant the realist the 
assumption that our moral beliefs are by-and-large true? If this is indeed so, how 
can it be epistemically illegitimate to rely on the truth of one’s moral belief in 
neutralizing the epistemic threat supposedly arising from evolution?  
Let me get this clear: an undercutting defeater indeed does not and cannot show that 
the relevant belief is false. So, the debunker must concede that evidence about the 
evolutionary influence on our moral beliefs does not entail the falsity of those beliefs. 
But that does not mean, as I will show in a moment, that it is legitimate for any 
believer to continue to rely on a set of beliefs in the presence of an undercutting 
defeater for those very beliefs. Admitting that evolutionary considerations do not and 
could not entail the falsity of our moral beliefs does not entail that we remain free to 
assume that our moral beliefs are by-and-large true after we have been confronted 
with these considerations. In short: conceding that a piece of evidence or information 
does not entail the falsity of your belief that p does not entail the further concession 
that, after you have been presented with this piece of evidence or information, you 
remain free to assume that your belief that p is in fact true.  
Let us start with a general observation about how responses to undercutting defeaters 
can fail. In general, it is not legitimate to rely on the truth of defeated beliefs to show 
that your belief is reliable. To see this, consider the following example (which is a 
variation of an example due to Moon (2016: p. 13)): 
XX DEFEATER. You ingest a pill called XX. You have no information about 
any negative effects of XX. You go outside to the driveway, and you see a red car 
parked there. Plausibly, your perceptual belief that there is a red car in front of 
you is defeasibly justified. But then you learn that XX makes 95% of those who 
ingest it see red cars even when there are no red cars in front of them. Here, you 
have a defeater for your belief via perception that there is a red car in front of you.  
It is clearly illicit to engage in the following kind of reasoning in trying to defeat the 
relevant defeater:  
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I have learned that XX makes 95% of those who ingest it see red cars even when 
there are no red cars in front of them. But I can see that there is a red car in front 
of me. So, as it happens, I must belong to the lucky 5%! 
Analogously, after you have received information that your moral faculty is 
untrustworthy, it also seems illicit to rely on the truth of the beliefs produced by this 
very faculty to reason your way to the conclusion that your moral faculty really is 
reliable. 
But this general point does not suffice to get us to the conclusion that, in the specific 
cases where the believer has further information available to her (e.g., that if her belief 
is true, it is modally secure), it is also true that it would be illegitimate to rely on the 
truth of a belief in the presence of a defeater for that belief. It does not suffice since 
the case of the subject in XX DEFEATER is not exactly analogous with the relevant 
cases of the moral believers according to the AMS and third-factor accounts. For 
instance, even if your belief that there is a red car in front of you is true, it is certainly 
not metaphysically necessarily true. 
Luckily, as I have tried to show above, there are cases that are exactly analogous to 
the cases of the relevant moral believers, and in those cases it seems that the incoming 
information about what best explains the subjects’ beliefs has epistemic 
consequences. Let us discuss the case of Larry first.  
Intuitively, it seems clear that: 
(i) Larry may well take his belief to be epistemically inappropriate, i.e. he may 
withhold belief about the claim that his theistic belief was reliably produced 
given that his belief has been formed and held by him under the influence of 
hallucinogenic drugs.  
(ii) Moreover, it also seems that if Larry then takes his belief that God exists to be 
epistemically inappropriate given all the information now in his possession, 
this response is the epistemically rational response to his situation, given 
everything else that he has come to believe or should have come to believe 
about his circumstances. From the vantage point of what Larry believes or 
should believe about his situation, it seems it would only be epistemically 
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rational for him to take a negative perspective towards his way of arriving at 
the belief that God exists.  
This raises the question: Why does this response seem to be the only epistemically 
rational one, given that Larry is aware and justifiably believes that if his belief is true, 
it was all but bound to be true? This question is pertinent, as given what we have said 
about this scenario so far, Larry could now reason in the following way:  
Sure, no facts about God were involved in the best explanation for my way of 
arriving at beliefs about God. But my belief that God exists is true! What’s more, 
I can see that given that it is true, it could not have been easily false, and 
furthermore, I could not easily have failed to have this belief. So, I was all but 
bound to get it right, and the presence of this explanation, and the lack of 
independent confirmation do not change that. 
I take it as intuitively obvious that something is wrong with this kind of reasoning. 
Yet it is precisely the kind of reasoning that the AMS urges on us. But how is it wrong? 
The epistemic wrongness that is exhibited by Larry’s reasoning here is the same kind 
of epistemic wrongness involved in the reasoning of the subject in the XX 
DEFEATER-case. To get this kind of epistemic wrong into view, we now need to 
say a few things about epistemic circularity.  
Moon (2016) argues convincingly that the debate on what is admissible as a defeater-
defeater is tied up with the debate on when epistemic circularity is problematic and 
when it is not. For example, my belief that my memory is overall reliable is 
epistemically circular if, for its justification, it depends itself on my memory (ibid.: p. 
9). As Moon points out, many epistemologists think that epistemic circularity need 
not always be problematic, as these epistemologists argue that “a belief’s being 
epistemically circular does not alone disqualify it from being justified; sometimes it 
does disqualify it, sometimes it doesn’t” (ibid.: pp. 9-10). There are malignant and 
benign cases of epistemic circularity, where malignant epistemic circularity disqualifies 
a belief from being justified, while benign circularity does not.  
Michael Bergmann (2006: pp. 198-200), who has done influential work on epistemic 
circularity, argues for the following sufficient condition for malignant circularity. For 
a subject S, her belief-forming faculty M, and her belief that p produced by M:  
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If S already has a defeater for believing that p is reliably produced by M, then using 
her belief that p, which is a deliverance of M, as her support for continuing to 
believe that M is reliable results in malignant epistemic circularity. (ibid.; Moon 
2016: p. 10) 
As Moon comments:  
[i]f one already has a reason to doubt source [M]..., then one cannot bootstrap 
one’s way out of doubting source [M]… by relying on the deliverances of [M]… 
(2016: p. 10).  
In a case of malignant epistemic circularity, a subject seriously questions or doubts, 
or should seriously question or doubt, the trustworthiness or reliability of her way of 
arriving at her relevant beliefs to the point where she should withhold or disbelieve 
that her beliefs are reliably formed in this way. In this situation, any further 
dependence on the subject’s part on her original way of arriving at her relevant beliefs 
results in malignant epistemic circularity and is thus unfit to reinstate the justification 
for those very beliefs.  
In his reasoning, Larry relies on his belief that God exists (produced by his theistic 
intellectual seemings-faculty), to show how his theistic intellectual seemings-faculty is 
a reliable way of arriving at beliefs about God’s existence. So, this belief is 
epistemically circular. If Larry is a subject in a defeater-defeater-case, then, ex hypothesi, 
we are assuming that his initially justified belief that God exists, formed via his 
intellectual seemings, is undercut when he receives information about what best 
explains his theistic intellectual seemings. Given Bergmann’s sufficient condition for 
malignant circularity, Larry’s belief that God exists is therefore malignantly circular. 
Relying on a malignantly epistemically circular belief cannot reinstate your justification 
for holding this very belief. The justification for Larry’s belief that God exists is 
therefore not reinstated via his ability to reason in the above way.  
With Larry, we have a case of a subject whose belief is modally secure if true, and 
who also justifiably believes that his belief is modally secure, if true. Nonetheless, it 
would be epistemically wrong for Larry to try to reinstate his justification in the face 
of the above incoming information by assuming that his belief that God exists is true. 
It seems that Larry does not have a suitable defeater-defeater at his disposal.  
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What’s more, the case of Larry seems exactly analogous to the relevant case of a moral 
believer according to the AMS. This is a moral believer who is confronted with 
information pertaining to the influence of evolution on her moral beliefs. Evolution 
makes it the case that the best explanation available to this moral believer for her 
moral faculty does not involve moral facts, and this moral believer lacks independent 
means of confirming the reliability of her moral faculty.  
Now, our question was: if we assume that  
(i) the moral beliefs of this subject are true,  
(ii) that if her beliefs are true, they are modally secure,  
(iii) and if we assume that this subject justifiably believes that if her beliefs are 
true, they are modally secure,  
does this suffice to reinstate the justification of her moral beliefs? 
The case of Larry seems to be exactly analogous with respect to all these features. In 
the case of Larry, I have argued that we should answer the corresponding question 
negatively. Given that the two cases are exactly analogous with respect to all the 
relevant features, I contend that the answer to this question should therefore also be 
negative.  
In a moment I will say something about my assumption in the discussion of this case 
(and in the discussion of the next case) that malignant epistemic circularity disqualifies 
a belief as a suitable defeater-defeater.  
But let’s first discuss Anne’s case. Once again, I regard it as intuitively obvious that 
Anne’s reasoning does not reinstate her justification for believing that Jordan’s spirit 
animal is an owl. But this is precisely the kind of reasoning that the third-factor 
theorist urges on us. Given all the information in her possession, it is an epistemically 
inappropriate response for Anne to continue to hold her belief that Jordan’s spirit 
animal is an owl.  
My explanation for this is again basically the same as in the case of Larry. Even if 
Anne’s belief is true, and even if ANNE’S THIRD FACTOR shows that if her belief 
is true, then Anne’s belief is not true as a matter of epistemic luck, Anne’s response 
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to her situation is epistemically wrong for involving a malignant kind of epistemic 
circularity.  
With the case of Anne, we have an example of a subject for whose belief there is a 
third-factor explanation, if this belief is true, and where this subject also believes that 
if her belief is true, then she can provide a story about how it is not just a coincidence 
that she believes truly.  
Yet again, it would be epistemically wrong for Anne to rely on the truth of her belief 
in the face of defeating evidence for this very belief. Assuming that Anne is in a 
defeater-defeater-case is tantamount to saying that being informed that her belief that 
Jordan has as a spirit animal an owl is best explained by her tumour (and that she is 
unable to independently confirm the reliability of her spirit animal-intellectual 
seeming-faculty) takes away her justification for believing this. But once the 
justification for this belief is lost, it becomes epistemically inappropriate to further 
rely on the truth of this belief in her reasoning.  
Furthermore, the case of Anne again seems to be exactly analogous to the case of the 
relevant moral believer according to third-factor accounts, who is faced with an 
undercutting defeater generated by the generic EDA.  
I hope what I have said so far in this section suffices to establish the claims that (i) as 
instances of defeater-defeaters, both third-factor accounts and the AMS are clearly 
problematic, and (ii) they are problematic in a similar kind of way.  
My line of reasoning so far plainly assumes that involving malignant circularity 
disqualifies a response from being a successful defeater-defeater. But this assumption 
(shared by Bergmann and Moon) seems very plausible. As the cases of Larry and 
Anne demonstrate, there are many cases, in which a subject could show that her belief 
is indeed reliably formed if she were to assume that her belief is true. Assuming that 
this move is permissible would serve to immunize beliefs from counter-evidence, 
when, intuitively, this counter-evidence still negatively affects the justification of those 
beliefs, as in the above cases. Therefore, declaring epistemically malignantly circular 
responses to be successful defeater-defeaters seems to conflict with our intuitive 
application of the notion of undercutting defeat. This, I take it, is why some 
philosophers working on EDAs have suggested that assuming that it is epistemically 
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unproblematic to rely on a set of beliefs in the presence of an undercutting defeater 
for those very beliefs threatens the “very intelligibility of the notion of undercutting 
defeat” (Lutz 2017: p. 18).  
This wraps up the substantial part of my discussion of the standard responses as 
defeater-defeaters. I conclude that the two standard responses to EDAs are 
ineffective if understood as defeater-defeaters: they do not serve to reinstate the 
justification of our moral beliefs. In the next chapter, I will discuss the standard 
responses understood as defeater-deflectors.  
3.5 THE DEFEAT ARGUMENT 
Let me now conclude my reasoning by summarizing the argument I have developed 
here. This argument builds on the following assumption:  
DEFEATER-DEFEATER ASSUMPTION: The standard responses try to 
reinstate the justification of our moral beliefs. 
If the standard responses try to reinstate justification of our moral beliefs, then this 
presumes that this justification was lost at an earlier point in time, where we (the moral 
believers) were confronted with the information about the evolutionary influence on 
our moral beliefs. This means that after being confronted with the considerations 
supporting the generic EDA (call the set of information that comprises these 
considerations DEBUNKING),89 our moral beliefs are defeated, and so, at a certain 
point in time, at t1, it is the case that we should withhold or disbelieve that our moral 
beliefs have been reliably formed via our moral faculty.  
From here, the following argument unfolds, which I have termed the Defeat Argument 
for easy reference. This argument starts with the following premise: at t2, the standard 
responses rely on COMMON-SENSE MORALITY to support the argument for the 
reliability of our moral faculty. This premise basically just states a crucial assumption, 
on which the standard responses must rely.  
                                              
89 In other words, the considerations that we are informed about at a certain point in time 
(t1 in the defeater-defeater-case; t2 in the defeater-deflector-case), and which make it the case 
that the best explanation available to us concerning our moral faculty does not involve the 
relevant moral facts, and which make it the case, that we become aware (or should become 
aware) that we lack independent means for confirming the reliability of our moral beliefs.  
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At t1, upon being confronted with DEBUNKING, we should withhold or disbelieve 
that our moral beliefs have been reliably formed via our moral faculty. This premise 
states that at a certain point in time (earlier than t2), we have a(n) (undercutting) 
defeater for our moral beliefs, which straightforwardly follows from S being in a 
defeater-defeater-scenario. Furthermore, in the present context, we assume that this 
undercutting defeater is generated by the incoming information DEBUNKING. 
Between t1 and t2 nothing else occurs that would make it the case that we should no 
longer withhold or disbelieve that our moral beliefs have been reliably formed via our 
moral faculty. This makes explicit that we assume that nothing else occurs, that 
reinstates the justification of our moral beliefs. We need this assumption for the 
standard responses to remain relevant. 
And now the real action happens: if, at t1, we should withhold or disbelieve that our 
moral beliefs have been reliably formed via our moral faculty, and if between t1 and t2 
nothing else occurs that would make it the case that we should no longer withhold or 
disbelieve that our moral beliefs have been reliably formed via our moral faculty, then, 
at t2, relying on COMMON-SENSE MORALITY to support the reliability of our 
moral faculty is malignantly epistemically circular. This premise basically applies 
Bergmann’s sufficient condition for malignant epistemic circularity to the present 
case. It is supported by the above discussion of Bergmann’s condition and by the 
discussion of the cases of Larry and Anne, where the analogous dependence on the 
truth of defeated beliefs was also intuitively epistemically wrong. It then follows that 
at t2, relying on COMMON-SENSE MORALITY to support the reliability of our 
moral faculty is malignantly epistemically circular.  
If a response involves malignant epistemic circularity, then this is sufficient to render 
that response unsuccessful in reinstating the justification of a belief or of a set of 
beliefs. This is an assumption that was made during the discussion above. As I have 
briefly argued, rejecting this assumption seems to conflict with our intuitive 
application of the notion of undercutting defeat. It then follows that the standard 
responses are unsuccessful in reinstating the justification for our moral beliefs. This 
concludes the Defeat Argument.  
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This result wraps up my discussion of the standard responses as defeater-defeaters. I 
conclude that the two standard responses to EDAs are ineffective if understood as 
defeater-defeaters: they do not serve to reinstate the justification of our moral beliefs. 




4 THE STANDARD RESPONSES AS DEFEATER-
DEFLECTORS 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
In the last chapter, I have argued that there are good reasons to think that both third-
factor accounts and the AMS are unsuccessful as defeater-defeaters. The reason for 
this is that it is clearly epistemically wrong to continue to assume the truth of your 
belief in the presence of a defeater for that very belief.  
In this chapter, I will now investigate how third-factor responses and the AMS fare if 
we understand them as defeater-deflectors. If third-factor accounts and the AMS 
cannot be understood as conditions that defeat a defeater, the hope remaining for the 
realist is that these responses are successful if understood as providing considerations 
that prevent the occurrence of potential defeat.  
Here is the plan for the chapter: in section (4.2.), I will break down what it means for 
a reply to be defeater-deflector, and I will determine how we can assess the standard 
responses as defeater-deflectors. In (4.3), I will revisit the cases of Larry and Anne 
from the last chapter to determine whether, intuitively, the subjects in those cases 
ever gain a defeater. In section (4.4), will try to get clear on the epistemological 
framework that we need to assume, to make the standard responses work as defeater-
deflectors. Here I will argue that it seems that the standard responses are in conflict 
with the NO DEFEATER-condition. In (4.5), I will sketch out a possible motivation 
for rejecting NO DEFEATER. In (4.6), I will argue that even if the standard 
responses succeed in protecting our moral beliefs’ justification, they are nonetheless 
deeply unsatisfying, as they recommend a kind of doxastic behaviour that is 
epistemically vicious. Finally, in (4.7), I will conclude by explicitly stating the argument 
developed in this chapter.  
4.2 THE DEFEATER-DEFLECTOR OPTION 
In reply to worries concerning the illegitimacy of third-factor responses, Wielenberg 
(2014: p. 161 & 2016: p. 506) writes that if third factor-accounts were brought forward 
as defeater-defeaters (i.e., as reasons reinstating our provisionally lost justification by 
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countering prima facie defeating considerations), they would indeed be suspect. They 
would be suspect for the simple reason that it is clearly not legitimate to rely on prima 
facie defeated claims to reinstate the justification of those very claims.  
But Wielenberg (2016: p. 506) then points to Moon (2016). Moon shows that in 
contrast to defeater-defeater-cases, it is not necessarily malignantly circular to rely on 
the truth of your belief that p to deflect an undercutting defeater for your belief that 
p produced by M. The reason for this is fairly simple. Recall Bergmann’s sufficient 
condition for when epistemic circularity is malignant: if S already has a(n) 
(undercutting) defeater for her belief that p via M, then it is malignantly circular to 
continue to rely on her belief that p (or any other belief relevantly dependent on M) 
in support of the reliability of M.  
In defeater-defeater-cases, it is necessarily malignantly circular to rely on the truth of 
your belief that p, since in those cases it is necessarily true that you have a defeater 
for your belief that p qua this being a defeater-defeater-case. In contrast, in defeater-
deflector-cases, it is not necessarily malignantly circular to rely on the truth of your 
belief that p in support of the belief that M has reliably produced your belief that p. 
The reason for this is simply that in defeater-deflector-cases, it is not necessarily the 
case that you already have an undercutting defeater for your belief that p. In other 
words, it is not necessarily true, that at one point along the timeline described by those 
cases you should withhold or disbelieve that your belief that p has been reliably 
formed via M.  
The Bergmann/Moon-point is then that benign or malignant epistemic circularity 
depends on whether the subject in question already should withhold or disbelieve that 
her belief that p has been reliably formed, and since in defeater-deflector-cases it is 
possible that the subject should not, it is possible that her dependence on the relevant 
belief in support of the reliability of M is not malignantly circular. What I mean to say 
with this is that in some of those cases, continued dependence on a belief, that is the 
product of M is not malignantly circular, but in some of these cases it is. To support 
this point, it will be useful to have an example for each kind of case in hand.  
Consider the following example, taken from Moon (2016: p. 12):  
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ZZ COLOUR VISION. You believe that your colour vision is overall reliable. 
You walk into a room with objects that have no standard colour (e.g., there are no 
bananas in the room, but chairs and bowls). You form the belief that the wall is 
red, the bowls are blue, and so on. Then, a friend, who you know to be an 
exceptionally reliable testifier, tells you that that the drug ZZ was mixed into your 
food earlier today. She also tells you that ZZ renders the colour vision of 95% of 
those who ingest it permanently unreliable. 
Is it epistemically unproblematic for you to rely on your beliefs about the colours of 
the objects in the room to show how the information about ZZ does not undercut 
the justification for your relevant colour beliefs? Are you entitled to reason in the 
following way:  
ZZ renders the colour vision of 95% of those who ingest it permanently 
unreliable. But this wall in front of me is red, and these bowls are blue! So, I must 
belong to the few people who are immune to ZZ! 
In this case, you infer that your colour vision is still reliable from the truth of your 
colour beliefs. You reason here that ZZ has not rendered your colour vision 
unreliable, since your colour vision still produces true beliefs, and so you must be 
immune to ZZ. Your colour beliefs here are meant to function as information that 
gives you reason to think that the information about ZZ does not undercut the 
justification of your colour beliefs at the point in time where you receive it. In other 
words, the truth of your colour beliefs is meant to deflect defeat when you are 
informed about ZZ. But can your colour beliefs successfully deflect the defeater in 
this case? 
The answer to this question seems to be “No”. Your colour beliefs about the objects 
in the room are not fit to the task of preventing defeat from occurring. The reason 
why your beliefs about the colours of the objects in the room are not able to prevent 
the occurrence of defeat is that as soon as your friend gives you the relevant 
information you instantly have an undercutting defeater for those very beliefs (ibid.). 
Your colour beliefs do not seem to be capable of preventing the occurrence of defeat. 
And once again, since those beliefs are defeated as soon as you receive the 
information about ZZ, relying on those colour beliefs in support of the reliability of 
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your colour vision is malignantly circular. So, your colour beliefs are inadmissible as 
defeater-deflectors.90  
Put a bit more formally, what the case of ZZ COLOUR VISION shows is the 
following: the possession or reception of a piece of information POTENTIAL D-
DEFLECTOR at t1, will not be sufficient for keeping information D from defeating 
S’s belief at t2, if before or at t2, S’s justification for believing POTENTIAL D-
DEFLECTOR is itself defeated. 
For example, assume you have a belief that p via M that is justified at t0. For a piece 
of information that you receive or possess at t1, which is also epistemically dependent 
on M (in the sense that the relevant beliefs have also been formed via M) to be 
sufficient for keeping defeat from occurring, it must not be the case that before or at 
t2, your justification for believing in the potentially deflecting piece of information is 
itself defeated. But now assume that the potentially undercutting information you 
receive at t2 calls into question the reliability of M generally, i.e. it is now the case that 
you have an undercutter for all beliefs epistemically dependent on M. This gives you 
at t2 an undercutting defeater for belief in POTENTIAL D-DEFLECTOR. 
Therefore, you must not rely on POTENTIAL D-DEFLECTOR, as relying on 
defeated beliefs in this way is malignantly circular. You must not already have an 
undercutter for your belief that p via M, as otherwise relying on beliefs which are 
epistemically dependent on M is malignantly circular.91 And as Moon puts it, in the 
case of ZZ COLOUR VISION, it seems that all beliefs epistemically dependent on 
your colour vision are undercut in “one fell swoop” (Moon 2016: p. 12).  
Now consider a different example, again adapted from Moon (2016: p. 13).  
YY IMMUNITY: You believe that your cognitive faculties are overall reliable. A 
scientist whom you know to be trustworthy tells you that several highly reliable 
tests clearly show that you are one of the few who is immune to the effects of YY. 
                                              
90 If the ZZ COLOUR VISION-case strikes you as similar in some respects to the cases of 
Larry and Anne, then this is no coincidence: I take this example from Moon (2016: p. 12) 
who acknowledges that the example is similar to Locke’s (2014: p. 231) “Martian”-case, and 
as I have acknowledged in the last chapter, my presentation of the cases of Larry and Anne 
draws on Locke’s example.  
91 Assuming that the relevant undercutter calls the reliability of M in general into question, 
as it is the case in the moral belief-case and the colour belief-case.  
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You ingest YY. You walk outside and see a red car in the driveway. You form the 
belief that there is a red car in front of you. You then learn that YY destroys the 
cognitive reliability of 95% of those who ingest it.  
You believe that there is a red car in front of you. You believe that despite ingesting 
YY, your cognitive abilities are still reliable. The consideration for why you believe 
that your cognitive abilities are still reliable is itself based on your cognitive abilities 
(which you use e.g., to register and take in the testimony of the scientist and memorize 
it, and furthermore, your knowledge about the scientist’s trustworthiness is also based 
on your cognitive abilities). When questioned on why you believe yourself to be 
reliable, you would offer these considerations, and your reasoning would show that 
your belief that your cognitive faculties are still reliable exhibits epistemic circularity. 
In other words, your belief that your cognitive faculties are still reliable is itself based 
on those very faculties. But in this case, the circularity appears to be benign, as you 
do not have an undercutting defeater that makes it the case that you should withhold 
or disbelieve that your cognitive faculties are reliable.  
Your justified belief that you are one of the immune 5% seems to be an admissible 
defeater-deflector for the potential defeater that your cognitive reliability is gone after 
you have ingested YY. This potential defeater never seems to gain defeating power in 
the first place in YY IMMUNITY, as it would be odd to hold that believing that you 
took YY provides you with a reason to doubt the trustworthiness of your cognitive 
abilities – while you also believe (on good grounds) that you are immune to YY (Moon 
2016: pp. 13-14). Given everything that you believe or should believe in this scenario, 
it is not the case that getting informed that YY destroys the cognitive reliability of 
95% of those who ingest it makes it the case that you should withhold or disbelieve 
that your belief that p was reliably formed via M.  
Therefore, your belief that you are one of the immune 5% seems to be an admissible 
defeater-deflector, fit to protect the justification for your belief that there is a red car 
in front of you, even though both beliefs have been formed via your cognitive 
faculties. In line with Bergmann’s sufficient condition for malignant epistemic 
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circularity,92 this kind of circularity is not problematic, since you lack a defeater for 
your belief that there is a red car in front of you.  
As I have written above in discussing ZZ COLOUR VISION, the question of 
whether some piece of information is an admissible defeater-deflector importantly 
depends on whether we remain justified in believing in this potentially deflecting 
information once we are confronted with the potential defeater. If we remain justified, 
then this information can be an admissible defeater-deflector. If we don’t, it can’t. In 
ZZ COLOUR VISION, you gain an undercutter for beliefs based on your colour 
vision, and therefore it is malignantly circular to rely on those beliefs. This disqualifies 
them as defeater-deflectors. In YY IMMUNITY, you do not gain an undercutter for 
beliefs based on your cognitive faculties, and therefore relying on those beliefs is only 
epistemically circular in a benign fashion. And so, in YY IMMUNITY, your beliefs 
about your immunity to YY, although epistemically dependent on your cognitive 
faculties, seem to be able to deflect the potential defeater. 
The important upshot of the discussion of these two examples is that while in 
potential defeater-deflector-cases, epistemic circularity need not be malignant, there 
are still such cases where it is malignant. The crucial question we must answer 
therefore becomes:  
Is it epistemically malignant for the standard responses to rely on COMMON-
SENSE MORALITY? 
Given Bergmann’s sufficient condition for malignant epistemic circularity, this 
basically means to ask: is it the case that at a certain moment in time93 the moral 
believer should withhold or disbelieve that her moral beliefs were formed reliably via 
her moral faculty? The answer to this question determines directly whether the 
defeater-deflector-option is any more promising than the defeater-defeater-
                                              
92 To remind us, here’s what this condition tells us: if S already has a defeater for believing 
that p is reliably produced by M, then using her belief that p, which is a deliverance of M, as 
her support for continuing to believe that M is reliable results in malignant epistemic 
circularity. 
93 That means at or before the point in time at which the moral believer is confronted with 
the information about the evolutionary explanation of her moral faculty. But since we here 
are interested in what happens once the moral believer is confronted with the relevant 
evidence, I will only look at what happens at the point in time, where the moral believer is 
confronted with the information about the evolutionary explanation for her moral beliefs.  
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interpretation of the AMS and third-factor accounts was. For if we already have a 
defeater for our moral beliefs, then our common-sense moral beliefs are just as 
inadmissible as a defeater-deflectors as are the colour beliefs in ZZ colour vision.  
The motivation for thinking of the standard responses as defeater-deflectors lies in 
the recognition that admitting that an argument like the generic EDA generates an 
undercutting defeater makes trouble for these responses (for the reasons discussed in 
the last chapter). In light of the considerations so far, it seems the best way of 
conceiving the standard responses is as providing us with accounts that are meant to 
show why an argument like the generic EDA does not give us a defeater for our moral 
beliefs in the first place. So, it is claimed that the generic EDA never leads to a loss 
of justification for our moral beliefs. 
I have already stated that with Wielenberg, we have at least one third-factor theorist 
who explicitly goes for this option. This reading is also in line with how Clarke-Doane 
presents the AMS. As a response to the generic EDA, the AMS basically tells us that 
the presence of a certain explanation of our moral faculty is insufficient for 
establishing that we should withhold or disbelieve that our moral beliefs were formed 
reliably without giving us some reason to believe that our moral beliefs are either not 
safe or not sensitive. Given MODAL SECURITY, if your basic moral beliefs are true 
and if there is a modally-robust explanation for why you hold the moral beliefs you 
do,94 then the evolutionary explanation of your moral faculty does not take away your 
justification for holding your moral beliefs. The presence of the evolutionary 
explanation does not make it the case that you should withhold or disbelieve that your 
moral faculty is reliable without giving you reason to think that the beliefs produced 
by this faculty are not safe or not sensitive. If your basic moral beliefs are true, and if 
you could not easily have had different beliefs, then the presence of the evolutionary 
explanation does not and cannot show you to be unreliable. This is how the AMS is 
meant to counter the explanatory challenge seemingly arising from EDAs: by showing 
it to be illusory. 
                                              
94 That means to say, an explanation that shows that you could not easily have believed 
differently.  
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So, the standard responses seem to argue that arguments like the generic EDA at no 
point generate an undercutting defeater for our moral beliefs. The question that we 
must discuss therefore is whether the considerations offered by the standard 
responses are sufficient to prevent the occurrence of defeat.  
4.3 THE CASES OF LARRY AND ANNE REVISITED 
In the last chapter, I have presented the cases of Larry and Anne. These are examples 
of cases where, intuitively, it would be epistemically wrong for the subjects to hold 
onto their beliefs in the face of certain incoming information. Intuitively, neither 
Larry’s belief in God nor Anne’s belief in spirit animals is justified after they receive 
information about what best explains their way of arriving at those beliefs. 
I have used these examples to show that if a subject’s relevant beliefs are defeated, 
then it would be epistemically wrong for these subjects to continue to hold and rely 
on those beliefs. The question now under discussion is different. It is not the question 
of whether one can rely on the truth of a defeated belief to support the claim that this 
belief was formed reliably. It is the question of whether moral believers who receive 
the relevant information about the evolutionary influence on our moral belief-
forming faculty ever gain an undercutting defeater for their moral beliefs. You might 
therefore object to my continued use of the examples of Larry and Anne.  
But for the point I want to make here, the examples of Larry and Anne do seem 
instructive and fitting: they are cases, which are (or so I have argued) exactly analogous 
with respect to all the relevant features to the cases of the respective moral believers.  
We now want to determine, whether the relevant moral believers gain a defeater for 
their moral beliefs upon receiving a certain kind of information, or whether the 
considerations involved in the AMS and third-factor accounts are sufficient for 
preventing the occurrence of defeat. And for the question of whether the relevant 
moral believers have an undercutting defeater for their moral beliefs at that point in 
time, it does seem relevant to ask whether we intuitively judge that subjects in exactly 
analogous cases have an undercutting defeater. If the subjects’ beliefs in the analogous 
cases are defeated, it seems, so are the relevant moral beliefs. On the other hand, if it 
is the case that the relevant moral believers have an admissible defeater-deflector 
available to them, then, given that these cases are exactly analogous to the cases of 
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Larry and Anne, we should also expect that Larry and Anne have an admissible 
defeater-deflector available to them. 
In the last chapter, we were concerned with the question: given that your belief is 
undercut, why is it wrong to rely on an undercut belief in support of the reliability of 
your method for arriving at those beliefs? Now we are concerned with the question: 
in the relevant moral belief-cases, are our common-sense moral beliefs undercut? And 
for answering this second question, our verdict about cases which are exactly 
analogous to the relevant moral belief-cases is relevant.  
At t0, Larry is justified in believing that God exists via his intellectual seeming, and 
Anne is justified to believe that Jordan’s spirit animal is an owl. Given everything else 
they believe, is it the case, that at t2 (i.e., the point in time at which they are confronted 
with the information about what best explains their respective intellectual seemings 
and become aware that they lack the means for independently confirming the 
reliability of their respective belief-forming faculties) they should withhold or 
disbelieve that their relevant beliefs are reliably formed via their intellectual seemings?  
Here I think we must note that, intuitively, this seems to be the case. It seems Larry 
and Anne should each withhold or disbelieve that their relevant beliefs were formed 
reliably via their intellectual seemings. Given the cases of Larry and Anne, which were 
presented in the last section, we should be immediately suspicious of the claim that 
the considerations offered by the standard responses could be sufficient for blocking 
the occurrence of defeat.  
Part of my argument in the last chapter was that we can find cases, which are exactly 
analogous to the cases of the relevant moral believers and where the beliefs of the 
subjects in those cases are intuitively defeated – even though these subjects can reason 
that if their beliefs are true, then they are modally secure or not subject to a 
problematic kind of epistemic luck. In the two cases discussed earlier, considerations 
which are exactly analogous to the considerations involved in the generic EDA 
seemingly were intuitively sufficient to defeat the justification of Larry to believe in 
God and of Anne to believe in spirit animals. 
To work as defeater-deflectors, the standard responses must hold that the believers 
in the relevant moral belief-cases at t2 do not have an undercutting defeater for their 
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moral beliefs due to evolution, because the considerations offered by these responses 
stop the occurrence of defeat. To deflect the defeater, both responses need to rely on 
the first-order moral claims contained in COMMON-SENSE MORALITY. But 
belief in those first-order moral claims is only legitimate in support of the reliability 
of the believer’s moral faculty, if it is not the case that the beliefs epistemically 
dependent on the moral faculty are undercut (cf. Crow 2016: pp. 390-391).  
The cases of Larry and Anne seem to provide as with examples of cases, which are 
(in all relevant respects) exactly alike the cases of the relevant moral believers, and 
where considerations in terms of modal security or a third-factor explanation 
intuitively do not suffice to prevent the occurrence of defeat. They are not sufficient 
for preventing the occurrence of defeat, since  
(i). the considerations offered by these responses are dependent on the truth of 
relevant first-order claims (COMMON-SENSE MORALITY in the moral 
belief-cases; the claim that God exists in Larry’s case; the claim that spirit 
animals exist in Anne’s case),  
(ii). belief in these first-order claims is epistemically dependent on the very faculty, 
whose reliability is under debate,  
(iii). and, intuitively, in the exactly analogous cases of Larry and Anne, the 
information received by the subjects serves to undercut the justification for all 
beliefs epistemically dependent on the relevant faculty.  
Given (iii) and given the exact analogy between the cases of Larry and Anne and the 
relevant moral belief-cases (in all epistemically relevant respects), it seems that in the 
moral belief-cases too, all beliefs epistemically dependent on the moral faculty are 
undercut in one fell swoop.95 
                                              
95 This result is very similar to a point made by Crow (2016: pp. 390-391). As Crow points 
out with respect to third-factor explanations, one’s justification for believing e.g. that the 
goodness of survival is partially metaphysically dependent on the facts about survival or that 
facts about cognitive faculties partially ground facts about rights depends on one’s 
justification for believing particular first-order moral claims. So, the justification for believing 
the relevant explanatory claim in the third-factor accounts depends epistemically on first-
order moral claims. And assuming the empirical hypotheses involved in EDAs are correct, 
our beliefs in those claims depend causally on evolutionary pressures.  
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This leaves the standard responses with two choices: either to argue that the cases of 
the relevant moral believers are not analogous to the cases of Larry and Anne, or to 
argue that the beliefs of Larry or Anne are not actually defeated by the incoming 
information about the origin of those beliefs since Larry or Anne can deflect the 
defeater.  
As I have argued in the last chapter, it seems we have good reason to think that the 
cases of Larry and Anne are exactly analogous in all relevant respects to the cases of 
the moral believers. Absent any convincing argument for the claim that there is a 
relevant disanalogy, it appears plausible that this is indeed true.  
4.4 THE EPISTEMOLOGY OF THE STANDARD RESPONSES AS DEFEATER-
DEFLECTORS 
This leaves open only the second option. That is to argue that Larry or Anne have 
after all access to admissible defeater-deflectors, and so, at the relevant point in time 
t2, it is not the case that Larry or Anne already have or gain an undercutter for their 
respective beliefs.  
Holding that Larry’s and Anne’s beliefs are not undercut by being informed about the 
drug and the tumour seems to be rather counter-intuitive. Indeed, given all I have said 
so far, it seems that the cases of Larry and Anne are clear counter-examples to the 
epistemological stories undergirding the AMS and third-factor accounts respectively. 
But at this point, Clarke-Doane and the third-factor theorists would perhaps simply 
insist that the beliefs of Larry and Anne respectively are never defeated due to the 
presence of admissible defeater-deflectors. Since I am interested in making progress, 
I won’t simply stand my ground on this issue. Before I give my further argument for 
the claim that even if Larry’s and Anne’s beliefs are justified, their doxastic 
behaviour96 is nonetheless epistemically criticisable, I think we should try to answer 
the following question:  
                                              
96 What is “doxastic behaviour”? I assume that we do not usually have voluntary control over 
our beliefs (or over our doxastic attitudes more generally). In other words, we cannot usually 
choose what doxastic attitude to adopt towards a proposition. Nonetheless, as Peels (2017: 
p. 2898) writes, we have direct or indirect control over “belief-influencing” activities, 
activities which taken together comprise what I call here “doxastic behaviour”. These are e.g. 
“evidence gathering, working on our epistemic virtues and vices, and improving the 
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What could be the epistemological motivation for claiming that Larry’s and Anne’s 
beliefs are not undercut?  
That means to ask: what kind of epistemological story do you have to suppose to 
arrive at the result that Larry’s or Anne’s beliefs do not lose their justification at t2? 
Both standard responses seem to rest on an externalist conception of epistemic 
justification, according to which justified belief is a standing “one has in virtue of the 
(de facto) reliability of the processes one employed in arriving at truth” (Goldberg 
2014: p. 280).97 The AMS also explicitly comes with an account of undercutting defeat 
that seems to fit an externalist conception of justification: information E can only 
undercut the justification for S’s belief that p, if it gives S reason to think that her 
belief that p is either not safe or not sensitive.98 Given this account of undercutting 
defeat, Clarke-Doane might now stand his ground in the face of my reasoning in this 
section so far, and state that Larry’s belief is not undercut at t2 since Larry himself 
sees that the information about the drugs does not show on its own that his beliefs 
were either not safe or not sensitive.  
Although third-factor accounts do not make this explicit, it seems that they too would 
have to endorse a similar account of undercutting defeat in order to motivate the 
claim that Anne’s belief in spirit animals is not defeated (along the lines of: 
information E can only undercut the justification for S’s belief that p, if it gives S 
reason to think that her relevant belief was subject to epistemic luck in a problematic 
sort of way). 
So, given that the standard responses need some epistemological motivation for their 
claims that the beliefs of Larry and Anne respectively are not undercut, it seems they 
are committed to one of these externalist accounts of undercutting defeat (and in the 
                                              
functioning of our doxastic mechanisms—briefly, our evidence bases and our belief-forming 
habits” (ibid.). Since subjects’ in many cases have sufficient control over their doxastic 
behaviour understood in this sense, it might be appropriate to hold them (intellectually) 
responsible for these belief-influencing activities.  
97 For a few paragraphs on the distinction between internalism and externalism about 
epistemic justification, please see appendix A. 
98 Internalists about epistemic justification could certainly agree that your belief can become 
unjustified if you receive information that indicates that your belief is not safe or not 
sensitive. But internalists typically would not restrict themselves to stating that only 
information like this can make your belief become unjustified via undercutting it.  
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case of the AMS, this commitment is even an explicit and integral part of Clarke-
Doane’s argument). Call these kinds of views, which both roughly hold that some 
information E can only undercut the justification for S’s belief that p, if it gives S 
reason to think that her relevant belief is not modally reliable, “strongly externalist 
views of undercutting defeat”. According to these views, information E can only 
undercut S’s belief that p via showing that the belief has been subject to a problematic 
kind of epistemic luck. 
If you commit yourself to one of these accounts of undercutting defeat, you will hold 
that Larry’s or Anne’s justification for holding their respective beliefs remains intact 
even after receiving the information about what best explains their intellectual 
seemings (and after becoming aware that they lack independent means of 
confirmation). Part of the argument of the last section was that Larry and Anne both 
could and should take a negative perspective toward whether their relevant beliefs 
have been produced in a reliable fashion. In other words, from their perspective, it 
seems perfectly rational to take their own beliefs to be undercut by the incoming 
information. But the important upshot of committing yourself to a strongly externalist 
kind of undercutting defeat is that the fact that from your own perspective, it is 
perfectly rational to take your belief to be undercut does not make it the case that 
your belief is undercut. The fact that you rationally believe that your belief that p was 
not reliably formed via M does not suffice to make it the case that you should 
withhold or disbelieve that your belief that p was reliably formed via M.  
Let us define some terminology, to get clearer into view what’s now at issue. Call a 
“rationality undercutter” any information, which upon its reception by a believer 
makes it the case, that the believer is epistemically irrational if she does not take her 
belief to be undercut.99 Importantly, a rationality undercutter may not give the believer 
                                              
99 The notion of a “rationality undercutter” developed here is built to accommodate the 
possibility that epistemic rationality and justified belief might come apart. We need to 
accommodate this possibility to make sense of the position I have termed strong externalism 
about undercutting defeat. Of course, you might just deny that rationality and justified belief 
can come apart, because you think that “rational belief” and “justified belief” are synonyms 
or close to being synonyms. I have great sympathies with that response. But I abstain from 
making this reply, because I am interested in further exploring the epistemological story that 
supports the standard responses. Here, I try to give these responses their best shot. 
Ultimately, I think that this makes the line of reasoning developed here more damaging to 
the standard responses, as I hope to show that even buying into a highly controversial 
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any reason to think that her belief is not modally reliable (which is demonstrated by 
the cases of Larry and Anne, where the subjects believe that their relevant beliefs were 
formed modally reliably, if their beliefs are true and where we assume that their beliefs 
are true). Therefore, accepting one of the above externalist views on undercutting 
defeat has the consequence that rationality undercutters are no undercutters at all. 
Undercutting defeat, according to these views, is not so much about what epistemic 
perspective it is rational for a believer to adopt towards her own beliefs from her own 
limited, first-personal point of view as a believer. Rather, it is exclusively about 
whether the relevant information gives the believer any reason to think that her belief 
was subject to a problematic sort of epistemic luck. 
What’s characteristic about strong externalism and important for our purposes is that 
this account holds that the possession of a rationality undercutter is not sufficient for 
generating an undercutting defeater for S’s belief that p. This is important, as you 
might have a rationality undercutter for your belief that p even though you see that if 
your belief is true you could not have failed to arrive at the truth or that your believing 
truly is not a matter of problematic epistemic luck (this is supported by the cases of 
Larry and Anne). Assuming strong externalism about undercutting defeat then allows 
you to say that the only way for your belief to be undercut is by receiving information 
that indicates that your belief is not modally reliable. But that’s not something that a 
rationality undercutter necessarily indicates (which is again intuitively attested by the 
cases of Larry and Anne).  
Strong externalism about epistemic defeat is therefore the view that is open to the 
possibility that S’s belief is not undercut (due to the fact that S’s circumstances are 
such that they guarantee that her belief is modally secure or not true as a matter of 
problematic epistemic luck, if her belief is true), even though judging from the 
perspective of the relevant believer, we would, intuitively, say that that believer should 
rationally take her belief to be undercut.100 
                                              
epistemological account does not achieve the goal of making these responses work 
satisfyingly.  
100 The view that I call “strong externalism about epistemic defeat” is therefore, it seems, at 
odds with the intuitive thought that underlies the NO DEFEATER-condition, i.e. the 
thought epistemic justification has a perspectival dimension. More on this below.  
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The benchmark that undercutting defeaters therefore must meet (according to the 
strong externalist views) is that they must give the relevant believer sufficient reason 
to think that her belief is modally unreliably formed via M even while assuming that 
her belief is true.  
Importantly, this benchmark is not met in either the cases of Larry or Anne, where, 
ex hypothesi, the two subjects (justifiably) believe that their relevant beliefs are modally 
reliably formed if they are true. And in those cases, it also clear that the information 
they are receiving (about the drugs and the tumour respectively) do not give them any 
direct reason to think that their relevant beliefs are false. It therefore seems that 
(assuming strong externalism about epistemic defeat) Larry’s and Anne’s respective 
beliefs might well not be defeated at t2, when they receive the relevant information 
(about the drugs and the tumour respectively). 
It is noteworthy, that many externalists about epistemic justification are not strong 
externalists about undercutting defeat. Many externalists accept the proviso that 
purely internal evidence can function as a defeater for a belief’s justification even if 
this belief was originally justified in virtue of external features alone (e.g., via being 
the product of a de facto reliable mechanism) (Baker-Hytch 2017: p. 6; cf. Bergmann 
2006: Ch. 6; Goldberg 2014; Sudduth 2008: section 3a). These externalists about 
epistemic justification agree with internalist views at least on the claim that that for 
S’s belief to be undercut, it suffices if S, given her own epistemic perspective on the 
situation, takes or should rationally take her belief to be undercut.  
Why would externalists about epistemic justification build this proviso into their 
accounts? A reason that strikes me as a good one is that this allows you to give a 
straightforward account of why subjects like Larry and Anne, who rationally should 
take their belief to be undercut, lose their justification for holding their respective 
beliefs, even though they have not gained a reason to think that their beliefs are modally 
unreliable.101 On the other hand, commitment to a strongly externalist account of 
                                              
101 My remarks here are in line with Goldberg, when he writes that “not all de facto reliable 
processes are such that the subject is entitled to rely on them” (Goldberg 2014: p. 292). To 
demonstrate this point, Goldberg uses a version of BonJour’s (1980) famous example of a de 
facto reliable clairvoyant. My examples of Larry and Anne are like this clairvoyance-case 
insofar, as they are all trying to establish the point that a subject can base her beliefs on a de 
facto reliable process, and yet she would be, intuitively, epistemically irrational to believe or 
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undercutting defeat of the above sort has the implication that subjects (like Larry or 
Anne) can retain justification for their beliefs – when, intuitively, (i) the justification 
for their beliefs is undercut, and (ii) the subjects themselves could and should think 
of their own beliefs as being undercut.  
But assume that either the AMS or third-factor accounts (or both) present us with 
successful defeater-deflectors. This also means that the beliefs of subjects like Larry 
and/or Anne remain justified, even though both Larry and Anne have a rationality 
undercutter for their beliefs. According to strong externalism about undercutting 
defeat, this rationality undercutter is “misleading”. That means it does not give the 
relevant subjects reason to believe that their beliefs are not modally reliable, and so 
does not undercut the justification for holding those beliefs.  
At this point, we need to tread carefully, and make some subtle, but important points 
to get clear on what is at issue here. I have stated that subjects like Larry and Anne 
have a rationality undercutter for their relevant beliefs. In other words, they are 
epistemically irrational if they do not take their beliefs to be undercut. Given that 
Larry’s and Anne’s cases are exactly analogous to the case of the relevant moral 
believers, it seems that those moral believers also at least have a rationality undercutter 
for their beliefs.  
Here’s how I would say that a rationality undercutter gives rise to an undercutting 
defeater. A rationality undercutter makes it the case that given her doxastic/normative 
set, S should withhold or disbelieve that p*. And this undercuts S’s justification for 
holding her belief that p. To me this seems to be an intuitive account of how epistemic 
rationality and epistemic justification are connected. This account also seems perfectly 
in line with the epistemologists who support versions of the NO DEFEATER-
condition.102 But in some way, the kind of strong externalism about undercutting 
defeat, to which the standard responses are committed, seems to be at odds with this 
intuitive and popular account.  
                                              
keep believing on the basis of this information given everything else that she believes or 
should believe.  
102 Cf. Bergmann (2006: Ch. 6). 
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There are three possibilities here on how strong externalism conflicts with this picture 
or might seem to conflict with this picture. The first possibility does not consist in a 
very deep disagreement: you could assert that this general picture is right, but state 
that it does not apply to the cases discussed. It is therefore not at all a disagreement 
with the above picture as such, but just with the application of the picture to certain 
cases. That means you could deny that subjects like Larry and Anne have a rationality 
undercutter.  
But that seems to commit you to saying that there is nothing epistemically wrong with 
subjects like Larry and Anne. That means not only is it the case that their justification 
remains intact, they are not even in the least bit epistemically criticisable for displaying 
their relevant doxastic behaviour. I should make explicit that my own explanation for 
why Larry and Anne’s respective doxastic behaviour would be epistemically 
criticisable below will depend on the assumption that they do have a rationality 
undercutter for their relevant beliefs. In this argument, the explanation of why 
subjects like Larry and Anne are behaving in an epistemically wrong kind of way 
assumes the presence of a rationality undercutter. And so, in my explanation, the 
epistemic wrongness of their conduct in retaining their relevant beliefs is dependent 
on their possession of a rationality undercutter. So, by denying that Larry and Anne 
have a rationality undercutter, you can undermine my argument.  
That being said, it seems rather incredible to state that subjects like Larry and Anne 
do not have a rationality undercutter and are therefore not rightly epistemically 
criticisable if they retain their original beliefs. It just seems very intuitive to think that 
Larry and Anne should rationally think of their beliefs as being undercut by the 
information about the drugs and the tumour respectively. I therefore contend that 
every account of epistemic rationality that supports the result that subjects like Larry 
and Anne should not rationally take their beliefs to be defeated owes us a very good 
argument. (What I mean to say is that such accounts owe us a very good argument to 
the effect that subjects like Larry and Anne should not rationally take their beliefs to 
be defeated.) Absent such a very good argument, we should therefore reject the claim 
that subjects like Larry and Anne should not rationally take the relevant beliefs of 
theirs to be defeated. 
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The second option is that you can concede that the relevant subjects have a rationality 
undercutter, but state that the possession of a rationality undercutter does not make 
it the case that, given your doxastic/normative set, you should withhold or disbelieve 
p*. In other words, the presence of a rationality undercutter does not make it the case 
that you have an undercutting defeater, since a rationality undercutter does not make 
it the case that you adopt or should adopt a negative perspective towards your belief. 
The problem I see here is that if the presence of a rationality undercutter is not 
sufficient to make it the case that, given your doxastic/normative set, you should 
withhold or disbelieve that p*, then I am not sure what is. The second option 
concedes that subjects like Larry and Anne have a rationality undercutter. That means 
that Larry and Anne are epistemically irrational if they do not take their beliefs to be 
undercut. It seems eminently plausible to say that this makes it the case that they 
should withhold or disbelieve that their relevant beliefs were formed reliably. If it is 
the case that from your own perspective, it would be irrational to hold onto a belief 
in the presence of the information you are now receiving, then, it seems, given 
everything you believe or should believe, you should withhold or disbelieve that your 
belief was formed reliably.  
For example, intuitively, in ZZ COLOUR VISION, it is the case that your belief that 
the wall is red gains a rationality undercutter. In that case you are told that you have 
ingested ZZ before you came into the room – and this makes it the case that you 
would be epistemically irrational, if you did not adopt the view, that the justification 
for your belief that the wall is red is undercut. By contrast, in YY IMMUNITY, we 
can partly account for why you shouldn’t withhold or disbelieve that your cognitive 
faculties are reliable via pointing out that you never seem to gain a rationality 
undercutter in this scenario. What this comparison between ZZ COLOUR VISION 
and YY IMMUNITY suggests is that the presence of a rationality undercutter for 
your belief that p seems to be sufficient for making it the case that, given your 
doxastic/normative set, you should withhold or disbelieve that p*. Again, absent a 
very good argument against this claim, I think we should accept it.  
Third, you can concede that the subjects have a rationality undercutter and concede 
that the subjects now, given their doxastic/normative sets, should withhold or 
disbelieve p*. But you could deny that the fact that you should withhold or disbelieve 
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that p* (given your doxastic/normative set) makes it the case that you lose your 
justification for believing that p. That means denying the NO DEFEATER-condition 
on epistemic justification. Given everything we have said so far, this is the only option 
left.  
The surprising sub-conclusion we have now arrived at is that the standard responses 
are committed to the rejection of the NO DEFEATER-condition on epistemic 
justification. We have arrived at this sub-conclusion by noticing that the standard 
responses are best seen as defeater-deflectors. Their success as defeater-deflectors is 
dependent on the claim that before or at t2, our moral beliefs are not undercut. But 
in the exactly analogous cases of Larry and Anne, the subjects in those cases have an 
undercutting defeater for their respective beliefs at t2 – or at least, that’s what it looks 
like.  
Now, the standard responses need to state that Larry or Anne’s beliefs at t2 are not 
undercut if they want to avoid stating that the beliefs of the moral believers in the 
analogous cases are undercut. Here they meet the complication that it seems that they 
must concede that Larry and Anne have a rationality undercutter, and that a rationality 
undercutter makes it the case that the subjects should withhold or disbelieve that their 
relevant beliefs were reliably formed. In response to this, they must hold that it is not 
necessary for S’s belief that p to be justified that S, given her doxastic/normative set, 
should not withhold or disbelieve that p*.  
At this point, I suspect that many epistemologists would stop the argument and 
simply state that this suffices for us to reject the standard responses.103 In section 
(1.4.1), I have stated that I think it is safe to say that the NO DEFEATER-condition 
seems to be widely endorsed. If the standard responses need to reject this condition 
(as it seems they must) on account of being committed to a kind of strong externalism 
about undercutting defeat, we should ask whether there is any independent support 
in the literature for this kind of view on what gives rise to a loss of justification after 
                                              
103 If we assume that NO DEFEATER (or a relevantly similar version of it) spells out a 
necessary condition for justified belief in a proposition, then we are able to stop the argument 
at this point. The argument against the standard responses as defeater-deflectors, conditional 
on the truth of the NO DEFEATER-condition (or a relevantly similar version of it) would 
then simply be that the cases of Larry and Anne show that the considerations offered by the 
standard responses are insufficient to prevent the occurrence of defeat.  
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receiving information that changes what you believe or should believe.104 Why would 
you reject the NO DEFEATER-condition on epistemic justification? I will 
investigate this question in the next section.  
4.5 EXTERNALIST SCEPTICISM ABOUT DEFEAT  
Maria Lasonen-Aarnio (2010) has argued that epistemic externalists have reason to be 
sceptical of “no defeater”-conditions on justification and knowledge. She argues that 
a subject’s knowledge and justification can be retained even in cases where this subject 
is confronted with evidence that intuitively makes it the case that the subject should 
revise her relevant beliefs, and where the subject would be intuitively epistemically 
criticisable for failing to do so.105 
Why should we think that Lasonen-Aarnio’s arguments can provide support for the 
crucial point that S’s possession of a relevant rationality undercutter is not sufficient 
for taking away the justification of S’s belief that p? Assume the above strong 
externalism about epistemic justification. Given that one accepts this view on 
justification, one is now confronted with the problem that there seem to be cases 
where a subject’s belief is epistemically negatively affected by incoming information, 
but where the information that this subject receives does not imply that the subject’s 
belief is not modally reliably formed. The cases of Larry and Anne are good examples. 
How should the externalist react to these cases?  
One option already sketched out is to accept the internalist proviso above. But that 
option is not open to the externalists we have in mind here (for taking this option 
means admitting that the justification for the relevant beliefs is lost in cases like Larry’s 
and Anne’s). Lasonen-Aarnio wants to make room for the option that subjects in 
such cases can preserve the justification of their beliefs. And this is just what the 
                                              
104 Due to the apparent conflict between the popular NO DEFEATER-condition on 
epistemic justification and strong externalism about epistemic defeat, another fitting label for 
this view (which externalist supporters of the NO DEFEATER-condition might prefer) is 
perhaps “externalistically motivated scepticism about undercutting defeat”.  
105 The way in which I relate Lasonen-Aarnio’s arguments to the debate between the 
evolutionary debunker and the moral non-naturalist is similar to the way in which Law (2016) 
relates Lasonen-Aarnio’s arguments to the debate between the religious debunker and the 
defender of religious belief.  
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philosophers supporting the AMS or third-factor accounts should be looking for, if 
what I have said so far is right.  
Therefore, I suggest here that the philosophers presenting the standard responses 
could perhaps look towards Lasonen-Aarnio’s arguments for support for the point 
that the presence of a rationality undercutter does not suffice for the loss of 
justification for the relevant beliefs. Lasonen-Aarnio’s reasoning potentially provides 
the standard responses with an epistemological story on why subjects like Larry or 
Anne (and subjects in analogous cases, like the relevant moral believers) at t2 do not 
lose their justification for their relevant beliefs. As we have seen, this point is highly 
important: the defeater-deflector option is viable only on the assumption that the 
moral beliefs which are epistemically dependent on the believers’ moral faculty do not 
lose their justification at t2 due to the incoming information.  
Here’s a very rough sketch of Lasonen-Aarnio’s reasoning. Suppose Larry’s belief that 
God exists is modally reliably formed, i.e. let’s say it is true, and it is safe and sensitive 
if it is true, and so it is both safe and sensitive. Given how I have set up the case, there 
is no reason to think that the seemingly undercutting information he receives indicates 
that his belief is unsafe or insensitive, if his belief is true. Assume (just for the sake of 
the example) that knowledge is just safe and sensitive belief. Then, from the 
perspective of the (strong) externalist, it actually becomes puzzling why possessing 
this seemingly undercutting information should make a difference with regards to the 
justification of Larry’s belief. If Larry’s safe and sensitive belief constitutes knowledge 
in cases where he does not possess this information, and if this information does not 
actually connect with the features of the situation that are alone epistemically salient 
from the externalist’s perspective, how can the presence of this information rob Larry 
of his knowledge (via taking away his justification)? It seems therefore, that from the 
(strong) externalist’s point of view, there is some reason to think that the presence of 
this information does not rob Larry of his justification for believing that God exists.  
If this is accurate, then the externalist, it seems, has reason to believe that subjects like 
Larry (or Anne, depending on the details of the externalist view you want to go for) 
can retain knowledge in cases where this seemingly defeating information is present. 
And so, subjects like Larry and Anne might be able to retain knowledge (and in turn, 
justified belief) in cases where they have a rationality undercutter, and where they 
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therefore should withhold or disbelieve that their way of arriving at their belief is 
reliable.  
So, assume a package of strongly externalists views on justification and defeat, 
according to which subjects are justified or unjustified depending on whether their 
beliefs are based on de facto modally reliable faculties, and where information only takes 
away your justification if it indicates that your beliefs are not modally reliably formed. 
Assuming this strongly externalist package of views, Lasonen-Aarnio now provides 
you with a possible solution on how to deal with otherwise rather inconvenient cases: 
cases where a subject’s belief is de facto modally reliable, and where the subject receives 
some piece of information, that (i) does not indicate that the subject’s belief is not 
modally reliably formed, but (ii) where the subject would be intuitively irrational for 
not taking her belief to be undercut. These cases are inconvenient precisely because 
the information does not indicate that the belief is not modally reliably formed, but, 
intuitively, it seems that this information can nonetheless take away the justification 
of the subject’s belief. Lasonen-Aarnio provides a principled account for why 
epistemic justification is not lost in those cases, if the above strongly externalist 
perspective is true. 
So, assume that the standard responses co-opt Lasonen-Aarnio’s account to explain 
why the possession of a rationality undercutter for your belief that p is not sufficient 
for taking away your justification for believing that p. This would allow them to give 
an account for why it is not the case that Larry’s or Anne’s justification for holding 
their respective beliefs is taken away – and so neither is the justification of the moral 
beliefs in the analogous case, where the relevant subjects are confronted with the 
considerations powering the generic EDA.  
4.6 WHY THE DEFEATER-DEFLECTOR OPTION IS UNSATISFYING 
The trouble now is of course that (as Lasonen-Aarnio quite clearly appreciates) it 
would be nonetheless implausible to declare that the presence of a rationality 
undercutter is of no epistemic consequence. Lasonen-Aarnio thinks that although a 
subject’s belief in such a case need not become unjustified, a subject who retains her belief 
in the face of evidence that intuitively makes it epistemically irrational for her to 
continue to hold this belief is epistemically criticisable. This subject is epistemically 
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criticisable on account of being unreasonable.106 We are now in a position to see that 
the explanation from the last section for why it is epistemically wrong for subjects like 
Larry and Anne to hold onto their beliefs still works – even if we assume that a 
believer’s unreasonableness does not preclude a belief’s justification.  
Here’s the bare bones version of the argument to follow: if you divorce epistemic 
rationality from epistemic justification, then that might allow you to hold that subjects 
like Larry and Anne remain epistemically justified in holding onto their beliefs, despite 
being (in a clear sense) epistemically irrational for continuing to believe as they do in 
their respective circumstances. But being epistemically irrational is nonetheless 
epistemically bad! So, even in a kind of best case outcome for the standard responses, 
these responses seem capable of deflecting defeat only at the prize of endorsing 
epistemic irrationality.  
In what follows, I will put meat onto the bare bones structure of this argument via 
presenting a virtue epistemological account of epistemic rationality suggested by 
Lasonen-Aarnio herself. I do not think that this is the only way of fleshing out what 
is epistemically wrong with subjects like Larry and Anne, even assuming the 
justification of their beliefs remains intact. Thus, holding that something is 
epistemically wrong with subjects like Larry and Anne does not commit you to the 
specific story to follow.  
Nevertheless, I think the account suggested by Lasonen-Aarnio is an attractive one 
for our present purposes, in that it nicely highlights what I take to be the basic reason 
                                              
106 Lasonen-Aarnio’s general point seems to be the following: she distinguishes between two 
dimensions of normative (epistemic) evaluation, success and competence. Let’s assume that 
“knowledge” is the relevant success in the epistemic domain. Many paradigm examples of 
knowledge involve cases of competent success (e.g., people who know because they exhibit 
epistemic virtue). But the two dimensions of normative evaluation do not always over-lap: 
there are cases of incompetent success, and competent failure (e.g., cases where people 
ignore/take into account misleading evidence, and thereby succeed/fail to know). Amia 
Srinivasan (2015) puts the same general point regarding normative evaluations this way: there 
is no guaranteed alignment between the facts about what we are permitted to do or what we 
are obligated to do on the one hand, and the facts about whether we are blameworthy for 
what we do on the other – even in cases where non-culpable normative ignorance and 
incapacity are not involved. All norms can be violated through bad luck and conformed to 
by good luck. That means there are cases of blameworthy right-doing and blameless wrong-
doing. What Lasonen-Aarnio calls “unreasonable knowledge” is a prime instance of 
incompetent success or blameworthy right-doing.  
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for why the standard responses are deeply unsatisfying, even assuming they are 
successful in protecting the justification of our moral beliefs. This reason is that the 
standard responses license a kind of doxastic behaviour that allows subjects to insulate 
their beliefs from some piece of information, but where this doxastic behaviour is at 
odds with how a subject with an intellectually impeccable character would proceed in 
the same situation.  
If we divorce epistemic rationality or reasonableness from justification, why should 
we continue to think that reasonableness is epistemically valuable? The 
reasonableness of a believer seems to be epistemically valuable because of its tight 
connection to the goal of inquiry: knowledge. Consider the following example 
(Lasonen-Aarnio 2010: pp. 14-15; cf. Law 2016: p. 6). Say Joelle adopts the following 
rule or policy of belief-formation: Believe that p when you see that p, even in the 
presence of good evidence for thinking that your senses are not to be trusted. If we 
assume that seeing that p entails p,107 this method, when correctly applied, cannot 
produce a false belief. But nonetheless, Joelle should not adopt this rule, because it 
results in a bad belief-forming disposition, since a “subject who adopts this method 
is also disposed to believe p when she merely seems to see that p in the presence of 
evidence for thinking that her senses are not to be trusted” (Lasonen-Aarnio 2010: 
pp. 14-15).108 So, although the above rule cannot result in belief in a falsehood in cases 
where it is correctly applied, if Joelle were to adopt it, she would also be disposed to 
stick with her beliefs in cases where her evidence that her senses are untrustworthy is 
not misleading. So, adopting this rule would result in a disposition that overall is not 
knowledge-conducive. Assume that adopting this rule gives you knowledge in some 
cases. If it gives you knowledge in those, it also means that your belief is justified, or 
at least justified to the degree necessary for knowledge – which is really all the 
justification we can ask for. Nonetheless, being disposed to ignore good evidence (or 
seemingly good evidence) for thinking that your senses are not to be trusted (like 
                                              
107 For example, because we assume epistemological disjunctivism about veridical perception 
to be true (cf. Pritchard 2012b). 
108 The important point about this example is that although the above rule, when correctly 
applied, cannot result in belief in a falsehood, ordinary epistemic agents like us are quite 
incapable of adopting this rule in our doxastic behaviour without then also being disposed 
to apply it in cases where it only seems to us that we see that p.  
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Joelle) is unreasonable, due to the consequences for implementing this policy in one’s 
doxastic behaviour.  
As Baker-Hytch points out, this also accounts for “our reluctance as onlookers to 
attribute knowledge in such cases,… [which] is explained by our wish not to reward 
the subjects in such cases for their employment of an unreasonable belief-formation 
policy—a policy that in general does not yield knowledge” (2014: p. 176). Since 
plausibly, one major function of ascriptions of positive epistemic statuses like 
knowledge and justification is to mark other people as trustworthy potential sources 
of information (cf. Dogramaci 2012 & 2015), we are reluctant to ascribe you the 
statuses of knowledge and justification if an overall non-knowledge-conducive 
disposition is involved in the production of your belief or in your continued 
acceptance of it.  
Subjects like Larry and Anne seem to have a rationality undercutter for their relevant 
beliefs. I want to preclude a potential source of confusion here: the unreasonableness 
of S does not explain why S has a rationality undercutter.109 It explains why, in the 
presence of a rationality undercutter, it would be epistemically wrong to continue to 
hold the belief that is subject to a rationality undercutter. This of course, assumes that 
S does have a rationality defeater to begin with. So, to be perfectly explicit about this: 
I basically just assume that Larry and Anne indeed do have a rationality undercutter 
for their relevant beliefs. I am not sure that there is a deep explanation for why it 
would be irrational for Larry and Anne to not adopt the view that their relevant beliefs 
are undercut, and in any case, I do not pretend to have a deep explanation for this.110 
As stated before, it just seems intuitively obvious. You can reject my argument via 
rejecting the intuition that backs up this assumption. This assumption is therefore an 
important limitation of my argument. However, rejecting this intuition and the 
assumption it backs up seems to come at the cost of having to declare that subjects 
                                              
109 Although S’s unreasonableness does explain why it is epistemically bad for subjects like 
Larry and Anne to retain their beliefs in the presence of a rationality undercutter for those 
very beliefs – even though this rationality undercutter does not indicate that their beliefs are 
modally unreliable. In other words, the explanation in terms of unreasonableness accounts (or 
at least partly accounts) for why it is epistemically bad to hold onto a rationally undercut 
belief.  
110 A potentially promising explanation is perhaps the one offered by Baker-Hytch and 
Benton (2015: pp. 56-58). Cf. FN 111. 
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like Larry and Anne are not epistemically criticisable at all for retaining their beliefs in 
the respective scenarios. This move seems to force you to state that the doxastic 
behaviour of subjects like Larry and Anne is without blemish. This seems like a high 
cost to incur.111 
With that out of the way, I assume that subjects like Larry and Anne have a rationality 
undercutter. Plausibly, the presence of a rationality undercutter for your belief that p 
is sufficient for making it the case that, given your doxastic/normative set, you should 
withhold or disbelieve p*. Currently, we are discussing the question of why (i) even 
assuming that the fact that you should withhold or disbelieve that p* does not take 
away your justification for believing that p, (ii) you are nonetheless epistemically 
criticisable for believing that p (given that you should withhold or disbelieve that p*). 
Subjects like Larry and Anne are epistemically irrational in sticking to their beliefs in 
the presence of evidence that makes it the case that they should withhold or disbelieve 
that their relevant beliefs were reliably formed. If a kind of strong externalism about 
undercutting defeat is true (which I assume here for the sake of argument), this 
evidence is misleading in that it does not show that their way of arriving at their 
original beliefs was modally unreliable. But given the set-up of those cases, we have no 
reason to think that Larry or Anne (or the moral believer in the analogous moral 
                                              
111 Since even Lasonen-Aarnio thinks that there’s something epistemically wrong with 
subjects who hold onto their beliefs in the relevant defeat-cases, this move also seems 
without independent support from any current work in epistemology. Baker-Hytch and 
Benton (2015) supplement (and go beyond) Lasonen-Aarnio’s argument for the claim that 
knowledge can be retained in defeat-cases. But they also explain why subjects in these cases 
are epistemically irrational. Baker-Hytch and Benton argue that subjects in defeat-cases 
violate a derivative requirement of epistemic rationality: S must refrain from believing that p 
if S comes to believe or accept that one’s belief that p is not knowledge. This requirement is 
derived from the so-called “knowledge norm on belief”: S must not believe that p if S does 
not know that p. Subjects who persist in their beliefs in (undercutting) defeat-cases are 
violating this derivative norm, which is instrumental to fulfilling the primary epistemic norm 
of belief (p. 57):  
“When one acquires evidence that renders it improbable that one knows that p such that one 
thereby comes to believe or accept that one doesn’t know p, then by persisting in believing 
that p, one is violating the derivative norm…, even though one may in fact continue to know 
p (supposing one did know p to begin with).” (p. 58; italics in the original) 
So, even the externalist defeat-sceptics (Lasonen-Aarnio and Baker-Hytch and Benton) at 
least agree that something is epistemically wrong with subjects who just persist in their beliefs 
in (undercutting) defeat-cases. 
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cases) are anything other than ordinary believers: i.e. subjects who are not able to 
reliably discriminate between 
(i) cases, where the evidence in their possession is sufficient for making it the case 
that they should withhold or disbelieve that their relevant beliefs were reliably 
formed, but where this evidence is misleading,  
(ii) from cases, where the evidence in their possession is not misleading.  
For ordinary epistemic agents like these it is unreasonable to stick to their original 
belief in cases that belong to category (i), because it would foster a disposition in them 
to stick to their beliefs even in cases that belong to category (ii), where they are 
presented with non-misleading information or evidence. And this disposition would 
therefore fail to be knowledge-conducive over whole range of normal circumstances. 
Call the unreasonable disposition that is fostered here “dogmatism”, i.e. a pattern of 
doxastic behaviour, that is overall not-knowledge-conducive, where a subject 
systematically sticks to beliefs in the face of or incoming information or evidence 
when, with the goal of knowledge in mind, she would be better served by revising her 
beliefs in most of those cases. Dogmatism here is basically the subjects’ epistemically 
wrong disregard for incoming information or evidence that intuitively should prompt 
them to revise their beliefs.112 
A subject who dogmatically sticks to her beliefs in the face of misleading evidence or 
information fosters an epistemically bad disposition in herself. This disposition is 
epistemically bad as the dogmatic subject will also be disposed to stick to her beliefs 
in cases where she is presented with non-misleading information or evidence. The 
subjects we are talking about here are not in a position to reliably discriminate between 
the two kinds of cases. To subjects like these, even in the second case, “it will seem 
                                              
112 I do not mean to deny that there are possible epistemic agents, that we can come up with, 
who have the ability to reliably discriminate between cases, where the relevant information 
or evidence is misleading, from cases where it isn’t. As Lasonen-Aarnio is quick to point out, 
“[s]ince they make appeal to the dispositions and abilities that accompany the adoption of a 
method…evaluations [in terms of reasonableness] depend on the cognitive architecture of 
the subject under consideration” (ibid. p. 20). Subjects with the appropriate capacities would 
therefore perhaps not exhibit dogmatism in sticking to their beliefs, since it seems they do 
not run the danger of developing an overall non-knowledge-conducive disposition. But that 
should not come as any consolation to the standard responses, who (I assume) aim to protect 
the moral convictions of fairly ordinary, human epistemic agents.  
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to them as if they are following the same method as in good cases, thereby retaining 
knowledge, whereas they will in reality be retaining beliefs in falsehoods” (Lasonen-
Aarnio 2010: p. 15). Overall, subjects should thus follow a belief-forming policy that 
recommends the revision of belief in the light of new information or evidence (ibid.), 
when this new information or evidence is such that it gives them a rationality 
undercutter for their original belief. This policy is also bound to result in the need to 
give up modally reliably formed true beliefs in some cases, as the examples of Larry 
and Anne illustrate, but overall, it is conducive to the attainment of knowledge in a 
wide range of normal cases. Overall, it seems better to be disposed to suspend 
judgment unless you can independently confirm the reliability of the relevant belief-
forming faculty. 
Assuming that knowledge is the goal of inquiry and following Cassam’s (2016) 
account of intellectual vices,113 we can call dispositions to form beliefs in a certain 
manner under certain circumstances that are not overall knowledge-conducive vices in 
virtue of their role “in impeding effective and responsible inquiry” (p. 169). Lasonen-
Aarnio writes that epistemic reasonableness is “at least largely a matter of managing 
one’s beliefs through the adoption of policies that are generally knowledge-conducive, 
thereby manifesting dispositions to know and avoid false belief across a wide range 
of normal cases” (Lasonen-Aarnio 2010: p. 2; cf. 12-17). Epistemic reasonableness is 
connected to knowledge because it constitutes a believer’s ability to manage her 
beliefs through the adoption of knowledge-conducive policies.114 
                                              
113 Here’s a passage nicely summarizing this account:  
“What makes a character trait, thinking style or attitude intellectually vicious is its impact on 
our inquiries. Inquiry is the attempt ‘to find things out, to extend our knowledge by carrying 
out investigations directed at answering questions, and to refine our knowledge by 
considering questions about things we currently hold true’ (Hookway 1994: p. 211). In these 
terms, intellectual vices…can be characterized as intellectual character traits, thinking styles 
or attitudes that impede effective inquiry. Intellectual virtues, in contrast, are intellectual 
character traits, thinking styles or attitudes that abet effective inquiry. Examples might 
include open-mindedness, alertness, carefulness, and humility. An effective inquiry is one 
that is knowledge-conducive, and this casts light on why carelessness is an intellectual vice 
whereas carefulness is an intellectual virtue. Carefulness is knowledge-conducive whereas 
carelessness impedes our attempts to extend or refine our knowledge by inquiry.” (Cassam 
2015: p. 21) 
114 How are unreasonableness and intellectual vice connected? A subject is unreasonable 
when she adopts a non-knowledge-conducive belief-forming policy. In line with the account 
of intellectual vice offered by Cassam, I would then describe “unreasonableness” as an 
116 
Dogmatically sticking to your beliefs in light of counter-evidence or information 
sufficient for making it the case that you should withhold or disbelieve that your belief 
was reliably formed seems like a good example for exhibiting a belief-forming 
disposition that is intellectual vicious in Cassam’s sense. It is intellectually vicious, 
because in believing as the dogmatic believer does, she exhibits a disposition for 
doxastic behaviour that is not-knowledge conducive over a whole range of normal 
cases, and thus in general both impedes effective and responsible inquiry and marks 
the believer as an untrustworthy source of information for others. 
Assuming that Larry and Anne try to implement the recommendations respectively 
issued by the AMS and the third-factor accounts in their doxastic behaviour, they 
would retain their beliefs in light of the incoming information about what best 
explains their way of arriving at those beliefs. Since we now assume (for the sake of 
argument) that the Larry or Anne have a successful defeater-deflector at their disposal, 
their beliefs remain justified. But given everything we have said, it also seems to be 
the case that both Larry and Anne would exhibit a belief-forming disposition in their 
doxastic behaviour that is unreasonable for them to have, and that is therefore 
intellectually vicious. Given that the cases of Larry and Anne are in all relevant 
respects analogous to the cases of the relevant moral believers, it seems that for the 
respective moral believers it would also be intellectually vicious to hold onto their 
beliefs – even if their moral beliefs remain justified in light of the considerations 
powering the generic EDA. Therefore, even opting for the defeater-deflector-option, 
and working on the assumption (for the sake of argument) that the standard responses 
are successful in protecting the justification of our moral beliefs via preventing the 
occurrence of defeat, the standard responses can hardly be called a success.  
The important lesson to take from the discussion of the cases of Larry and Anne in 
this section is that dogmatically sticking to your original belief and ignoring incoming 
counter-evidence (or apparent counter-evidence) is epistemically wrong even in cases 
where your belief was modally reliably formed and where you justifiably belief that it is 
modally reliable, if true. It seems that being disposed to simply ignore incoming 
counter-evidence in good cases would also dispose you to simply ignore incoming 
                                              
umbrella term, that broadly groups together a variety of intellectually vicious forms of 
doxastic behaviour (i.e., forming and retaining beliefs and collecting and assessing evidence).  
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counter-evidence in bad cases that look like good cases from your vantage point. 
Overall, it would be better to be disposed to suspend judgment unless you can 
independently confirm the reliability of the relevant belief-forming faculty. 
4.7 THE DOGMATISM ARGUMENT 
What now remains to be done is to apply this lesson to the moral case. I will do so by 
explicitly stating the argument I have developed in this section. This argument 
presupposes several things. First and foremost, I assume the following:  
DEFEATER-DEFLECTOR ASSUMPTION: The standard responses try to 
prevent the occurrence of defeat.  
In the argument below, I assume that the standard responses are successful in 
showing that if our moral beliefs are true, then they are modally reliably formed. I 
assume that our moral beliefs are true. And, for the sake of argument, I assume that 
the presence of a rationality undercutter does not suffice to render a belief unjustified, 
if this undercutter does not show that our moral beliefs were not modally reliably 
formed. What the following argument, which I have termed the “Dogmatism 
Argument”, then shows is that even assuming that the standard responses are 
successful in preventing the occurrence of defeat, it is nonetheless the case that 
holding onto our moral beliefs in the presence of information DEBUNKING (cf. 
section (3.5)) is epistemically wrong.  
And now here’s the Dogmatism Argument: Upon being confronted with information 
DEBUNKING at t2, we have a rationality undercutter for our moral beliefs. We 
continue to hold onto our moral beliefs after t2, as the standard responses 
recommend, since we see that if our moral beliefs are true, then they are modally 
reliable. This assumes that we apply the reasoning urged on us by the standard 
responses to our case and hold onto our moral beliefs: we see that DEBUNKING 
does not give us a reason to think that our beliefs are not modally reliable, if they are 
true. And we simply assume that our moral beliefs are true. But, as I have argued 
above, information DEBUNKING nonetheless seems sufficient to generate a 
rationality undercutter for our moral beliefs. This premise is supported by the claim 
that subjects like Larry and Anne, whose cases are analogous to the cases of the 
relevant moral believers have a rationality undercutter for their respective beliefs. 
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Nothing else happens at or after t2, that counter-acts the rationality undercutter in our 
possession. This assumes that nothing else happens that would make it the case that 
we lose the relevant rationality undercutter. 
And now the real action starts: assume that you are epistemically entitled to disregard 
a rationality undercutter regarding a belief or a set of beliefs of yours only if you are 
in a position to appreciate the fact that this evidence is misleading and to reliably 
discriminate between this case and similar cases, where a similar rationality 
undercutter is sufficient for defeating the justification of your belief. This premise 
spells out a necessary condition that must be fulfilled for a subject to be entitled to 
disregard a piece of information that constitutes a rationality undercutter. 
I have argued that subjects are not entitled to just disregard rationality undercutters 
in their possession, even in cases where this rationality undercutter does not actually 
take away their justification (since we assume a strong externalism about defeat). 
Subjects are not entitled to do so, since this doxastic behaviour fosters in them a 
disposition that is not knowledge conducive over a large range of similar cases, and 
that is therefore intellectually vicious.  
We, as ordinary moral believers, are not in a position to appreciate the fact that 
DEBUNKING is misleading and to reliably discriminate between this case and 
similar cases, where a similar rationality undercutter is sufficient for defeating the 
justification of your belief. Therefore, we are not entitled to disregard this rationality 
undercutter regarding our moral beliefs.  
I term unentitled disregard “dogmatic ignorance”. Displaying dogmatic ignorance 
renders subjects vicious in exhibiting and fostering in them a non-knowledge 
conducive disposition for retaining beliefs and evaluating evidence. Dogmatically 
ignoring (=unentitled disregard for) a rationality undercutter regarding a set of your 
beliefs renders you epistemically vicious in holding onto your relevant beliefs.  
It then follows that we, as ordinary moral believers, who fail to satisfy the condition 
for entitled disregard of incoming information, are dogmatically ignoring a rationality 
undercutter regarding our moral beliefs. So, in holding onto our moral beliefs after t2, 
we are epistemically vicious. We are exhibiting epistemic vice in holding onto our 
moral beliefs after being confronted with DEBUNKING at t2. 
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What the Dogmatism Argument shows is that even if the standard responses were 
successful in protecting the justification of our moral beliefs, it would nonetheless be 
epistemically wrong for us to hold onto our moral beliefs in the presence of 
DEBUNKING. What this shows is that even the best-case scenario for the standard 
responses (where they succeed in protecting the justification of our moral beliefs) is 




By way of conclusion, let me now try to put together the most important points I 
have made in chapters (3) and (4). The winding path we have taken in critically 
discussing the AMS and third-factor accounts now puts us into a position to sum up 
the crucial insights gathered in our critical discussion in the form of a simple and 
straightforward argument.  
First, assume a plausible desideratum on any response to the generic EDA (or 
arguments like it): any satisfying response should support the claim that evolutionary 
considerations do not show that our moral beliefs are seriously epistemically deficient 
or that we are seriously epistemically deficient for holding them. In brief: a good 
response to the generic EDA should show that evolutionary considerations do not 
suffice to render us epistemically criticisable for holding or continuing to hold our 
moral beliefs. 
With this desideratum in hand, the following argument now unfolds: in response to 
the generic EDA, the standard responses are either to be regarded as defeater-defeaters 
or as defeater-deflectors. If the standard responses are regarded as defeater-defeaters, then 
they are unsuccessful in reinstating the justification of our moral beliefs. So, the first 
horn of this dilemma is a complete non-starter. 
If the standard responses are regarded as defeater-deflectors, then it is nonetheless the 
case that we would be epistemically vicious to hold onto our moral beliefs after we 
were confronted with DEBUNKING. As we have seen in the last section, even 
getting to the point that we are only epistemically vicious in continuing to hold our 
moral beliefs comes with serious epistemic baggage, as it commits the AMS and the 
third-factor accounts to a quite strong epistemic externalism about justification and 
defeat. Even then, evolutionary considerations suffice to make it the case that we 
would be epistemically criticisable for continuing to hold our beliefs.  
So, I conclude that the AMS and third-factor accounts are bad responses to the 
generic EDA. They are bad responses, as they fail to show that evolutionary 
considerations do not render us epistemically criticisable for holding or continuing to 
hold our moral beliefs. This is the central conclusion of this thesis.  
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I should make clear that the intended result of my arguments is not that an argument 
along the lines of the generic EDA is successful. The result I have argued for is that 
arguments like the generic EDA are not unsuccessful on account of the reasons provided by 
the standard responses. Yet these debunking arguments might fail for other reasons.115 
What I hope to have shown is that we have good reason to believe that certain popular 
ways of responding to EDAs on behalf of NNMR are (epistemologically speaking) 
deeply flawed. This result suggests that the popularity of these responses is quite 
unearned, at least in the context of the debate about evolutionary debunking in moral 
epistemology, and that this debate should be re-oriented towards paying greater 
attention to other issues with EDAs.  
  
                                              
115 Cf. appendix C for some empirically-minded responses to EDAs. 
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6 APPENDICES 
6.1 APPENDIX A: INTERNALISM & EXTERNALISM ABOUT EPISTEMIC 
JUSTIFICATION & MENTAL STATE DEFEATERS 
In this appendix, I will provide a rough characterization of internalism and 
externalism about epistemic justification, and I will state why I think that the 
framework of undercutting mental state-defeat presented in section (1.4.1) does not 
beg the question against (at least many versions of) externalism.116 
The debate (or rather debates) between internalism vs. externalism in epistemology is 
very roughly about whether certain necessary conditions for the possession of some 
positive epistemic status (e.g., justification, the possession of evidence, knowledge) 
are “internal” to the believer in a relevant sense (Bergmann 1997: p. 399). In which 
sense depends on the positive epistemic status in question, and on the forms of 
internalism and externalism contrasted with each other, e.g., access internalism holds 
that if a person has knowledge or justified belief, she has or could have access to the 
basis of her knowledge or justified belief (where “access” could be cashed out in terms 
of “knowability by some introspective or reflective method” (Goldman & Beddor 
2015: section 2)). Externalists will deny that access in this sense is required for 
knowledge or justification. 
For our purposes here, all we need is a rather basic idea about one point of contention 
between two varieties of epistemic internalism and externalism. In this thesis, I will 
understand “internalism” and “externalism” as two conflicting approaches towards 
epistemic justification. The conflict between internalism and externalism about 
epistemic justification arises from the fact that these views (or families of views) 
disagree about whether it is necessary for S’s belief that p to be justified that S has or 
could have access (in the sense of knowability through reflection) to (at least some 
essential part of) the justifier for S’s belief that p. “Justifiers” are those things, which 
                                              
116 There are epistemic externalists who are sceptical about the framework of epistemic 
defeat, and so, it is no wonder that they would object to NO DEFEATER, cf. section (4.5). 
Here, I just want to show that there are versions of epistemic externalism, who should be 
perfectly compatible with NO DEFEATER.  
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for any “… given justified belief… make up or constitute the person’s justification 
for that belief at that time” (Pappas 2014: section 3).  
Internalists about epistemic justification now assert that potential knowability through 
reflection of at least some essential part of the justifier for S’s belief that p is necessary 
for S’s belief that p to be justified. Externalists deny that this is a necessary condition 
for epistemic justification as such. Therefore, externalists in this sense could e.g., allow 
for S’s belief that p to be justified because her belief was produced by a reliable faculty 
in appropriate circumstances – even though the fact that her belief was produced by 
a reliable faculty in appropriate circumstances is not reflectively accessible to S.  
With this sketch of the distinction between internalism and externalism out of the 
way, let us next consider the following question:  
Does the focus on “mental state” defeaters in my thesis bias the account of defeat 
(presented in section (1.4.1)) towards epistemic internalism? 
No. First, Bergmann, who defends a version of NO DEFEATER himself, is an 
epistemic externalist about justification. And prominent epistemic externalists apart 
from Bergmann acknowledge the importance of mental state defeaters (cf. Nozick 
1981: p. 196; Goldman 1986: pp. 62–63, pp. 111–112). 
Secondly, it is not obvious why these commitments should be problematic for an 
externalist in the above sense: NO DEFEATER is perfectly compatible with S’s belief 
being justified and S never having considered whether her belief is formed in a 
trustworthy fashion. Furthermore, acknowledging the importance of mental state-
defeaters seems to be easy enough for most externalists, since this only requires 
conceding that a subject’s mental states can make some difference to the justificatory 
status of a belief of that subject. Conceding this point does not obviously require you 
to endorse a claim that clearly conflicts with epistemic externalism about justification 
(such as e.g., that only a subject’s mental states are relevant for the justificatory status 
of that subject’s beliefs).  
Thirdly, it is independently plausible that it reflects negatively on the epistemic status 
of your belief that p if you should withhold or disbelieve that your belief that p was 
formed reliably, given everything else you believe or should believe. And so, epistemic 
externalists at any rate should try to account for this intuitive thought. 
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6.2 APPENDIX B: SENSITIVITY AND SAFETY  
As stated in section (1.3.5), modal conditions are often used in epistemology to cash 
out the intuitive idea that knowledge requires our beliefs to be not merely correct, but 
to stably track the truth even if your circumstances would slightly change (Ishikawa 
& Steup 2017: section 5). The hope is that by applying these modal conditions, we 
can filter out cases that involve epistemic luck of the kind that is incompatible with 
knowledge. So, here’s a first stab at sensitivity and safety:  
Sensitivity1. S’s belief that p is sensitive if and only if: if p were false, S would not 
believe that p. 
Safety1. S’s belief that p is safe if and only if: if S were to believe that p, p would 
be true.117, 118, 119 
On Lewis’ (1973) semantics for counterfactual conditionals, the sensitivity condition 
is equivalent to the requirement that in the nearest possible world(s) in which not-p, 
S does not believe that p (Ishikawa & Steup 2017: section 5.1). The safety condition 
is then equivalent to the requirement that in the nearest possible world(s) where S 
believes that p, p is true.120  
                                              
117Cf. Sosa (1999): “A belief is sensitive iff had it been false, S would not have held it, whereas 
a belief is safe iff S would not have held it without it being true. For short: S’s belief B(p) is 
sensitive iff ¬p□→¬B(p), whereas S’s belief is safe iff B(p) □→p.” (p. 146) 
118 As Sosa (1999) points out, although contraposition is valid for material conditionals (i.e., 
“If A then B” is logically equivalent with “If not-B, then not-A”) it is not for counterfactuals, 
and so sensitivity and safety are not equivalent. To see this, consider the two propositions 
(α) “If John had gone to the party, Joanna still would have gone to the party” and (β) “If 
Joanna had not gone to the party, John still would not have gone to the party” (cf. Lewis 
1973: p. 35). It should be clear that (α) is not equivalent to (β) since even assuming (α) is true, 
(β) might still be false, as John might still have gone to the party had Joanna been absent (cf. 
Rabinowitz 2011).  
119 Apart from the point made in FN 118, it is also worth to emphasize a point nicely summed 
up by Comesaña in the following passage: 
“A subjunctive conditional does not have the same truth-conditions as a strict conditional, 
for a subjunctive conditional can be true even if there are some worlds where the antecedent 
is true and the consequent false, provided that those worlds are different enough from the 
actual world (for instance ‘If Mike Tyson were to fight David Letterman, then Mike Tyson 
would win’ is certainly true, even though there surely are possible worlds where Letterman 
wins).” (2007: p. 782) 
120 There is a technical complication that I gloss over here, but that I want to flag: As many 
commentators point out (Ichikawa 2011: p. 309, FN 22; Ichikawa & Steup 2017: section 5.2; 
Comesaña 2007: pp. 786-787; Roland & Cogburn 2011: p. 553), understanding safety in 
terms of counterfactuals does not seem to work well with the standard semantics for 
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But what’s the notion of “nearness” of or “closeness” between worlds involved here? 
As Hawthorne (2004: p. 56) notes (when discussing the safety-condition, but the point 
also applies to the sensitivity-condition) the kind of closeness that is of interest to 
epistemologists when they propose their modal conditions cannot be cashed out in 
terms of any general-purpose notion of metaphysical closeness at play in the 
discussion of counterfactuals.121 
Rabinowitz writes that for epistemic purposes which world counts as relevantly 
similar to the world w in which a subject S believes p at time t via method M is to be 
determined on a case by case-basis mostly (but not exclusively) relative to “the 
conditions of belief-formation” represented by the set of the belief that p, the time t, 
the subject S, and the method M by which S formed the belief p at t in w (2011: 
section 3). (The question of relevant similarity is also relevant in the discussion of the 
AMS, cf. section (3.2)). I would now like to focus on one of these conditions of belief 
formation, the method by which S formed her belief.  
When assessing a belief for safety or for sensitivity, it is important to hold fixed the 
way in which the agent arrives at or sustains her belief (i.e., the subject’s method or 
basis for belief), as otherwise applying these modal conditions won’t serve to capture 
the anti-luck intuitions they are intended to capture (Roland & Cogburn 2011: p. 
                                              
counterfactuals. Lewis’ account of counterfactuals includes a so called “centring condition” 
according to which the actual world is always the uniquely closest world. This would make 
safety a trivial condition, as all true beliefs would then trivially count as safe, because all 
actually true beliefs are also true in the next closest possible world if the next closest possible 
world is the actual world. (Ichikawa (2011: p. 309) sketches out an option for safety-theorists 
like Sosa (1999). In the same paper, Ichikawa also offers a semantics for counterfactuals that 
avoids this problem. But on this semantics, sensitivity and safety are equivalent.)  
In light of this issue, Ichikawa and Steup propose that it “may be most perspicuous to 
understand the safety condition more directly in…modal terms, as Sosa himself often does” 
(2017: section 5.2).  
121 According to David Lewis’ (1973) account, a counterfactual is true just in case the 
corresponding material conditional holds in all the worlds in a relevant set. The relevant set 
of worlds is the set of worlds where the antecedent is true that are more similar to the actual 
world than any worlds where the antecedent is false. So, to evaluate if p were the case, then 
q would be the case, we examine the sphere of p-worlds that differs less than any non-p-
worlds from the actual world and check whether q is true in those worlds. Here we can see 
how Lewis’ metric for similarity and similarity for epistemic purposes might come apart. On 
Lewis’ account a world w* can for instance fail to be relevantly similar to the actual world w 
if it has a different history. But as Rabinowitz (2011: section 3) points out, when it comes to 
safety, possible worlds with a different history to w can nevertheless count as close, provided 
that the conditions for belief-formation are the same or similar in both worlds.  
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550).122 Consider first cases relevant to the sensitivity-condition, where a subject 
believes that p on good grounds or by using a good method, but S could believe that 
p on bad grounds or by using a bad method, even if p were not the case (Ichikawa 
2011: p. 302). Consider Ichikawa’s example from the same passage:  
A wife believes, on the basis of excellent evidence, the truth that her husband is 
faithful. But she is psychologically unable to face difficult truths. So, had her 
husband been unfaithful, she would have self-deceived herself into irrationally 
believing him to be faithful. (ibid.) 
Here we can see the need to index the sensitivity-condition to the actual way in which 
the subject acquires her belief: Sensitivity1 gives you the result that the wife’s true 
belief acquired through considering excellent evidence is not sensitive and therefore 
does not constitute knowledge. But that’s counter-intuitive: the wife believes truly 
that her husband is faithful due to top-notch evidence.  
The analogous point also applies to safety: Consider a similar case, where the wife 
again actually responds properly to the evidence in her possession, but her belief fails 
to satisfy Safety1 (ibid.: p. 309): 
A wife believes, on the basis of excellent evidence, the truth that her husband is 
faithful. But she is psychologically unable to face difficult truths. Moreover, her 
husband might have easily been unfaithful. In that case, she would have believed 
that her husband is faithful via self-deception, even though this belief would be 
false in that case.  
Safety1  gives you the result that the wife’s true belief acquired through excellent 
evidence is not safe and therefore does not constitute knowledge. Again, this result 
seems counter-intuitive. Therefore, if the two modal conditions are not relativized to 
methods, they do not track the salient instances of epistemic luck.123 
Therefore, we need to relativize to the subject’s methods or basis for belief to avoid 
these problems. Here are amended versions of the two modal conditions: let “M” 
                                              
122 Roland and Cogburn call this requirement the “Constancy-Principle”:  
“When considering changes in an agent's doxastic attitude with respect to a proposition 
across worlds, the process/method by which the agent acquires (or sustains) that attitude 
must remain constant.” (2011: p. 550)  
123 I am side-stepping the worry here of how we ought to individuate methods (cf. 
Rabinowitz 2011: sec. 3.1.3).  
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denote the way in which the subject S acquires the belief that p, i.e. the subject’s basis 
for belief or her method for attaining it:  
Sensitivity2. S’s belief that p formed via or based on M is sensitive if and only if: 
if p were false, S would not believe that p via or based on M. 
Safety2. S’s belief that p formed via or based on M is safe if and only if: if S were 
to believe that p via or based on M, p would be true. 
In order to leave the problem flagged in FN 120 aside, I follow Ichikawa’s and Steup’s 
advice (cf. FN 120 above):  
Sensitivity3. S’s belief that p formed via or based on M is sensitive if and only if: 
in nearby possible worlds where p is false, S would not believe that p via or based 
on M.  
Safety3. S’s belief that p formed via or based on M is safe if and only if: in nearby 
possible worlds where S believes that p via or based on M, p is true.124 
A few examples might help to elucidate the two modal conditions a bit further. Robert 
Nozick’s (1981) influential statement of the sensitivity-condition was motivated by 
the anti-sceptical potential of the condition. According to Sensitivity3, my true belief 
that there is a cherry tree in my garden (formed via perception) can count as 
knowledge, since if there were no cherry tree in my garden, I would not believe that 
there is a cherry tree in my garden via perception. In the close possible worlds in 
which there is no cherry tree in my garden (e.g., where none is planted there; where I 
had it cut down), I do not believe that there is a cherry tree in my garden via 
perception. 
Sceptical scenarios do not impinge on my knowledge, as worlds where these scenarios 
apply are more dissimilar to the actual world than the world where no cherry tree is 
planted in my garden and are therefore “further off” (Rabinowitz 2011: section 1). 
                                              
124 There are several complications I am glossing over, but I want to flag one of them in this 
footnote. As Timothy Williamson (2000: p. 100) points out (with respect to safety, but the 
point also applies to sensitivity), the modal conditions are vague with respect to the question 
of “What counts as a close world?” because the notions meant to be elucidated by the modal 
conditions (i.e., “relevant similarity”, “reliability” and “knowledge”) are also vague. Due to 
this vagueness, Williamson argues that there will be cases in which whether you think that 
there is a close world in which the agent falsely believes depends on whether you are willing 
to attribute knowledge or reliability to the agent in the actual world in that case (ibid.; 
Williamson 2009: pp. 305ff).  
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This seems plausible. Radical sceptical scenarios typically involve quite fantastical 
elements or scenarios like e.g., the activity of powerful Cartesian demons. It is intuitive 
to think that worlds where these sceptical elements or scenarios obtain are highly 
dissimilar to the actual world. Thus, the fact that I would have false beliefs in the 
sceptical worlds125 is irrelevant with respect to the question of whether my belief 
amounts to knowledge in the actual world.  
Although originally motivated on account of its anti-sceptical prowess, sensitivity has 
also been criticised for struggling with “abominable conjunctions” in those kinds of 
scenarios (cf. DeRose 1995: pp. 27–28). Let’s suppose that scepticism with respect to 
ordinary knowledge is false. Let’s further suppose that I believe that I have hands (as 
I do). Given Sensitivity3, and everything else being equal,126 I know that I have hands, 
since in nearby worlds where I do not have hands (e.g., because there I recently had 
a horrible accident), I would not believe so via the same method or on the same basis. 
Now it seems incredibly intuitive to hold that if I know that I have hands, and I know 
that if I have hands this entails that I am not a handless brain in a vat (which seems 
to be a plausible assumption), then I know that I am not a handless brain in a vat.127 
However, on the sensitivity-account, I fail to know that I am not a handless brain in 
a vat. The reason for this is that I would falsely believe that I am not a handless brain 
in a vat in the closest world in which the proposition “I am not a handless brain in 
the vat” is false, i.e. the world in which I am a handless brain in the vat (Rabinowitz 
2011). This leads to an abominable conjunction: I know that I have hands and I do not 
know that I am not a handless brain in a vat (DeRose 1995: pp. 27-28). This is one of 
the reasons why many epistemologists today reject sensitivity as a necessary condition 
for knowledge, but nonetheless there are also defenders of the condition still standing 
(cf. several of the essays in Becker & Black 2012; Ichikawa 2011).  
Safety-accounts have been explicitly motivated by their ability to avoid these 
conjunctions. Consider for instance Sosa’s (1999) example of a belief that is safe, but 
                                              
125 In those cases it is part of the sceptical hypothesis that the relevant truths would have 
been different while my beliefs would have been the same.  
126 That is to say, if all other things necessary for knowledge are in place. 
127 The principle underlying this intuitive thought is that knowledge is closed under 
entailment (often referred to as the “Closure-Principle”), and roughly holds that if S knows 
p, and if S knows that p entails q, then S knows q. 
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not sensitive, i.e. the belief that a distant sceptical scenario does not obtain (e.g., “I 
am not a handless brain in a vat”). If we stipulate again, that scepticism regarding 
ordinary knowledge is false, then the belief that I am not a handless brain in a vat is 
safe, although it is not sensitive, as we have just seen.128 
To see why, consider this case: Let’s say that we have a subject here called “GE 
Moore”. GE Moore forms the true perceptual belief that “I have hands”. Given 
Safety3, Moore knows that he has hands, since in nearby possible worlds where he 
also forms the belief that he has hands via perception, he has hands.  
He then makes the following inference: “If I have hands, then I am not a handless 
brain in a vat”. Again, it seems plausible to say that if Moore knows that he has hands, 
then he knows that if he has hands, he is not a handless brain in a vat. His belief in 
the conditional “If I have hands, then I am not a handless brain in a vat” is also safe: 
in nearby worlds where Moore believes in this conditional, it is true that if he has 
hands, then he is not a handless brain in a vat.  
So, he infers from his perceptual belief the claim that “I am not a handless brain in a 
vat”, which he then believes. GE Moore’s true inferred belief “I am not a handless 
brain in a vat” is safe, since even if the circumstances surrounding Moore were to 
slightly change, his belief formed via inference would then still have been true. In 
nearby possible worlds, where Moore gains the belief that he is not a brain in a vat 
via the above inference, this inferential belief is still true.  
Moreover, the following point applies again: the sceptical worlds where Moore has 
the inferential belief and where it is false are more distant and are therefore not 
relevant. Therefore, Moore can know that he has hands, that if he has hands, then 
he’s not a handless brain in a vat, and that he is not a handless brain in a vat.  
                                              
128 Here’s Sosa’s own short summary on why the belief that a sceptical scenario does not 
obtain is safe: 
“[N]ot easily would one believe that not-H [where H is the claim that a sceptical scenario 
obtains] (that one was not so radically deceived) without it being true (which is not to say 
that not possibly could one believe that not-H without it being true). In the actual world, and 
for quite a distance away from the actual world, up to quite remote possible worlds, our belief 
that we are not radically deceived matches the fact as to whether we are or are not radically 
deceived”. (Sosa 1999: p. 147) 
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And safety-accounts also seem to work fine in non-sceptical cases: My true perceptual 
belief that there is a cherry tree in my garden can count as knowledge, since in the 
next closest worlds where I have this belief, but where things are slightly different, 
the belief is still true. Moreover, in the relevant nearby worlds where I do not have 
this perceptual belief, this is so because in those worlds there is no cherry tree in my 
garden for me to perceive.129, 130 
It should be added that not everyone agrees that either safety or sensitivity are 
necessary for knowledge. For purported examples of insensitive knowledge, cf. Vogel 
(2012). For purported examples of unsafe knowledge, cf. e.g., Bogardus (2014). 
Although I do find these examples convincing, my argument in this thesis does not 
depend on their success.  
6.3 APPENDIX C: IDEALIZATIONS 
In section (1.4), I try to investigate whether we can find an epistemologically 
respectable epistemic challenge to our moral beliefs that arises from making the 
discovery that evolution has influenced our (i.e., your and my) moral beliefs in some 
way. From (1.4), and throughout the rest of my thesis, I assume that we indeed have 
good reason to believe that evolution has influenced our (i.e., your and my) moral 
beliefs in a way that is apt to give rise to the challenge that is formulated by the generic 
EDA. But this assumption presupposes several idealizations that need to be made 
explicit.  
First off, it assumes that there is a considerable evolutionary influence on the moral 
convictions of contemporary humans, and that evolution (perhaps combined with 
other causal factors, like e.g., cultural influences) explains why contemporary humans 
have (at least many of) the moral convictions they do have. Some critics of EDAs 
dispute this. For example, Jessica Isserow (2018) argues that we are not in a position 
                                              
129 In many cases safety and sensitivity converge, i.e. in many cases, if your belief is safe, then 
it is also sensitive. This is indeed plausibly the case in the example above, where it is also true 
to say, that in nearby worlds, where there is no cherry tree in my garden (e.g., because I had 
it cut down), I do not have the perceptual belief that there is a cherry tree in my garden.  
130 When it comes to cases concerning knowledge of the negation of sceptical hypotheses, 
the safety-condition is less demanding than the sensitivity principle. However, there are also 
possible cases where safety is more demanding than sensitivity, cf. Rabinowitz (2011: section 
3b). 
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to place a sufficiently high level of confidence in any account of our moral evolution. 
Therefore, typical EDAs fall short of generating a defeater. And William Fitzpatrick 
(2015; 2016) argues, that in claiming that our moral beliefs across the board are 
nothing but the results of truth-indifferent processes, the debunkers simply 
overreach. According to him, what the debunkers fail to take into account is the 
possibility that although the psychological capacities we utilize in forming moral 
beliefs evolved for Darwinian reasons, we may nonetheless be able to develop our 
abilities for moral reflection and reasoning in cultural contexts and exercise them with 
a considerable degree of independence from those truth-indifferent influences 
(Fitzpatrick 2016: p. 437, cf. Fitzpatrick 2015).  
Furthermore, the above assumption presupposes something more than just that 
evolutionary forces have influenced the moral beliefs of contemporary humans. It 
assumes that evolution has influenced your moral beliefs and my moral beliefs. 
Evolution (it is assumed) accounts for why individual contemporary humans have 
many of the moral beliefs they do have. However, this assumption is also 
controversial in its own right. Mogensen (2016b) and Hanson (2017) have each 
pointed out that this assumption seems to conflict with an influential view in the 
philosophy of biology, the view that natural selection only explains frequencies in 
which traits occur in populations (cf. Sober 1984). Since this view holds that natural 
selection cannot explain the traits of individuals, it seems to entail that the facts about 
past selection cannot form part of a discrediting explanation of the moral beliefs of 
any individual (Mogensen 2016b: pp. 1805-1806).  
These are serious worries, but I am going to set them aside in this thesis. By setting 
them aside, I do not mean to detract from their importance. Rather, I am bracketing 
these worries to make it easier to consider in abstract terms whether an evolutionary 
moral genealogy could ever amount to or be part of a coherent epistemic challenge 
(Locke 2014: p. 223) – despite the considerations offered by the standard responses. 
This is the topic of my current undertaking. Once you have explored this possibility, 
you can still take away my assumptions and consider whether the differences between 
the idealized and a more realistic scenario make an epistemically relevant difference. 
The topic of this thesis is whether certain standard responses to EDAs are successful. 
Obviously, I think it is a fair response to EDAs to call into doubt the relevant 
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empirical assumption involved in those arguments. But importantly, this route is not 
taken by these standard responses, and indeed, it seems that the empirical responses, 
if successful, would render the standard responses superfluous: if EDAs fail for 
reasons related to their empirical assumptions, why would we need to engage in the 
quite intricate manoeuvres involved in the standard responses (cf. also section (3.3.2), 
FN 86)?131 
This point motivates several idealizing assumptions that I will make concerning 
evolution and human moral psychology. I take these useful idealizing assumptions 
concerning the evolutionary impact on our moral beliefs from Dustin Locke (2014: 
pp. 222-223) although I have slightly amended the terminology:132 
(a). All of our moral beliefs are directly based on our moral faculty.  
(b). Our moral faculty has a direct and complete Darwinian explanation. This 
explanation holds that in the environment of evolutionary adaptation, our 
ancestors’ moral faculty was naturally selected to produce adaptive moral 
beliefs, and this is why we now have this faculty.  
(c). There is no epistemically relevant difference between our current environment and 
the environment of evolutionary adaptation.  
Why make these three assumptions? These assumptions abstract away from the far 
messier and more complex picture of our actual moral psychology and its evolutionary 
history. It is precisely the messiness and complexity of the actual picture, which 
motivates criticisms in the vein of Fitzpatrick, Hanson, Isserow and Mogensen, and 
                                              
131 This harkens back to a point I have made in the introduction (chapter 0) to this thesis.  
132 Instead of speaking of “moral dispositions” as Locke does, I talk of the “moral faculty”. 
I am not sure if there is more than a terminological difference between Locke and me here, 
but I will of course provide my rationale. I use the term “faculty” interchangeably with 
various terms: “methods”, “mechanisms”, “sources” and “processes”. These all refer to the 
same thing, i.e. our way of arriving or forming specific beliefs. I use the term “belief-forming 
dispositions” in a way that is not equivalent to the above terms. Perception, introspection, 
deductive and inductive inference are all faculties/mechanisms/methods/processes/ 
sources – but e.g. being open-minded, being diligent in gathering and evaluating evidence or 
being disposed to dogmatically refuse to take new evidence into account are not. The latter 
examples are what I will call “belief-forming dispositions”. These are traits of the intellectual 
character of a person, that influence the belief-forming and evidence-gathering habits of that 
person. For a similar distinction between ways of arriving at specific beliefs and intellectual 
character traits cf. Lepock 2011.  
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which I want to idealize away from to inquire into the epistemological underpinning 
of debunking arguments.133 
Assumption (a) holds that our moral beliefs are formed via the workings of a moral 
faculty. One way of thinking about the relationship between our moral beliefs and the 
moral faculty is to hold that our moral beliefs “depend crucially on intermediate 
conscious states, delivered by our moral faculty” (Bogardus 2016: p. 641). The term 
“moral faculty” then just refers to whatever produces these intermediate conscious 
states. Different views on moral psychology will fill in different intermediate 
conscious states here: moral sentiments, gut reactions, affect-laden intuitions, 
intellectual seemings, pure and affectless conscious thoughts etc. Our moral faculty 
produces the intermediate conscious state and this state then regularly and directly 
prompts the formation of moral beliefs. Tomas Bogardus calls this popular family of 
views “Representationalism” (ibid.).134 
Condition (a) idealizes first of all away from the fact that many of our moral beliefs 
are not simply based on the workings of this moral faculty, but are e.g., the product 
of chains of reasoning, of testimony etc. Fitzpatrick’s critical point above is thus 
bracketed. Secondly, since (a) also entails that the moral beliefs of every individual 
human moral believer are directly based on the moral faculty, assuming (a) also allows 
us to bracket Mogensen’s and Hanson’s worry. And thirdly, (a) leaves aside other 
accounts of moral psychology, like e.g., rationalism or divine command theory 
(Bogardus 2016: p. 642). 
                                              
133 This epistemological underpinning might still be of interest even if it turns out that 
evolutionary debunking fails once we remove these idealizing assumptions (cf. Locke 2014; 
Lutz 2017; Vavova 2014: p. 79). We may well be able to apply the abstract epistemological 
story (developed in section 1.4, summarized in appendix I) to other cases in which a set of 
beliefs was apparently formed under the influence of epistemically-irrelevant factors.  
134 Bogardus (2016) emphasizes that moral psychology is of key importance in determining 
the scope of EDAs. Assume that an EDA can be found that rests on a sound epistemological 
principle. Bogardus argues that even then, this EDA will only be of danger to moral non-
naturalists who accept Representationalism. Both rationalists who hold that we can gain 
direct access to the moral truth via rational reflection and theists who hold that some of their 
moral beliefs are in one way or another ultimately produced by divine activity can rationally 
maintain that their justification for such beliefs is not threatened by even the most 
challenging kind of EDA. He therefore concludes that only those who accept a broadly 
naturalistic worldview should be concerned by EDAs.  
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Assumption (b) idealizes away from the fact that the actual empirical explanation of 
our moral belief-forming processes will likely be very complex (i.e., not solely 
consisting of evolutionary factors) and far less direct. As Matt Lutz (2017: p. 13) 
writes, the appeal of evolutionary explanations to the debunker is that they 
complement sociological and neuropsychological accounts of human moral 
conviction and thus seem to go a long way toward completing a naturalistic 
explanation of our moral beliefs that makes no mention of the mind-independent, 
non-natural moral truth. (b) simplifies the actual situation by stating that such a 
complete naturalistic explanation is provided by an available evolutionary account.  
I also think it is true that as things currently stand, we should not be too confident 
about any one explanation of our moral evolution. This is precisely Isserow’s point. 
But for the purposes of formulating a generic EDA, I will assume below (in section 
(1.4.5): see assumptions (I) and (II) stated there), that the above direct and complete 
Darwinian explanation is among all the respectable available explanations of our 
moral faculty the one that is clearly best supported by the overall evidence. It should 
be added, that my assumption is not that this Darwinian explanation is so exceedingly 
well supported that it is hard to even begin to raise doubts about it in a rational 
fashion. Rather, I assume that the relevant direct and complete Darwinian explanation 
is sufficiently supported to constitute both (i) a sufficiently good explanation of our 
moral faculty, and (ii) the clearly best explanation currently available to “us” (i.e., 
everyone who gets informed about the current state of research on the evolution of 
morality).135  
Assumption (c) enables us to draw direct inferences from the reliability of the moral 
faculty in our ancestors’ circumstances to the reliability of the moral faculty in our 
circumstances. This enables us to draw inferences like e.g., if the moral faculty reliably 
produced true beliefs in the environment of evolutionary adaptations, then it still 
reliably produces true beliefs. This is important, as whether a certain belief-forming 
mechanism is reliable or not depends in part on the circumstances in which it is used. 
                                              
135 It is important to mention these two points separately, as it is possible for an explanation 
to be the best explanation available to us, while this explanation is still exceedingly poor. I 
also assume here that part of what makes an explanation “good” is that it is well supported 
by the available evidence.  
135 
Even perception, the prime example of a typically highly reliable mechanism, will not 
produce accurate beliefs in a stable and trustworthy manner in all kinds of 
circumstances. You should not trust your sense perception to the same extent as you 
would in normal circumstances when it is e.g., dark and foggy outside, or when the 
distorting effects of heavy medication affect you. (c) prevents the many differences 
between our current circumstances and the circumstances of evolutionary adaptation 
from making an epistemically relevant difference of this sort.  
No doubt, my idealizing assumptions certainly make things easier for the aspiring 
debunker. But they do not make things too easy: the two standard responses are not 
impeded by my idealizations.136 What these idealizing assumptions in effect 
accomplish, is that the generic explanatory EDA does not succumb to the empirically-
minded responses to EDAs, which are independent of the standard responses. These 
idealizations make sure that there is a real job to do for the standard responses. As I 
have stated in the introduction, the allure of these responses is that they promise to 
neutralize the epistemic threat supposedly arising from evolution, even under the 
assumption that the debunkers’ empirical hypotheses are largely correct, and if we 
assume NNMR. 
6.4 APPENDIX D: RELIABILITY  
In this appendix, I basically just want to give you quick idea of two popular and 
distinct uses of the term “reliability” in contemporary epistemology.  
According to one established sense of the term, “reliability” refers to the sort of modal 
stability of the connection between belief and truth that characteristically appears to 
be missing in Gettier-cases, where the relevant subject ends up with a true belief but 
does so in a manner which is problematically accidental (cf. the example of Bertrand 
in section 1.3.5). This sort of modal reliability is cashed out by the modal conditions 
of knowledge that we have already come to know.  
A different understanding of the term “reliability”, which can come apart from modal 
reliability (cf. Baker-Hytch 2014: pp. 175-176) refers to “process reliability” (cf. 
                                              
136 As I have mentioned in the introduction, for the standard responses to be non-
superfluous, we need to assume that EDAs are somewhat resistant to other empirical and 
epistemological criticisms. Otherwise, it is hard to see what the appeal of these responses is. 
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Becker 2008; Pritchard 2012a): i.e., “the salient process-type that produced… [the 
subject’s] belief has a high truth-ratio in the actual world and in worlds with similar 
physical laws” (Baker-Hytch 2014: p. 176).137 
To see that modal reliability and process reliability can come apart, consider that a 
false belief cannot be reliably formed, if we understand the notion in terms of modal 
reliability. The modal connection between belief and truth cannot be sufficiently 
modally stable (for knowledge), if it came apart in the actual world! This is reflected 
in the safety-condition and the sensitivity-condition, which both presuppose that the 
relevant belief is true in the actual world.  
On the other hand, if we suppose that the term “reliability” refers to process reliability, 
then a belief can be reliable, even though it is false, on account of being produced by 
a salient process type that has high truth-ratio in the actual world and in worlds with 
similar physical laws. Having a high-truth ratio is compatible with producing some 
false beliefs. 
6.5 APPENDIX E: NO DEFEATER 
Here I want to provide some clarifications regarding NO DEFEATER. First, it 
should be emphasized, that S’s “doxastic/normative set” of beliefs does not simply 
comprise all beliefs S has or could have: the doxastic set comprises only beliefs S 
actually has, the normative set comprises only beliefs which S should have given her 
evidence (regardless of whether S actually has those beliefs). Since S’s normative set 
depends on the evidence available to S, and since S’s doxastic set depends on S’s 
actual beliefs, there might well be beliefs that S could have, that are not contained in 
S’s doxastic/normative set. That means it is entirely possible that there are beliefs, 
that S could have, but that S neither actually holds, nor are they beliefs that S should 
hold, given the evidence available to her.  
Secondly, a possible criticism of NO DEFEATER is that it leads to scepticism. I 
imagine, that the argument here goes as follows: for any belief that p, there is always 
some belief in the doxastic/normative set of S that makes it the case that S should 
                                              
137 A nasty problem that looms here is known as the “generality-problem”, which arises from 
the difficulty of providing a principled account of what the “salience” of a process-type boils 
down to (cf. e.g., Conee & Feldman 1998). 
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withhold or disbelieve that p*. Perhaps this argument gains some initial plausibility 
from reflecting on the “messiness” of the doxastic sets of actual believers. But I think 
we have good reason to resist this line of argument. Notice that this argument would 
also call into doubt the existence of doxastic and normative defeaters more generally. 
So, this argument does not apply to NO DEFEATER specifically.  
Moreover, it is actually a dubious claim that for any or even for most beliefs of mine, 
that I take to be justified, we can find elements in my doxastic or normative set, that 
generate an undercutter in the above sense. It is far from obvious that for many 
ordinary beliefs of mine, like e.g., my belief that there’s a PC in front of me, we can 
find a belief of mine or a belief I should have, that makes it the case that I should 
withhold or disbelieve that my belief that there’s a PC in front of me was reliably 
formed.  
A major advantage of a condition like NO DEFEATER, compared to other higher-
order requirements, is that this condition does not imply that for any of S’s beliefs to 
count as justified, S must hold the respective higher-order belief that that belief was 
formed reliably (cf. Moon 2018: pp. 254ff.). NO DEFEATER is perfectly compatible 
with the possibility that S’s belief that p is justified, and S e.g., has never even 
considered whether p*. NO DEFEATER is therefore perfectly compatible with 
externalist accounts of justified belief, on which it is not required for S’s belief that p 
to be justified that S is or could easily be aware of information that shows that her 
belief that p was formed in a trustworthy manner (cf. also appendix A). 
6.6 APPENDIX F: COGNITION DEFEAT 
Here I want to provide some further intuitive motivation for COGNITION 
DEFEAT. Let’s first consider an ordinary case. Intuitively, in normal circumstances, 
Carla’s visual perception of a red block in front of her provides her with justification 
for the belief in the proposition that there is a red block in front of her. Now it seems 
plausible to assume that if things are here as they normally are, then it is not the case 
that Carla should withhold belief that explanatory history of her visual perception 
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does not involve facts about middle-sized objects and their qualities.138 Indeed, in this 
case we might even look for an evolutionary account to support the claim that the 
explanatory history of visual perception involves facts about middle-sized objects and 
their qualities. Griffiths and Wilkins (2013: pp. 137-139) have argued that our evolved 
cognitive mechanisms (like e.g., our visual perception) which we use to form everyday 
beliefs (like e.g., beliefs about middle sized objects and their qualities) are probably 
adaptations. And given that they are adaptations, it is hard to see “what…[their] basic 
evolutionary function could be other than tracking truth” (ibid.). If this is right, then 
it seems we can be optimistic about the claim that evolutionary explanations 
concerning our cognitive mechanisms like perception will not make it the case that 
we should withhold belief that the explanatory history of these mechanisms involved 
the relevant truths or facts. Therefore, COGNITION DEFEAT is compatible with 
being justified in believing in the reliability of one’s relevant cognitive mechanism in 
ordinary cases, where we would intuitively judge that these beliefs are indeed justified.  
Now, let’s return to the scenario featuring Johnny and his visual perception of a red 
car, familiar from section (1.4.1). At the outset, Johnny is initially justified to believe 
that the faculty that he uses to arrive at his belief about the object in the driveway 
(and which he assumes to be ordinary visual perception) is reliable when it comes to 
producing accurate beliefs about objects like cars in the appropriate conditions. Say 
e.g., that Johnny then receives convincing information that he has been the subject in 
an experiment. He receives information that the scientists conducting this experiment 
have implanted in him a belief-forming faculty that in various circumstances issues 
beliefs about certain objects in his vicinity and their qualities. However, it seems that 
the scientists did not design this faculty to produce accurate beliefs about objects like 
cars in the appropriate, ordinary conditions. Rather, they randomly chose the 
propositions that this faculty would prompt him to believe in certain circumstances 
from a list of some true and some false propositions about objects in his vicinity and 
their qualities.139 The information he receives also clearly and convincingly tells him 
                                              
138 I assume here that the facts about red blocks fall under facts about middle-sized objects 
and their qualities. And a bit further down below, I assume that facts about red cars also fall 
under facts about middle-sized objects and their qualities too.  
139 This example is a variation of a case presented by Locke (2014: p. 229).  
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that he has used this faculty in forming the belief about the car in the driveway – and 
it is also the case that he used this faculty to form the belief. 
Johnny has come to believe all of this about himself (or in any case, Johnny should 
come to believe all of this about himself given his evidence). After coming to believe 
all of this, it seems that Johnny loses his initial justification for believing that he has 
used a reliable way of arriving at beliefs about the object in front of him. Why? 
Because Johnny will have stopped believing (or should have stopped believing) that 
the facts about objects like blocks and cars are part of the explanatory history of the 
implanted faculty. This seems like a plausible diagnosis of what makes it the case that 
Johnny loses his initial justification for believing in the reliability of the relevant 
cognitive mechanism. This provides COGNITION DEFEAT with some intuitive 
plausibility.  
6.7 APPENDIX G: BEST EXPLANATION 
Here I would like to discuss the following question in a bit more detail: When should 
S withhold belief that the explanatory history of M involves X-facts?140 Here are two 
possible answers, which seem to suggest themselves: 
NO EXPLANATION. If there is no explanation available to S of her belief-
forming process M that involves (=presupposes, posits, implies or makes likely) 
the existence of X-facts, then S should withhold belief about the claim that the 
explanatory history of M involves X-facts.  
BEST EXPLANATION. If the best explanation available to S of her belief-
forming process M nowhere involves (=presupposes, posits, implies or makes 
likely) the existence of X-facts, then S should withhold belief about the claim that 
the explanatory history of M involves X-facts.  
NO EXPLANATION says that the lack of an explanation suffices to make it the case 
that S should withhold belief about the claim that the explanatory history of M 
involves X-facts. BEST EXPLANATION says that the availability141 of a certain best 
                                              
140 This is a question that Locke does not discuss in any detail.  
141 As McCain comments, there are a myriad of proposals for what the “availability” of an 
explanation amounts to (2016: p. 10). But it is clear that the notion of “availability” involved 
here needs to be a modest one to be plausible. Let us assume the following working 
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explanation suffices to make it the case that S should withhold belief about the claim 
that the explanatory history of M involves X-facts. What makes an explanation 
“best”? For an explanation to be the best available all that is required is that there is 
no equally good or better rival explanation available.142  
To get clearer about what that means, let’s look at how this applies to EDAs. In the 
context of EDAs, what we want to explain is why moral believers have the moral 
belief-forming faculty they do have and that they use to arrive at their moral beliefs. 
Now we have an explanation on the table that posits, implies, presupposes or makes 
likely the proposition that there are non-naturalistically construed moral truths or 
facts. This is a vindicating moral genealogy. But we also have an explanation on the 
table that does not involve (=posit, imply, presuppose or make likely) this 
proposition. This is the debunking moral genealogy. Two explanations are rivals with 
respect to a proposition if and only if (i) both explanations concern the same 
explanandum, but (ii) one explanation does not involve a certain proposition, while 
the other does, and (iii) it is also the case that not both explanations could be true. 
Therefore, the vindicating and the debunking moral genealogy are rivals.143 From the 
                                              
assumption of what the “availability” of an explanation comes down to, taken from McCain 
(2013: p. 303; 2016: p. 10).  
Assume that what we want to explain is why moral believers have the moral belief-forming 
faculty they do have. Let us say that the best explanation available to us involves the 
proposition that there are non-naturalistically construed moral truths or facts. This part of 
the explanation and the explanation itself are available to a moral believer if she has the 
concepts required to understand the proposition and if she is disposed to have a seeming 
that the proposition is part of the best answer to the question of why she forms moral beliefs 
in the way she does. According to one popular account, “seemings” are not themselves 
beliefs or inclinations to believe, but rather sui generis mental states with a propositional 
content and a distinct phenomenology (ibid.; cf. also Tucker 2013). To have the concepts 
required to understand a proposition and to see it as part of the best explanation one has, all 
that is required is that the believer has “the ability to understand the question ‘why do I have 
this?’ (where ‘this’ refers demonstratively to her evidence) and the ability to understand when 
something is the best answer to this question” (McCain 2013: p. 303).  
142 This point too is taken from McCain (2013; 2014; 2016). 
143 It is important to see that the standard responses are not vindicating explanations in this 
sense, although they do feature some sort of evolutionary explanation. The vindicating 
explanation we are looking for here is an evolutionary explanation of the development of 
our moral faculty that features non-naturalistically construed moral facts (and these facts are 
not superfluous to the explanation). It is an evolutionary explanation of why moral believers 
have the moral-belief forming mechanism they do have. The standard responses do not 
feature explanations of why moral believers have developed the moral faculty they do have. 
Rather, these accounts feature a story of how this faculty would come to be reliable (given 
that our moral beliefs are mostly true), even though the explanation of the development of 
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vantage point of the debunker, what matters than for satisfying BEST 
EXPLANATION is that there is no equally good or better explanation for why moral 
believers have the moral belief-forming faculty they do have that features the 
proposition that there are non-naturalistically construed moral truths or facts. 
Whether one explanation is better than another depends partly on which explanation 
is better supported by the available evidence, and on which one is more explanatorily 
virtuous, i.e. which explanation is more parsimonious, has more explanatory power 
etc.144 
BEST EXPLANATION also requires one further restriction. We can imagine cases 
where the best explanation available to S is still a very poor one. For BEST 
EXPLANATION to be plausible, the presence of an explanation with certain 
qualities in one case needs to make a tangible epistemic difference to the situation. It 
does not seem clear that the presence of an exceedingly poor explanation is sufficient 
to make that difference. Therefore, the kind of explanation we are looking for in 
BEST EXPLANATION needs to be both (i) sufficiently good, and (ii) it must be the 
case that there is no equally good or better rival explanation available.  
Now we need to settle on either NO EXPLANATION or BEST EXPLANATION. 
In one sense, NO EXPLANATION is a stronger demand than BEST 
EXPLANATION, as the former declares that the absence of an explanation is 
enough for it to be the case that S should withhold while the latter demands this only 
if an explanation with certain qualities is available to S. On the other hand, there is 
also a sense in which NO EXPLANATION is a weaker demand than BEST 
EXPLANATION. To neutralize the defeating potential of NO EXPLANATION it 
suffices if S comes into the possession of any appropriate explanation. However, to 
neutralize the defeating potential of BEST EXPLANATION, S needs to come into 
the possession of a better vindicating explanation.  
                                              
this faculty does not feature non-naturalistically construed moral facts. In other words: a 
vindicating explanation in the above sense explains why we have a reliable faculty for forming 
moral beliefs (rather than an unreliable moral faculty or no faculty at all) (Morton 2018: p. 
4). And the standard responses do not explain why we have some reliable moral faculty, but 
rather propose that evolution has imbued us with tendencies to form certain beliefs, and (as 
it happens) those beliefs are true (ibid.). 
144 And clearly, these two factors are not unrelated.  
142 
Now, this already points to a weakness of NO EXPLANATION. NO 
EXPLANATION declares that the following two cases have different epistemic 
consequences: 
(a). There is no explanation available to S of M that involves X-facts.  
(b). S has an explanation of M that involves X-facts, but it is a very poor 
explanation and S is aware of this or should be aware of this.  
NO EXPLANATION entails that S should withhold belief about the claim that the 
explanatory history of M involved X-facts in (a), while S in (b) (as far as NO 
EXPLANATION is concerned) is free to believe this claim. However, that is 
counterintuitive: if the relevant explanation is sufficiently poor, and if S is aware of 
this (or should be aware of this), then it seems the presence of such a poor explanation 
should not make a positive epistemic difference. In all cases that fit this general 
description, if it were true that S should withhold in (a), then S should withhold in (b) 
too.145 
To see this, consider the following pair of cases:  
(c). There is no explanation available to Johnny concerning his belief-forming 
mechanism that involves facts about middle-sized objects. Johnny is aware 
of this or should be aware of this. 
(d). There is an explanation available to Johnny concerning his belief-forming 
mechanism that involves facts about middle-sized objects, but it is a very 
poor explanation. Johnny is aware of this or should be aware of this.  
When we consider (c) and (d), I think it becomes plain that if it were true that Johnny 
should withhold belief in (c), then he should also withhold belief in (d).146 However, 
this result is not in line with NO EXPLANATION. This provides us with a reason 
to reject NO EXPLANATION.147 
                                              
145 Just to be clear: Since I argue that the debunker should opt for BEST EXPLANATION 
here, I do not argue that S should withhold belief in either (a) or (b). I am just trying to make 
explicit what I take to be a counter-intuitive consequence of NO EXPLANATION.  
146 Cases like these also motivate the above restriction of BEST EXPLANATION to 
explanations that are good enough.  
147 I do not regard this point as decisive: perhaps NO EXPLANATION could be amended 
to deal with cases like these, e.g. by introducing restrictions on the quality of the explanation 
that S needs to have available.  
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Nevertheless, let us also consider the choice between NO EXPLANATION and 
BEST EXPLANATION in the context of EDAs. Here it is rather clear that if you 
want to set up your evolutionary moral genealogy as an explanatory challenge, then 
you should opt for BEST EXPLANATION. The reason for this is simple: EDAs are 
built on the idea that the presence of empirical evidence on the evolution of human 
morality generates an undercutting defeater. But this empirical evidence plays no role 
in an explanatory challenge that proceeds via NO EXPLANATION. 
I have written above that EDAs are moral genealogies, turning specifically on the 
evolutionary origin of and influences on our moral beliefs. Every EDA deserving of 
its name will thus feature a non-superfluous empirical part in it, drawing on findings 
in recent scientific work on the evolution of human morality. When I say “non-
superfluous”, what I mean to say is that whether or not your debunking argument is 
sound should depend partly on whether this empirical story is true. If we opt for NO 
EXPLANATION, we construct a challenge that does not feature a non-superfluous 
empirical part at all. Since NO EXPLANATION only requires the absence of a 
relevant vindicating explanation, the presence of a debunking explanation drawing on 
what we know or have good reason to believe about the evolution of morality is 
superfluous to a challenge proceeding via this principle.148 
BEST EXPLANATION on the other hand, gives evolutionary considerations a real 
job to do: what the best explanation of our moral belief-forming faculty is, will to a 
considerable extent depend on which explanation is best supported by the empirical 
evidence, which will include evidence concerning the evolution of morality.149 
This point is highly relevant to the present debate of evolutionary debunking: several 
critics150 of EDAs have alleged that the empirical part of the arguments is actually 
redundant, as evolutionary objections collapse into non-empirical epistemological 
objections to NNMR, which makes the emphasis on the evolutionary influence on 
                                              
148 That means the presence of a debunking explanation drawing on what we know or have 
good reason to believe about the evolution of morality is not necessary to mount an 
explanatory challenge built on NO EXPLANATION. And I take it that part of what makes 
an argument an EDA is that it necessarily features an empirical component of this sort. 
149 This last point of course is reflected in and carried to its extreme by the idealizing 
assumptions in appendix C, and by assumptions (I-II) in section (1.4.5).  
150 Cf. e.g., Clarke-Doane 2012; Jonas 2016; Klenk 2016; Vavova 2014; White 2010.  
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morality in the presentation of EDAs grossly misleading. These critics have argued 
that at their heart, EDAs build on the claim that NNMR cannot explain how our 
moral beliefs ever non-accidentally land on the moral truth. This is said to be due to 
the fact that moral truths never cause our moral beliefs and our moral beliefs do not 
cause or constitute the moral truths. But since this fact is entailed by the metaphysical 
commitment of moral non-naturalism to the proposition that the moral truths are 
stance-independent and causally inert, the objection does not depend on the empirical 
findings of recent scientific work.  
The fact that is supposed to make epistemic trouble for the non-naturalist if we opt 
for NO EXPLANATION is that the moral believer lacks an account of how moral 
facts figure in the explanation of her moral faculty. However, you might think that 
this fact arises simply from reflection on the metaphysical commitments of non-
naturalism (cf. Crow 2016: p. 380). Hence opting for NO EXPLANATION does not 
seem to be a viable option for the evolutionary debunker. 
EDAs hold that the relevant fact that make epistemic trouble for NNMR is crucially 
connected to the facts about the evolutionary origin of our moral beliefs. In particular, 
(most) EDAs claim that it is the way that natural selection has causally affected our 
moral beliefs that creates an epistemic problem. Since the nature of this impact is an 
empirical matter, the evolutionary objection includes an empirical hypothesis that 
specifies the nature of this evolutionary influence on our moral beliefs. Therefore, an 
EDA qua being an EDA must feature a (non-superfluous) empirical part. Since BEST 
EXPLANATION makes empirical considerations a non-superfluous part of the 
argument, and since BEST EXPLANATION seems independently more plausible 
than NO EXPLANATION, I opt for BEST EXPLANATION over NO 
EXPLANATION in constructing the generic EDA.  
Before we proceed, we should also briefly stop to think about whether BEST 
EXPLANATION is independently plausible. I think it is. If the best explanation 
available to Johnny concerning his belief-forming mechanism nowhere presupposes, 
posits, implies or makes likely the existence of facts about middle-sized objects, then 
Johnny should withhold belief about the claim that the explanatory history of this 
belief-forming mechanism involves facts about middle-sized objects. This strikes me 
as highly plausible.  
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6.8 APPENDIX H: INDEPENDENCE CONSTRAINT 
To motivate the INDEPENDENCE CONSTRAINT, consider the following case, 
again taken from Locke (2014: p. 229), although I have amended it a bit:  
CAMMIE’S SPORTS BELIEFS. Cammie has lots of beliefs about various 
sports. However, she did not arrive at those beliefs in any of the usual ways 
(watching television, reading books, browsing the internet, asking friends etc.). 
Rather, a mad scientist designed and implemented in her a belief-forming faculty 
(call this her “sports-faculty”) that in various circumstances issues beliefs about 
sports. Moreover, when the scientist was putting this faculty in place, he randomly 
chose the propositions that this faculty would prompt her to believe in certain 
circumstances from a list of some true and some false propositions about sports. 
Cammie has come to justifiably believe all of this about herself. However, 
Cammie’s epistemic guardian angel now comes to the rescue: the angel provides 
Cammie with a divine sports almanac, that contains all truths about sports. By 
reading the sports almanac, Cammie has discovered that all the sports 
propositions that the scientist randomly chose for her to believe happen to be 
true. Her epistemic guardian angel, whom Cammie justifiably believes to be well 
meaning, incapable of lying or deceiving and omniscient, assures her that her 
sports-faculty will continue to produce exclusively true beliefs about sports.  
In this case, Cammie can see that the facts that explain her sports faculty were such 
that they shaped her faculty to be reliable even though the explanatory history of her 
faculty does not involve facts about sports (cf. ibid.). This is the case, since Cammie 
can see that once the scientists happened to select only true propositions, and once 
the guardian angel gives Cammie her assurance, it was guaranteed that Cammie would 
come to have a faculty that would reliably produce accurate beliefs about sports (cf. 
ibid.). In that case, it seems that Cammie remains justified in relying on her sports 
faculty, despite the fact that she believes that the explanatory history of this faculty 
involves no sports facts (ibid.) This is the case, because Cammie has means 
independent from her sports faculty to assure herself of the reliability of this faculty 
(via the guardian angel, the divine sports almanac and via the cognitive faculties that 
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she uses to take in and store the information contained in the almanac and provided 
by the angel’s testimony).  
The INDEPENDENCE CONSTRAINT can also be further motivated in the 
following way. Let’s say there is no epistemic guardian angel and no sports almanac. 
Let’s stipulate that Cammie has no way of assuring herself of the reliability of her 
sports faculty that is independent of this same faculty. In that case, and if Cammie 
should still believe that the explanatory history of her sports faculty does not involve 
sports facts, it seems impermissible for Cammie to believe in the reliability of her 
sports faculty.  
The demand for independent confirmation posited by the INDEPENDENCE 
CONSTRAINT does not appear to be unreasonably demanding since it only arises 
in cases where we already have some reason to doubt the reliability of the belief-
forming mechanism in question. It does not touch the justification of the ordinary 
believer who is not confronted with a potentially defeating explanation of M. It only 
arises in cases where we should withhold belief in the claim that the explanatory 
history of M involves X-facts. Moreover, it appears that this demand is not 
unreasonably demanding for the further reason that when it arises, it can at least 
sometimes be met. Cammie can use other cognitive mechanisms of hers to find out 
whether her sports faculty produces accurate beliefs about sports.  
And the same thing seems true in more ordinary cases. Let’s imagine that after 
running through some tests, Larissa is told by her optometrist that her colour vision 
might be deceiving her. The tests indicate that Larissa is red-green colour blind. Since 
people with red-green colour blindness struggle with discriminating red and green 
hues, after receiving this information, it is plausible that Larissa is no longer permitted 
to think of herself as reliable in e.g., judging (on the basis of her vision alone, and 
from a certain distance) that there are no wild strawberries growing on that meadow. 
What’s more, she cannot regain this permission by reasoning: 
But I see no strawberries on that meadow. So, there are no strawberries on that 
meadow. So, my colour vision is reliable. 
This is a clearly fishy response. On the other hand, if Larissa can repeatedly and 
independently confirm that her colour vision gives her the right results through e.g., 
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testimony, then she might be able to regain this permission after all. Therefore, I 
conclude that the INDEPENDENCE CONSTRAINT looks like a plausible 
demand.  
6.9 APPENDIX I: THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL UNDERPINNING OF THE 
GENERIC EDA REVISITED 
Here’s a succinct, abstract statement of the epistemological story, which undergirds 
the generic EDA. For a subject S, a belief-forming mechanism M that forms belief 
involving the concept X, a belief that p formed via M involving the concept X, and 
with “X-facts” referring to the facts involving the object/property/relation/kind/etc. 
picked out by X: 
(i) The best explanation available to S for her belief-forming mechanism M 
nowhere involves (=presupposes, posits, implies or makes likely) the existence 
of X-facts. 
(ii) If the best explanation available to S nowhere involves the existence of X-
facts, then S should withhold belief about the claim that the explanatory 
history of M involves X-facts.  
(iii) Therefore, S should withhold belief about the claim that the explanatory 
history of M involves X-facts. 
(iv) If S should withhold belief about the claim that the explanatory history of M 
involves X-facts, then it is epistemically permissible for S to believe that M is 
reliable only if her belief is based on a source for justification independent of 
M.  
(v) It is epistemically permissible for S to believe that M is reliable only if her belief 
is based on a source for justification independent of M.  
(vi) S’s belief that M is reliable is not based on a source for justification 
independent of M. 
(vii) It is not epistemically permissible for S to believe that M is reliable.  
(viii) If it is not epistemically permissible for S to believe that M is reliable, S should 
withhold or disbelieve that M is reliable.  
(ix) S should withhold or disbelieve that M is reliable.  
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(x) If S is justified in believing that p via M then it is not the case that S should 
withhold or disbelieve that M is reliable. 
(xi) S is unjustified in believing that p via M.  
Is it a plausible story? In constructing this story, I have tried to lend some motivation 
to every step we have taken along our way. I hope this suffices to lend this account 
some independent plausibility. Nevertheless, we can probe a bit deeper by asking two 
further questions: 
(i) What about the compatibility of this story with contemporary epistemology?  
(ii) What distinguishes the challenge generated by this story from global sceptical 
challenges?  
Let’s tackle (i) first. Even if the above story is initially plausible, it would clearly not 
bear well for the story’s overall plausibility if it were not compatible with at least 
significant parts of contemporary epistemology. Let’s see how things stand with 
regards to this. 
As I have noted, NO DEFEATER is widely endorsed, and what’s more, 
epistemologists who otherwise disagree a lot with each other endorse it (or versions 
of it) (cf. Moon 2018: p. 270). The collection of principles BEST EXPLANATION, 
COGNITION DEFEAT and the INDEPENDENCE CONSTRAINT taken 
together do not strike me as posing a demand that is not or could not be 
accommodated by at least many respectable epistemological theories. All that is 
needed to accommodate this collection of principles is to agree with the following: 
the availability of a certain kind of explanation makes a difference to whether a subject 
can continue to believe in the reliability of a cognitive mechanism of hers without 
having to confirm its reliability independently. 
Versions of externalism and internalism about epistemic justification might very well 
have the room to accommodate this thought. In the next few paragraphs, I will try to 
give some reason to think that the previous sentence is true. Since it goes beyond the 
scope of this appendix (or even this thesis) to go through every, most or even many 
versions of externalism and internalism, I will instead proceed in a rather eclectic 
manner. I will briefly sketch out why the availability of a certain explanation might 
well make an epistemically relevant difference on one popular version of each of 
externalism and internalism respectively.  
149 
As I have said in appendix A, I take it that internalists about epistemic justification 
assert that the potential knowability through reflection of at least some essential part 
of the justifier for S’s belief that p is necessary for S’s belief that p to be justified. 
Externalists deny that this is necessary for epistemic justification.  
Now, externalists about epistemic justification, who accept a version of NO 
DEFEATER, usually build “no-defeater”-conditions into their accounts of epistemic 
justification. Take e.g., Michael Bergmann’s (2006: p. 135) account: 
BERGMANN’S PROPER FUNCTIONALISM. S’s belief that p is justified if 
and only if (i) S does not take the belief that p to be defeated and (ii) the cognitive 
faculties producing the belief are (a) functioning properly, (b) truth-aimed and (c) 
reliable in the environments for which they were “designed”.151  
What’s important for us here is that Bergmann’s account seems compatible with 
BEST EXPLANATION, COGNITION DEFEAT and the INDEPENDENCE 
CONSTRAINT. If S receives information that the best explanation of M available to 
S does not involve the relevant facts, this plausibly provides her with a prima facie 
reason to think that the cognitive faculty M that produces the relevant belief is not 
truth-aimed. Now assume that M is despite this in fact a properly functioning, truth-
aimed faculty, that works reliably in the right environment. So, the information that 
                                              
151 As Mogensen (2014: p. 8) points out, within the context of the debate on evolutionary 
debunking, there also looms another possibility for utilizing Bergmann’s account. According 
to Bergmann’s account, a belief is justified only if it is the product of a cognitive faculty 
whose function it is to produce true beliefs in the appropriate environment. On one 
prominent naturalistic account of function, to which Bergmann points to, “the function of 
a trait is to produce whatever effect has led to selection for that trait within the organism’s 
[i.e., the organism that is the bearer of that trait] evolutionary history” (ibid.; cf. e.g., Milikan 
1984 & 1989). Assuming “proper functionalism”, and this “selected effect”-account of 
function, one might then argue that “our moral beliefs are not justified simply because human 
moral psychology has not been shaped by selection for accuracy” (Mogensen 2014: p.8).  
Framed this way, this seems to be an argument for the claim that evolutionary science shows 
that our moral beliefs are unjustified and never were justified to begin with. And this is quite 
different from a challenge framed in terms of epistemic defeat, where it is assumed that our 
beliefs were initially justified, and where incoming information is said to affect our initial 
justification via changing what we believe or should believe (cf. ibid.).  
However, we might reframe this challenge in terms of defeat. First, our reasoning could start 
with e.g. an appeal to modesty: even if the empirical hypothesis involved in our EDA is very 
well supported, we should perhaps still not fully commit ourselves to the claim that 
evolutionary science simply shows our moral beliefs to never have been justified. Instead we 
could adopt the view that given the currently best explanation of our moral faculty, we should 
take it that we are no longer entitled to our moral beliefs.  
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makes it the case that the best explanation of M available to S does not involve the 
relevant facts is misleading in this respect. Nonetheless, given everything that S believes 
or should believe, it seems that receiving this information then plausibly furnishes S 
with a doxastic or normative undercutting defeater for her belief that p produced via 
M, at least in the absence of independent means for S to confirm the reliability of M. 
Since it seems that evidence of unreliability can be defeating, even if it is misleading, 
it also seems that a satisfying externalist account of justification should have room for 
accommodating this thought.152  
The “no defeater”- condition that Bergmann builds into his account, and his 
commitment to a picture of defeat, which is basically in line with NO DEFEATER, 
should enable his brand of Proper Functionalism to accommodate this thought. The 
INDEPENDENCE CONSTRAINT then formulates a plausible constraint on what 
it takes for S to be in a position to reinstate her justification. S needs to have a way of 
independently confirming that M is after all reliable. If S can confirm this, then S has 
reason to think that M is truth-aimed after all. And this neutralizes the defeating force 
of the best explanation for M via giving S reason to think that M is truth-aimed.  
I thus conclude that the above triplet of principles seems compatible with Bergmann’s 
account of epistemic justification. On this account, the availability of a certain kind 
of explanation makes the appropriate epistemic difference via calling into doubt 
whether S’s cognitive faculty is truth-aimed, and by so (potentially) generating an 
undercutting defeater for S’s belief that p.  
Now, this result seems to have a general applicability beyond Bergmann’s account. If 
S finds out that the best explanation of M does not involve the relevant facts, this 
plausibly provides her with a prima facie reason to think that the cognitive faculty M 
that produces the relevant belief is not truth-aimed. Moreover, it’s eminently plausible 
that having a prima facie reason to think that M is not aimed at the truth in producing 
beliefs should be of epistemic consequence for S. This result (= receiving information 
that gives S a reason to think that M is not truth-aimed is of epistemic consequence) 
is likely to be in line with versions of externalism beyond Bergmann’s. Furthermore, 
it is also a result that seems to be in line with many versions of internalism.  
                                              
152 Cf. Goldman (1979). 
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Take for instance Michael Huemer’s Phenomenal Conservativism, which very roughly 
holds:  
PHENOMENAL CONSERVATIVISM. If it seems to S that p, then, in the 
absence of defeaters, S thereby has (at least some) justification for believing that 
p. (Huemer 2007: p. 30; cf. also Huemer 2006: pp. 148-149; Huemer 2005: Ch. 5 
& 2014).153 
What matters for our purposes here is that for a seeming to justify S in believing that 
p, it must not be the case that given her background beliefs, S believes that there’s no 
appropriate relationship between the fact that p and S’s seeming that p (cf. McCain 
2016: p. 12). Let’s say that the best explanation available to S for why S has the 
seeming that p nowhere involves the fact that p. Again, it seems plausible to say that 
receiving this information is apt to give S a reason to think that there is no appropriate 
relationship between the fact that p and S’s seeming that p. Let’s say there is no better 
explanation for why it seems to S that p that does involve the fact that p. Absent other 
means to show that S’s seeming that p indeed does stand in an appropriate 
relationship with the fact that p, it very much appears that S loses her justification to 
                                              
153 “Seeming” states, understood in a broad sense, include perceptual, intellectual, memory, 
and introspective appearances (Huemer 2014: section 1a.). According to Phenomenal 
Conservativism, justification is grounded in the way things appear or seem to the subject 
(McCain 2016: p. 2). As Huemer writes:  
“[Phenomenal Conservativism]… fits with an internalistic form of foundationalism—that is, 
the view that some beliefs are justified non-inferentially (not on the basis of other beliefs), 
and that the justification or lack of justification for a belief depends entirely upon the 
believer’s internal mental states. The intuitive idea is that it makes sense to assume that things 
are the way they seem, unless and until one has reasons for doubting this.” (Huemer 2014: 
introduction).  
“Seemings” are not themselves beliefs or inclinations to believe, but rather sui generis mental 
states with a propositional content and a distinct phenomenology, that can confer (non-
inferential) justification upon beliefs, and there are a number of competing accounts of 
seeming states (cf. Tucker 2013).  
Huemer’s version of moral intuitionism is also tied up with his version of Phenomenal 
Conservativism. As Huemer uses the term, “intuitions” are intellectual seemings, that can (in 
the absence of defeaters) confer non-inferential justification on beliefs. Although moral 
intuitions on this account are epistemically significant, in that they can provide non-
inferential justification for our moral beliefs (in the absence of defeaters), Huemer’s version 
of intuitionism eschews any allegiance to some of the more controversial commitments of 
more traditional versions of moral intuitionism, such as “claims to direct insight, 
indefeasibility, certainty and infallibility” (Hermann 2017: p. 830). Note also that Huemer’s 
moral intuitionism contrasts with other recent versions of this view, which hold that 
“intuitions” are (roughly) non-inferentially justified beliefs (Audi 2004; Shafer-Landau 2008).  
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believe that p because it seems to her that p. So, with a few minor alterations, it seems 
that our triplet of principles could be accommodated by a major version of epistemic 
internalism as well.154 
Sketchy as these remarks may be, I hope they nonetheless achieve the purpose of 
providing you with some reason to think that the above story is an account worth 
taking epistemologically seriously. The principles invoked in this story seem to be 
independently plausible and compatible with a couple of the major epistemological 
theories on epistemic justification.  
Now, let’s tackle (ii): in the context of both the debate about evolutionary debunking 
(cf. Berker 2014; Vavova 2014 & 2015) and in epistemology more generally, epistemic 
principles are often criticized for entailing global scepticism. This is one of the most 
popular ways for casting suspicion on any given epistemic principle.  
Does this charge have any bite against the collection of principles involved in our 
epistemological story, which taken together formulate an explanatory constraint on 
                                              
154 Since the epistemological story presented here rests on claims about the epistemic 
relevance of explanations, and since a recent form of internalism puts explanations centre 
stage, you may wonder about the connection between the two. Kevin McCain’s (2013; 2014; 
2016) explanationist evidentialism very roughly holds that your belief is justified just in case your 
belief ‘‘fits’’ the evidence, where a belief, p, fits the evidence, e, at time t, just in case ‘‘p is 
part of the best explanation available to S at t for why S has e’’ (McCain 2014: p. 63). I have 
obviously drawn a lot on McCain’s exposition and defence of the view, which is attested by 
the many times I have quoted him while developing the story above.  
Now, the explanatory constraints featured in the epistemological story above are certainly a 
lot weaker and more indirect than the claims that explanationist evidentialism makes about 
the connection between justification and explanation. Explanationist evidentialism defines 
justification in terms of the best available explanation. All that is needed for our above 
account is the following: the availability of a certain kind of explanation makes a difference 
to whether a subject can continue to believe in the reliability of a cognitive mechanism of 
hers without having to confirm its reliability independently. To think that the presence of a 
certain kind of explanation is one of the things that can give rise to a need for independent 
confirmation of your reliability on a subject matter, you do not need to endorse 
explanationist evidentialism.  
On the other hand, if explanationist evidentialism is true, then you can develop a way more 
straightforward version of the story above. Here’s a rough sketch of this version:  
(i). S is justified to believe that p at time t if and only if p is part of the best explanation 
available to S at t for why S has her total evidence e.  
(ii). p is not part of the best explanation available to S at t for why S has e.  
(iii). Therefore, S is not justified to believe that p at t.  
This version of the story resembles the core idea behind Lutz’s EDA (2017).  
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which claims we can believe with justification (i.e., BEST EXPLANATION; 
COGNITION DEFEAT; INDEPENDENCE CONSTRAINT)? 
I have already noted above that the account we are considering is distinct from global 
sceptical challenges in allowing for a default entitlement to the belief that our 
cognitive mechanisms are reliable. Global sceptical challenges usually invoke 
constraints on justification that aim to establish the point that we never were or are 
justified to believe any claim at all. 
Furthermore, in contrast to sceptical challenges, where it is hard to see how we could 
ever be in a position to exclude the scenarios, which motivate these doubts (e.g., we 
cannot know that we are not radically deceived), there are straightforward ways in 
which challenges built on the above story can be met:  
(a). Turn the debunking explanation into a vindicating explanation. That is to 
show how X-facts are after all involved in the supposedly debunking 
explanation of M. 
(b). Present an equally good or better vindicating explanation. That is to show that 
there is an equally good or better explanation available to S for M that does 
involve X-facts.  
(c). Show that although the explanatory history of M does not involve X-facts, this 
is no reason for concern, as S has M-independent means of showing that M is 
reliable.  
If you can do any of (a)-(c), then as far as the above story is concerned, no 
(undefeated) defeater for S’s belief that p has been generated. As has been noted in 
the literature on the epistemology of scepticism many times, it is characteristic of 
global sceptical challenges that we lack any clear idea of how we could ever be in a 
position to exclude the possibility that we are in a scenario that gives rise to these 
kinds of all-encompassing doubts (cf. Klein 2015: section 1). How can you e.g., show 
that you are not deceived about everything by a Cartesian demon, or that you are not 
a brain-in-a-vat?155  
                                              
155 Of course, some philosophers have tried to argue that you can show that you are not in 
a sceptical scenario. Moore (1939) is the classic example here. But then again, following 
Wittgenstein (1969) a substantial part of the literature on scepticism has been dedicated to 
showing what is wrong with Moore’s response.  
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On a related note, one could also argue that the above story does not lend any support 
to a globally sceptical position since the sceptic’s case for the claim that the best 
explanation available to us for all our belief-forming mechanisms does not involve 
the relevant facts has not been sufficiently supported by anyone.156  
A further point worth emphasizing is that while empirical facts and claims can make 
a difference to what the best explanation for a belief-forming faculty of ours is, this 
point does not seem to have a place in the argument of the global sceptic. It is not 
the case that the global sceptic has good empirical evidence that we are deceived on 
a large scale and that this gives rise to sceptical doubts. It is rather the claim that we 
cannot exclude the possibility that we are so deceived that gives rise to these doubts. 
For example, the sceptic does not present you with experimental data, which suggests 
that despite what you think you perceive, you may not actually have hands. It follows 
that if we have reason to think that for a given application of the above 
epistemological story, the argument that builds on this story features an empirical 
component that is not superfluous to its soundness, then we have reason to think that 
this argument is not a globally sceptical one.  
Therefore, I conclude that the above story not only has some independent initial 
plausibility, but also gains further support from the observation that (i) it is compatible 
with major epistemological theories of epistemic justification on both sides of the 
externalism/internalism divide, and (ii) it is clearly distinct from globally sceptical 
challenges. 
  
                                              
156 This point is inspired by McCain (2014: p. 131), who advertises explanationist 
evidentialism for its anti-sceptical capabilities. Here McCain assesses the hypothesis of 
external world-scepticism in comparison with a common-sense hypothesis and asks which 
of the two would be the better explanation available to an ordinary person for the total 
evidence in her possession. He proceeds by evaluating the two hypotheses with respect to a 
number of explanatory virtues. In the end, he concludes that while it is not clear that the 
common-sense hypothesis scores higher with respect to every explanatory virtue he 
proposes, it is nonetheless reasonable to conclude that it is overall better. 
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